Volltext herunterladen
(273.9 KB)
Zitationshinweis
Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-264055
Export für Ihre Literaturverwaltung
A signaling model of environmental overcompliance
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract We present a theory of unilateral regulatory overcompliance as a signaling device. Firms that have a competitive advantage in the use of a cleaner but more costly technology overcomply in order to signal to an imperfectly informed, benevolent government that compliance costs are low, thereby trigger... mehr
We present a theory of unilateral regulatory overcompliance as a signaling device. Firms that have a competitive advantage in the use of a cleaner but more costly technology overcomply in order to signal to an imperfectly informed, benevolent government that compliance costs are low, thereby triggering tougher regulation. We identify the conditions under which such an overcompliance signaling equilibrium arises, showing that there may be over-overcompliance in that firms may overcomply even when tougher regulation is not socially desirable. We also discuss the differential implications of the signaling theory as compared to other theories of unilateral regulatory overcompliance.... weniger
Klassifikation
Volkswirtschaftslehre
Wirtschaftspolitik
Freie Schlagwörter
Voluntary actions; Overcompliance; Signaling; Regulation; Raising rivals' costs; D43; D82; L51
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2008
Seitenangabe
S. 293-303
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68 (2008) 1
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.04.009
Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)