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Does R&D cooperation facilitate price collusion? An experiment
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract We examine in a laboratory experiment whether R&D cooperation facilitates tacit price collusion. For two scenarios of technological spillovers, a baseline treatment without binding contract possibilities and a contract treatment where it is possible to credibly commit to an R&D contract, are run. We... mehr
We examine in a laboratory experiment whether R&D cooperation facilitates tacit price collusion. For two scenarios of technological spillovers, a baseline treatment without binding contract possibilities and a contract treatment where it is possible to credibly commit to an R&D contract, are run. We find that the degree of price collusion in the contract treatments is significantly higher in periods where R&D contracts are made than in periods without contracts, and than in the baseline treatments.... weniger
Thesaurusschlagwörter
Kooperation; Kartell; Laborexperiment; Forschung und Entwicklung
Klassifikation
Forschung, Forschungsorganisation
Methode
Theoriebildung
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2008
Seitenangabe
S. 822-836
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 66 (2008) 3-4
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2007.01.002
Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)