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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Gill, P., & Phythian, M. (2012). Intelligence Studies: some thoughts on the state of the art. *Annals of the University of Bucharest / Political science series*, 14(1), 5-17. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-389493>

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INTELLIGENCE STUDIES: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE STATE OF THE ART¹

PETER GILL, MARK PHYTHIAN

Abstract

The paper is not intended to be a comprehensive review of the field of Intelligence Studies but summarises the major currents in research in this area, in the last twenty years. In addition, it suggests directions for future research concluding that Intelligence Studies represents a healthy and growing activity of great relevance to contemporary security governance. There are identified a few challenges for the development of the domain, mainly the fact that Anglo-American authors and subject matter continue to dominate the literature, and the fact that the relations between the academic institutions and intelligence agencies, the civil-military relations, have not always been easy.

Keywords: Intelligence studies, intelligence services, academia, security governance, academic intelligence

It is twenty years since Wesley Wark reflected on the state of Intelligence Studies (IS) in his introduction to a special issue of *Intelligence and National Security* that was based on papers delivered at a conference in Toronto in 1991. Wark identified eight approaches to the study of intelligence: the research project; the historical project; the definitional project; the methodological project (applying social science concepts to intelligence); memoirs; the civil liberties project; investigative journalism; and the popular culture project.² Since then, we have seen steadily, at times rapidly, growing interest in and discussion of intelligence matters that has been driven not only by the pressure of events but also by greater academic research and increased teaching of relevant subjects. As we shall see, the term 'Intelligence Studies' is used advisedly since all those who have commented on its development agree that the field is multi- if not inter-disciplinary. This may reflect the relative youth of the field – until 1990 people outside the US will only have talked of 'intelligence history' – but it is also a strength. Many academic disciplines now

¹ This article is adapted from the 'Introduction' to the second edition of our *Intelligence in an Insecure World* (Cambridge: Polity, 2012).

² Wesley K. Wark, 'Introduction: the Study of Espionage: Past Present, Future?' *Intelligence and National Security* 8, 3 (1993), pp. 1-13.

contribute to IS by bringing their disciplinary concepts and methods to the party and this is important in demystifying the study of intelligence. In its early days writing was dominated by ex-practitioners and the impression given was that intelligence was a unique human activity. But intelligence is, at heart, an organisational activity and, with its special features such as secrecy, can be studied as such.

This survey is not intended to be a comprehensive review of the field but summarises what seem to us to be the major currents in research and, in so doing, suggests directions for future research. The recent growth is reflected in a number of interesting articles examining the state of IS in various countries/languages. Drawing on Wark, Scott,³ Kahn,⁴ Rudner,⁵ Denécé and Arboit,⁶ and Matey,⁷ we identify four main areas of work: research/historical; definitional/methodological; organisational/functional; and governance/policy. The **research/historical** project continues to be dominant, at least outside the US, where the IS community has always been larger and more diverse. In the UK what has sometimes been described as the ‘British school’ of IS reflects not just the strength of the British community of historians but also that the two twentieth century world wars provided much of the original raw material; the strength of official secrecy ensured little on peacetime intelligence emerged before the 1990s and made the study of contemporary intelligence developments almost impossible. Academic writings based in part on released archives⁸ were supplemented by ‘insider’ accounts and memoirs of former practitioners,⁹ official histories,¹⁰ ‘usually reliable sources’ in which intelligence officers found willing journalists and writers such as Chapman Pincher and ‘Nigel West’ to make their views public,¹¹ and more critical accounts from writers such as Stephen Dorril.¹² Since the ‘open government’ initiative

³ Len Scott, ‘Sources and Methods in the Study of Intelligence: a British view’, *Intelligence and National Security* 22, 2 (2007), pp. 185-205.

⁴ David Kahn, ‘Intelligence Studies on the Continent,’ *Intelligence and National Security* 23, 2 (2008), pp. 249-75.

⁵ Martin Rudner, ‘Intelligence Studies in Higher Education: Capacity-Building to Meet Societal Demand,’ *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 22, 1 (2009), pp. 110-30.

⁶ Eric Denécé, Gérald Arboit, ‘Intelligence Studies in France,’ *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 23, 4 (2010), pp. 725-47.

⁷ Gustavo Díaz Matey, ‘The Development of Intelligence Studies in Spain,’ *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 23, 4 (2010), pp. 748-65.

⁸ For example, Christopher Andrew, *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community*, London, Heinemann, 1985.

⁹ For example, Percy Sillitoe, *Cloak without Dagger*, London, Pan Books, 1956.

¹⁰ Five volumes of an official history of *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, authored mainly by F. H. Hinsley, were published: volumes 1-3 concerned the influence of intelligence on strategy and operations; vol. 4, security and counterintelligence; vol. 5 strategic deception.

¹¹ For example, Chapman Pincher, *Their Trade is Treachery*, London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1981; Nigel West, *A Matter of Trust: MI5 1945-72*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982.

¹² Stephen Dorril, *The Silent Conspiracy: Inside the Intelligence Services in the 1990s*, London, Heinemann, 1993.

launched by Prime Minister John Major's administration in the early 1990s started to bear fruit, releases of files from the National Archives have accelerated, at least from MI5 and GCHQ, if not MI6.¹³ There has been much more academic work, for example, by former intelligence official Michael Herman,¹⁴ Richard Aldrich on UK/US co-operation in the Cold War¹⁵ and GCHQ,¹⁶ Phil Davies on MI6¹⁷ and whistleblower contributions.¹⁸ To celebrate their one hundredth anniversaries in 2009, both MI5 and MI6 commissioned official histories,¹⁹ with all the potential and limitations that official sanction implies.²⁰ In some cases unofficial histories based on 'liberated' archives have been written, for example, the collaboration between Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin on KGB material.²¹ A further trove of information appears in the evidence to and reports of inquiries into intelligence failures on Iraq, especially Butler, Hutton and Chilcot,²² and the second Intelligence and Security Committee report into the July 7 2005 bombings in London.²³

¹³ Stephen Twigge, Graham Macklin, *British Intelligence: Secrets, Spies and Sources*, London, The National Archives, 2008.

¹⁴ Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War; Intelligence Services in the Information Age*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

¹⁵ Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence*, London, John Murray, 2001.

¹⁶ Richard J. Aldrich, *GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency*, London, HarperPress, 2010.

¹⁷ Philip H. J. Davies, *MI6 and the Machinery of Spying*. London, Frank Cass, 2004.

¹⁸ For example, Annie Machon, 2005, "Spies, Lies and Whistleblowers", Lewes, *The Book Guild*, 2005; Richard Tomlinson, *The Big Breach: from Top Secret to Maximum Security*, Edinburgh, Cutting Edge, 2001.

¹⁹ Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5*, London, Allen Lane, 2009; Keith Jeffery, *MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949* London, Bloomsbury, 2010.

²⁰ As John le Carré wrote: "When a secret service professes a new openness, we do well to count our silver. When it appoints its own trusted writer and feeds him selected top-secret documents that would land the less favoured in gaol, we have every right to be sceptical, as the recent "official histories" of MI5 and MI6 demonstrate all too clearly." John le Carré, 'Agent Zigzag', *The Times*, March 5, 2011.

²¹ Christopher Andrew, Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West*, London, Allen Lane/Penguin, 1999; *The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World*, London, Allen Lane/Penguin, 2005.

²² Lord Butler, *Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction*, HC898, London, TSO, 2004, <http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf>; Lord Hutton, *Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr. David Kelly*, 2004, <http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/> accessed January 31, 2012; The Chilcott Inquiry is due to report in 2012.

²³ Intelligence and Security Committee, *Could 7/7 Have been Prevented?* Cm 7617, London, TSO, 2009; http://7julyinquests.independent.gov.uk/hearing_transcripts/index.htm, accessed 10 August 2011.

Until 20 years ago there were only memoirs and journalistic writings on French intelligence.²⁴ Until the 1990s even academic writing tended to be by foreigners, though since the mid-1990s academic output of history and other research subjects has increased.²⁵ David Kahn talks of a re-birth of French intelligence literature in the past decade, mainly regarding the Cold War and facilitated by new archive releases²⁶ but Eric Denécé and Gérald Arboit observe that IS is only in its infancy in France. Intelligence in France has been mistrusted since the Dreyfus affair, and academics have approached it in a fragmentary fashion. They note the lack of a French intelligence culture and that, very differently from the UK; it is seen primarily as a domestic phenomenon – the problem of the ‘enemy within’.²⁷

The German intelligence literature is less extensive than the Francophone and is also primarily historical.²⁸ The International Intelligence History group meets mainly in Germany and has published the *Journal of Intelligence History* since 2001.²⁹ Kahn notes the creation after re-unification of the office for the administration of the Stasi archives, known as Gauck-Behörde, with many volumes published and which provides access to personal files for victims/families.³⁰ Gustavo Matey’s discussion of IS in Spain is more normative in tone but notes a similar increase in interest since the end of the Cold War. Earlier intelligence studies were dominated by history and military studies, reinforced by books on intelligence scandals in the 1980s and 1990s. Matey suggests there are four main broad approaches to IS in Spain: the historical-military approach, the journalistic approach, the economic, and the international relations/political science (including philosophy and law).³¹

Of course, the largest community of intelligence scholars is in the US but, whereas in most countries historical research dominates, in the US it has been complemented by other concerns. Although the study of intelligence everywhere is hindered by the ubiquity of secrecy, as Jim Wirtz notes, compared to elsewhere, Americans are remarkably open about discussing intelligence processes.³² He suggests this ‘culture of openness’ derives from a number of factors: the tradition of official post mortems into intelligence failures – there have been ten official inquiries into Pearl Harbour;

²⁴ For example, Richard Deacon, *The French Secret Service*, London, Grafton, 1990.

²⁵ For example, Douglas Porch, *The French Secret Services: From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War*, London: Macmillan, 1995.

²⁶ Kahn, ‘Intelligence Studies on the Continent’, *cit.*, pp. 249-62.

²⁷ Denécé & Arboit, ‘Intelligence Studies in France.’

²⁸ Kahn, ‘Intelligence Studies on the Continent’, *cit.*, pp. 262-71.

²⁹ www.intelligence-history.org/

³⁰ http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Home/home_node.html accessed September 18, 2011.

³¹ Matey, ‘The Development of Intelligence Studies in Spain’, *cit.*

³² James J. Wirtz, ‘The American approach to Intelligence Studies’, in Loch Johnson (ed.), *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*, Abingdon, Routledge, 2007, pp. 28-38.

investigations into intelligence ‘scandals’, such as those during 1975-76 into CIA and FBI operations and in the 1980s into the Iran-Contra affair; official use of classified information to justify policy – most recently and infamously, Colin Powell’s highly misleading presentation on Iraq to the UN Security Council in February 2003; serial commissions and inquiries into how to ‘fix’ the US intelligence community; and leaks, of which the recent *Wikileaks* case was on an especially massive scale.

Martin Rudner notes that out of 1800 research chairs in Canadian universities, there is not one in IS.³³ Nevertheless, in many respects the scholarly and research community in Canada is better developed than in any other country outside the U.S. This can be seen in the very active Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) whose annual conference exceeds in size and interest anything that could be currently organized in Europe. There have been similar motivations for historical research as in US, including investigation of scandals – McDonald³⁴ and O’Connor³⁵ – edited work on historical archives such as those on *RCMP Security Bulletins* by Greg Kealey and Reg Whitaker³⁶ and Wesley Wark’s official history of the community – long completed but as yet unpublished because of opposition from one of the agencies.

∴ Reflecting the youth of the field, the **definitional/methodological** project is very alive and definitional debates are still taking place.³⁷ While overly pedantic to some, these matter to the extent that they seek to clarify what is to be studied and why. For example, one key question is whether ‘intelligence’ should be defined purely as an information or knowledge process or whether it is also a power process involving policy and action. We take the latter view because the very act of gathering information can affect others and, if the intended object of intelligence is not to influence action or policy, what is it for? Therefore we have defined intelligence as:

³³ Rudner, ‘Intelligence Studies in Higher Education’, *cit.*, p. 133.

³⁴ Justice McDonald conducted the *Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police*.

³⁵ Justice O’Connor conducted the *Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar*, <http://publications.gc.ca>.

³⁶ A multi-volume series published in the 1990s by the Canadian Committee on Labour History.

³⁷ Main examples include Michael Warner, ‘Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence,’ *Studies in Intelligence*, 46, 3 (2002), <http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/vol46no3/article02.html>, accessed December 5, 2011; Kristan Wheaton, Michael Beerbower, ‘Towards a New Definition of Intelligence’, *Stanford Law and Policy Review* 17, 2 (2006) pp. 319-30; Peter Gill, ‘Theories of Intelligence: Where Are We, Where Should We Go and How Might We Proceed’, in Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, Mark Phythian (eds.), *Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates*, London, Routledge, 2009, pp. 208-26.

*'the mainly secret activities – targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action – intended to enhance security and/or maintain power relative to competitors by forewarning of threats and opportunities.'*³⁸

We should remember Wilhelm Agrell's observation that 'if everything is intelligence, then nothing is intelligence',³⁹ in other words, is 'intelligence' any different from the 'knowledge management' that is the bedrock of all state and corporate activities? If the answer is 'yes' then we must be able to specify what is different about intelligence. We suggest that the key factors are security, secrecy and the fact that its exercise will be subject to resistance. We also need to consider the difference between intelligence and the more general 'risk-assessment' process that accompanies everything from business takeovers and foreign investment to organising school trips for children.⁴⁰

For more than fifty years the intelligence 'cycle' has been almost universally-applied as a model for understanding intelligence and teaching under- and postgraduates as well as practitioners. With some slight variations this has been seen as proceeding from planning and direction to collection, processing, analysis and dissemination. But while the significance of these as elements in a 'process' is not really contested; there is increasing criticism of the idea that they constitute a sequential 'cycle'. Indeed, it can be argued that in the light of technological and other developments, this model is so misleading that it should be abandoned.⁴¹

More than 20 years ago some researchers were already seeking to apply concepts from elsewhere in the social sciences to understanding intelligence, to explain its successes and failures and to examine intelligence organisations and processes, especially with the normative aim of improving them.⁴² Much consideration has been given to the issue of 'failure', starting with Betts' classic article⁴³ which arguably provides a theoretical handle on our subject equivalent to the 'causes' of war in International Relations.⁴⁴ More researchers have

³⁸ Peter Gill & Mark Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, 2nd edn., Cambridge: Polity, 2012, p. 30.

³⁹ Wilhelm Agrell, *When Everything Is Intelligence – Nothing Is Intelligence*, Occasional Papers, 1, 4, (2002), Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis. <https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/pdf/OPNo4.pdf>, accessed December 12, 2011.

⁴⁰ With colleagues we have discussed this question in a number of articles appearing in *Intelligence and National Security*, 27, 2 (2012).

⁴¹ This was the subject of a Panel at the International Studies Association conference, San Diego, April 2012. See also Gill & Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, 2nd edn.Ch.1.

⁴² Wirtz, *The American approach*, pp.31-34.

⁴³ Richard K. Betts, 'Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,' *World Politics*, 31, 1 (1978), pp. 61-89 (re-printed in Gill, Marrin & Phythian (eds.), *Intelligence Theory*, pp. 87-111).

⁴⁴ Mark Phythian, 'Intelligence Theory and Theories of International Relations: Shared World or Separate Worlds?' in Gill *et al* (eds.), *Intelligence Theory*, pp. 54-72.

applied other social science concepts, for example, Michael Herman⁴⁵, Phil Davies⁴⁶ and Amy Zegart⁴⁷ deploying ideas of organisational process; Gill using ‘information control’⁴⁸ and our use of ‘surveillance’ as an underlying concept for the study of intelligence.⁴⁹ The main point is that intelligence is a pre-eminently social and political phenomenon and, therefore, there is no need for IS to re-invent the wheel.

Most of the historical work discussed above was essentially descriptive but it provides the essential basis for the third project: the **organisational/functional**. Looking at the potential population of intelligence agencies that might have been written about, it is striking that some have received much more coverage than others. Probably reflecting the historical interest in international politics and war, foreign intelligence agencies are best covered, especially those gathering human intelligence and also involved in covert operations. More ink has probably been spilt on the CIA than any other agency in the world.⁵⁰ Why is this? The analytical directorate of the CIA provided a home for many intellectuals who, on retirement, took the opportunity to reflect on and contribute to the debates about the study of intelligence and intelligence reform. The operational side of the CIA, on the other hand, provided much of the material for discussing the more kinetic side of intelligence throughout the Cold War and after. Domestic agencies have received less coverage, although the counter-intelligence efforts of the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover have been well documented.⁵¹ Outside of liberal democracies, agencies such as the Soviet KGB and GDR’s Stasi combined foreign and domestic intelligence duties which were best described in the context of their respective ‘counterintelligence’ states.⁵²

⁴⁵ For example, in Herman *Intelligence Power*, chs. 16-18.

⁴⁶ Davies, *MI6*.

⁴⁷ Amy B. Zegart, *Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI and the Origins of 9/11*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2007.

⁴⁸ Peter Gill, *Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State*, London, Frank Cass, 1994, pp. 48-55.

⁴⁹ *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, chapter 2.

⁵⁰ Just a few examples: John Diamond, *The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence from the End of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008; Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, 3rd edn., New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003; Kaeten Mistry (ed.), ‘The CIA and U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1947: Reforms, Reflections and Reappraisals’, special issue of *Intelligence and National Security*, 26, 2-3 (2011); L. Britt Snider, *The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008); Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA*, London, Allen Lane, 2007.

⁵¹ Frank J. Donner, *The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America’s Political Intelligence System*, New York, Vintage Books, 1981; William W. Keller, *The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and Fall of a Domestic Intelligence State*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1989.

⁵² For the KGB, see Andrew & Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*. There is now a considerable literature on the Stasi. Key works in English include: Gary Bruce, *The Firm: The*

Apart from largely descriptive histories of agencies and occasional attempts to explain how they function in terms of organisational processes that we referred to above, another goal of this project is the normative one of improving agency performance in terms of effectiveness and, hopefully, propriety. The balance between these goals is likely to be determined by the context in which it takes place. Where agencies are deemed to have failed, such as in the US in not preventing the 9/11 attacks, there has been great concentration on the inability of both FBI and CIA to cooperate. These efforts are likely to concentrate on recruitment and training – more people with language skills and cultural understanding of ‘the other’ must be recruited – and seeking organisational and/or technical solutions to problems of information sharing. Within the broader context of ‘democratizing’ agencies in former authoritarian regimes, emphasis has been placed on increasing the professionalism of intelligence officials. This involves replacing loyalty to a party or ideology with that to a notion of national security and public safety that reflects a genuine assessment of a country’s needs rather than merely the security in office of a specific faction. Though the existence or not of such professionalism is a factor that normally distinguishes intelligence agencies in democratic from those in authoritarian regimes, agencies in some ‘older’ as well as ‘newer’ democracies have had to reassess the ethical component of professionalism in the wake of the extraordinary rendition scandal.⁵³

Compared with other state bureaucracies, intelligence agencies have segregated themselves behind walls of secrecy so, if their own methods of working were to change, it would be because of their own internal dynamics. However, few organisations change themselves easily and, if reform or regression takes place, it is very likely to be the result of external pressure from other, government or civil society, actors. This relationship is the subject of the fourth project: **governance/policy**. This might be summarised as: what impact does intelligence have on government and what impact does government have on intelligence? The first of these – the relationship between intelligence and policy – is part of the intelligence process referred to above. While much intelligence that is developed may go no further than the organisational ‘store of

Inside Story of the Stasi, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010; Kristie Macrakis, *Seduced by Secrets: Inside the Stasi’s Spy-Tech World* New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008; Mike Dennis, *The Stasi: Myth and Reality*, Harlow, Longman, 2003; and Anna Funder, *Stasiland: Stories From Behind the Berlin Wall*, London, Granta, 2003.

⁵³ For example, Toni Erskine, ‘As Rays of Light to the Human Soul? ‘Moral Agents and Intelligence Gathering’, *Intelligence and National Security*, 19, 2 (2004), pp. 359-81; Jan Goldman (ed.), *Ethics of Spying: a Reader for the Intelligence Professional*, Lanham, MD, The Scarecrow Press, 2006; Michael Herman, ‘Ethics and intelligence after September 2001’, *Intelligence and National Security*, 19, 2 (2004), pp. 342-58; David Omand, *Securing the State* (London, Hurst, 2010); Michael Quinlan, ‘Just Intelligence: Prolegomena to an Ethical Theory’, *Intelligence and National Security* 22, 1 (2007), pp. 1-13.

memory', the reason that states fund intelligence at all is so that they are better informed. Therefore, one central aspect of the literature, especially in the US, is the extent to which intelligence does or does not actually affect government policy. In the wake of the Iraq WMD controversy, of course, there has been much study of the reverse: when policy determines what is defined as 'intelligence'. For most of the twentieth century the answer to the second question of how much control and oversight of intelligence agencies was exercised by elected governments was: 'Not a lot'. But in the last quarter century or so, a great deal more attention has been given to these questions, both in the older democracies where scandals about the abuse of intelligence have led to reforms and in post-authoritarian states where more democratic intelligence architectures have been constructed.⁵⁴

Most of this governance literature to date, following on the historical research into single countries and single agencies, is concerned with issues of control and oversight of *state* intelligence only. Current developments throw up new challenges for future research, however. First is the rapid growth of corporate intelligence represented mainly by the increased role of private security and military companies working on contract for governments or companies.⁵⁵ While much of this work is clearly related to security as conventionally defined, much of it will also be in the area of 'economic intelligence' that has received less attention in the Anglo-American literature than it does in the more recent European literature, as we saw above in France and Spain. A second key area is international intelligence collaboration. The earliest work here discussed the post war UKUSA signals intelligence agreement between the US, UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand⁵⁶ but there is little literature on this question, mainly because it is one that all countries and agencies keep very secret. New urgency has been injected into the subject by the post-9/11 surge in collaboration, mainly at the behest of the US, vis-à-vis the perceived global threat of terrorism and the subsequent controversies around rendition and torture. Current arrangements for the control and oversight of international intelligence cooperation are, to put it mildly, underdeveloped.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ For example, Hans Born, Ian Leigh, *Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies* (Oslo, Parliament of Norway, 2005); Hans Born, Loch K. Johnson, Ian Leigh (eds.), *Who's Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability*, Washington DC, Potomac Books, 2005; Thomas C. Bruneau, Steven Boraz (eds.), *Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 2007.

⁵⁵ On intelligence see especially Tim Shorrock, *Spies for Hire: the Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008.

⁵⁶ Jeffrey T. Richelson, Desmond Ball, *The Ties That Bind* 2nd edn., Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1990.

⁵⁷ Hans Born, Ian Leigh & Aidan Wills (eds.), *International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability*, London, Routledge, 2011.

Finally, we come to the question of at whom IS is aimed. Within UK universities there are some courses in intelligence for undergraduates that usually reflect the interests of a specific member of staff and sit within broader programmes on international relations and politics. The main increase in security-related courses since 9/11 has been in ‘terrorism’, e.g. within law, criminology, IR, some of which may well include aspects of intelligence. Paul Maddrell’s 2003 survey of Intelligence Studies at UK universities identified 12 universities with an undergraduate module in some aspect of intelligence studied by about 1000 students.⁵⁸ We should note that different academic courses have different emphases: on the one hand, there are those seeking to advance the social science analysis of security intelligence as a social and political phenomenon; on the other hand, there are courses with a higher training component aimed at those already working in intelligence or hoping for such a career.

The oldest example of the latter, and most extensive programme for undergraduates, is found in the US at the private university at Mercyhurst, where courses were developed specifically for those looking for a career in intelligence. In 1995 a non-profit Centre for Intelligence Research and Training was created to go after contracts, collaboration and grants in part to give students experience of working with open sources through internships with companies such as Kroll. After 9/11 both the availability of jobs in the public and private sector and those willing to take them increased dramatically: the US Intelligence Community initiated a ‘Center of Academic Excellence’ programme in 2005 that involves ten US universities.⁵⁹ These also mainly private – there is more resistance on the campuses of public universities to teaching intelligence.

Outside of the US, most courses are at postgraduate level. In several European countries there is an explicit attempt to construct an ‘intelligence culture’ which reflects post-reform openness and seeks to develop not just increased awareness of the importance of a ‘democratic intelligence’ but also greater readiness by academics and other professionals to lend their expertise to the intelligence community.⁶⁰ Rey Juan Carlos III University in Madrid established a National Intelligence Centre and in 2005 a Chair of Intelligence Services and Democratic Systems. In 2006 an Institute of Intelligence for Security and Defence was set up at Carlos III University in Madrid. These initiatives are sponsored as part of a broader ‘intelligence culture’ project by the Spanish intelligence service: *Centro Nacional de Inteligencia* (CNI). 2009-10 saw the first cohort of thirty graduates on the MA in Intelligence Analysis taught by the two universities. The journal *Inteligencia y seguridad: Revista de análisis y*

⁵⁸ Paul Maddrell, ‘Intelligence Studies at UK Universities: an Expanding Subject,’ CISS: <http://users.aber.ac.uk/rbh/iss/uk.htm>, accessed August 31, 2011.

⁵⁹ Rudner, ‘Intelligence Studies in Higher Education,’ pp. 114-15.

⁶⁰ For example, Matey, ‘The Development of Intelligence Studies in Spain.’

prospectiva, first appeared in 2006. The ‘intelligence culture’ project in Romania has been developed similarly by political scientists at the University of Bucharest in cooperation with the National Intelligence Academy. Working through an NGO initiative – KROSS – which encourages OSINT research, two Academic Intelligence and Security Studies (AISS) Conferences have been held in Bucharest.

There are still only six UK universities with specific postgraduate courses in intelligence and something like 120-150 students: Aberystwyth, Birmingham, Brunel, Buckingham, King’s College London, Salford. The most recent additions to this list – Brunel and Buckingham - market themselves more explicitly towards existing practitioners or those who are aiming for a career in intelligence, while Salford deploys distance learning for part time students already employed in military intelligence. Part of the programme at King’s has been developed in response to the Butler Report’s recommendations for reform of analyst training.⁶¹

Conclusion

This brief survey indicates that IS represents a healthy and growing activity of great relevance to contemporary security governance. At the same time IS faces continuing challenges. First, Anglo-American authors and subject matter continue to dominate the Anglophone literature. Take, for example, the eight volumes published by Praeger (*Strategic Intelligence*, 5 volumes, 2007), Routledge (*Handbook of Intelligence Studies*, 2007; *Intelligence (Critical Concepts in Military, Strategic and Security Studies)*, 2010) and Oxford University Press (*The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*, 2010), all edited by Loch Johnson, which collectively can be regarded as the best guide to the ‘state of the art’. Some authors appear in more than one of these but there are over 219 authors of the 205 articles. 75% of the authors are US-based (94% of the authors are US, UK or Canadian) and roughly 68% of the articles concern US intelligence alone. Even allowing for recent history and the size of their respective intelligence and university sectors, we suggest we are moving too slowly away from the Anglo-American centrism that characterised the early development of IS. As we have seen, there are increasing communities of scholars elsewhere and it is important that their work be recognised within the IS mainstream. Single country studies still constitute the bulk of historical and current work; they provide the bedrock for IS, but we suggest a globalised world and increased intelligence cooperation cry out for more comparative work

⁶¹ Michael S. Goodman, David Omand, ‘What Analysts Need to Understand: the King’s Intelligence Studies Program,’ *Studies in Intelligence*, 52, 4 (2008), <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-52-no-4/teaching-intelligence-analysts-in-the-uk.html>, last accessed December 12, 2011.

so that we can avoid simplistic assumptions about the relevance of the US or UK experience to countries with very different economic, political and social conditions.⁶²

Relations between intelligence agencies and academic institutions have not always been easy; indeed, relations between operations people and analysts *within* agencies have often been fraught. Discussing the CIA in its earliest days, Roger Hilsman noted: ‘And they (practitioners) distrust the research man—they see the researcher as a long-haired academic, poring over musty books in dusty libraries far from the realities of practical life.’⁶³ And it does not seem that much changed in the following half century: in her analysis of the CIA’s contribution to the 9/11 failure, Amy Zegart found that Directorate of Operations (DO) officers still viewed analysts with disdain.

‘So deep was the divide between DO officers and analysts that when the Counterterrorist Center was first created (in 1996), DO personnel assigned there requested additional safes and procedures to keep their information out of the hands of the analysts working alongside them, despite the fact that the Center was designed to foster precisely this kind of collaboration between analysts and collectors and everyone held the same level of security clearance.’⁶⁴

So it is hardly surprising that there is even greater mistrust from the practitioner community towards (even short-haired) academics and, as Scott notes, in many countries there is minimal contact and what does occur is fraught with suspicion.⁶⁵ This has a clear impact on the numbers of academics prepared to contemplate research into intelligence:⁶⁶ there is now much archival material for historians to examine but accessing more current material is still impossible (unless revealed by an agency’s own web-site, inquiry or whistleblowers). Many officials will not want to be interviewed and obtaining large research grants is much harder than in more conventional areas of ‘political science’. However, the study of intelligence remains a fascinating intellectual experience

⁶² With colleagues we have tried to set an example, for example, Stuart Farson, Peter GILL, Mark Phythian, Shlomo Shpiro (eds.), *PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence, National Approaches*: volume one, *The Americas and Asia*; volume two, *Europe, the Middle East and South Africa*; Farson & Phythian (eds.) *Commissions of Inquiry and National Security*, Westport, CT, Praeger Security International, 2008. See also, Peter Gill, ‘Knowing the Self, Knowing the Other’: the Comparative Analysis of Security Intelligence,’ in Johnson (ed.) *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*, pp.82-90.

⁶³ Roger Hilsman ‘Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs’, *World Politics*, 5, 1 (1952), pp. 1-45.

⁶⁴ Zegart, *Spying Blind*, p. 91

⁶⁵ Scott, ‘Sources and Methods in the Study of Intelligence’, p. 195.

⁶⁶ For example, Amy B. Zegart, ‘Cloaks, Daggers, and Ivory Towers: Why Academics Don’t Study U.S. Intelligence’, in Loch K. Johnson (ed.) *Strategic Intelligence*, volume 1, *Understanding the Hidden Side of Government*, (Westport, CT, Praeger Security International, 2007), pp. 21-34.

with very important potential for the quality of security governance and the new, though still partial, openness provides many research opportunities.

In addition to research, there is also clearly a place for academics to use their expertise to advise agencies, but this poses a dilemma for scholars that is analogous to that of the correct distance between intelligence professionals and policy-makers: if it is too distant then the former have little or no influence; if it is too close then their independence may be compromised. Scholars must consider the implications of their work: in some circumstances it may not be appropriate – for example, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) examined concerns over the involvement of anthropologists in the U.S. Army's Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq. The AAA concluded that the programme's goals – research, data collection, sources of intelligence and a counterinsurgency tactic – were potentially irreconcilable and incompatible with disciplinary ethics and practice.⁶⁷ Practitioners turned academics are in a unique position to develop interesting and relevant courses, but academic rigour must not be sacrificed to the desire to attract paying students. IS will lose legitimacy if it is seen merely as a vehicle for agencies to recreate themselves, or for former practitioners to recount 'war stories'. Thus academics should never see themselves as any more than 'critical friends' of the agencies.

⁶⁷ <http://www.aaanet.org/issues/policy-advocacy/CEAUSSIC-Releases-Final-Report-on-Army-HTS-Program.cfm>, accessed September 18, 2011.