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## THE 1953 BUNDESTAG ELECTION

Evidence from West German Public Opinion

Richard L. Merritt<sup>+</sup>

The 1953 Bundestag election is frequently interpreted as a critical milestone in postwar West Germany's political history. Some saw its outcome, which gave Chancellor Adenauer's CDU/CSU 45.2% of the vote (31.0% in 1949) and his coalition 63.8% (and a constitution-changing 68.4% of Bundestag seats), as a major surprise, as proof that West Germans had firmly accepted democracy, or as simply another election, to be explained by the appeal of political issues, party identification, the candidates' personalities, special political circumstances (e.g. U.S. intervention), or the sociological characteristics of the voters themselves.

The paper looks into the validity of a particular set of public opinion surveys on the 1953 Bundestag election, commissioned by the Evaluation Staff of the Office of Public Affairs, U.S. High Commission for Germany (HICOG).

The data from the 1953 election study show that neither the electoral outcome nor the degree of West Germans' acceptance of democratic institutions and practices should have come as a surprise. Specific issues seemed to play little role, but differences in general mood, related to several such issues, were important. Party identification as such was important for only a few. Voters subsequently saw Adenauer's personality and the general mood he represented as the most important element in the outcome; the special circumstances mentioned by several writers were insignificant in the voters' consciousness. The data suggest that social class and religion were important variables determining voters' predispositions, but the lack of theoretic orientation in the study makes impossible any definite conclusion about their weight vis-à-vis other variables such as issues.

Few observers were indifferent to the outcome of the 1953 parliamentary election in West Germany. The United States State Department termed the results "gratifying", and saw in them a vindication of American policy toward the Federal Republic. (1) French spokesmen were warier. Above all they feared that Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's success would increase United States pressure on France to move

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toward the military rehabilitation of West Germany. But the British were happy enough that extremist factions had gone down to defeat, and that at least one major continental country seemed assured of a strong and stable government. The Soviet press, interpreting the West German electoral context as one of terror, saw in Adenauer's victory both "a serious threat" to European peace and an end to the prospects for German unity.

The election of September 6, 1953 had indeed altered the West German political scene. As Table 1 shows, it gave Adenauer's governing coalition an even larger majority than it had obtained in the 1949 federal election. His own party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), together with its Bavarian sister, the Christian Social Union (CSU), increased its share of votes by almost half, from 31.0 to 45.2 per cent, and its number of Bundestag seats from 139 to 243, giving it just one vote less than an absolute majority. The major opposition party, the Social Democratic party (SPD), gained a million votes and 20 additional seats in parliament, but dropped slightly in its share of the vote total. The CDU/CSU and its conservative coalition partners, the Free Democratic party (FDP) and the German party (DP), had controlled a slim majority in the First Bundestag (208 of 402 seats, or 51.7 per cent). The coalition dominating the Second Bundestag, which included the new Refugee party (GB/BHE) as well as the CDU/CSU, FDP, and DP, enjoyed a constitution-changing majority of 68.6 per cent (334 of 487 parliamentary seats). The number of parties obtaining representation in the Bundestag declined from eleven to six. Among the casualties were the Communist party (KPD), which lost its parliamentary representation altogether, and various rightist factions.

Given such shifts in voting over the course of four years, it is not surprising that journalists, scholars, and others have showered attention upon the 1953 Bundestag election. The veritable mythology which has grown up about the election itself, what produced the specific outcome and what it meant, has in part prevented observers of a later generation from understanding its true place in postwar German developments. This paper seeks to cut through some of the mythology by examining available public opinion data. Its focus, however, is less on the election itself than the usefulness of a particular body of survey data for understanding it--as well as by implication, other aspects of postwar West Germany's political path, such as rearmament and moves toward European unity, about which similar bodies of data exist. The paper uses data about the 1953 election as a means to explore the uses and limitations of these kinds of data.

#### VIEWS OF THE 1953 BUNDESTAG ELECTION

Among the many interpretations given the 1953 parliamentary election in the Federal Republic of Germany, a prominent one stresses the element of surprise. It would seem that few, even among those who had hoped most ardently for it, had anticipated the dramatic nature of the CDU/CSU's success. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, for instance, whose Secretary of State had made an open bid to influence voters in the election, thought its results better than the United States had "dared to expect".(2) Even those closely attuned to

**Table 1: Bundestag Election Results, 1949 and 1953**

Voting Participation

	<u>1949</u>	<u>1953</u>
Eligible voters:	31.207.620	33.121.066
Valid votes cast:	23.732.298	27.551.376
Percentage valid votes:	78.5%	83.2%

Second Votes Cast

	<u>1949</u>		<u>Bundestag Seats</u>		<u>1953</u>		<u>Bundestag Seats</u>	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
CDU/CSU	7.359.084	31.0%	139*	34.6%	12.444.055	45.2%	243*	49.9%
SPD	6.934.975	29.2	131	32.8	7.944.953	28.8	151	31.0
FDP/DVP	2.829.920	11.9	52*	12.9	2.629.169	9.5	48*	9.9
GB/BHE	-	-	-	-	1.616.956	5.9	27*	5.5
DP	939.934	4.0	17*	4.2	896.230	3.2	15*	3.1
KPD	1.361.706	5.7	15	3.7	607.761	2.2	-	-
BP	986.478	4.2	17	4.2	465.641	1.7	-	-
GVP	-	-	-	-	318.476	1.1	-	-
DRP <sup>1</sup>	429.031	1.8	5	1.2	295.746	1.1	-	-
DZP	727.505	3.1	10	2.5	217.078	0.8	3 <sup>2</sup>	0.6
DNS	-	-	-	-	70.726	0.3	-	-
SSW	75.388	0.3	1	0.2	44.585	0.2	-	-
Others	2.088.377	8.8	15	3.7	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>23.732.398</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>27.551.376</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>487</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

\* Coalition partners

<sup>1</sup> In 1949, the DReP/DKP

<sup>2</sup> Including one CDU member, who joined the coalition.

Party Abbreviations

CDU/CSU	Christian Democratic Union and, in Bavaria, Christian Social Union
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany
FDP/DVP	Free Democratic Party and, in Baden Württemberg, Democratic Peoples Party
GB/BHE	All-German Party, and Refugee Party (literally: Federation of Those Expelled from their Homeland and Deprived of their Rights)
DP	German Party
KPD	Communist Party of Germany
BP	Bavarian Party
GVP	All-German Peoples Party
DRP	German Reich Party (successor, in effect, of the German Party of the Right (DReP) and German Conservative Party (DKP))
DZP	German Center Party
DNS	German National Convention
SSW	South Schleswig Voters Association

Source: Kurt Horstmann, "Die Wahl zum 2. Deutschen Bundestag am 6. September 1953", Wirtschaft und Statistik, 5:9 (September 1953), 383-390, passim.

German domestic politics, the argument continues, had little basis for predicting the electoral outcome. As the West German political historian, Heino Kaack, has pointed out, the coalition's clearcut victory was especially surprising if one took as a point of comparison the results of preceding state parliamentary elections (3): In eleven such elections between 1949 and 1953, the SPD had won 32.1 per cent of the cumulated vote, against only 29.2 per cent for the CDU/CSU, and had emerged as the strongest single party in eight of them.(4)

A second interpretation sees the election as West Germany's response to the question of whether or not it was prepared for democracy. Would the Germans, as unpredictable as many thought them to be, prove themselves capable of conducting democratically their first free elections in more than two decades? The answer given to such a rhetorical question is almost uniformly a resounding "Yes!" After all, five of six eligible voters had cast their ballots (in contrast to 62 per cent in the 1952 presidential election in the United States), and three of four of these had gone to the two major parties. Extremist parties of the right and left had lost the voters' favor since the 1949 election: Jubilant editorial writers for The New York Times assured us with a great sigh of relief that the Good had in fact triumphed over the Confused as well as the downright Evil:

"In an election which smashed all precedents and swept away much of the debris of a dismal past the people of Western Germany have rolled up a landslide victory for Chancellor Adenauer, and have therewith also cast their votes in favor of the West, of European unification and of a common defense of Western civilization against the new barbarism threatening from the East. By doing so they have removed all doubt as to where the new Germany stands. They have made it not only a staunch ally of the West against Communist aggression but also a cornerstone in the new European order, which has as its ultimate goal an United States of Europe able to restore the Old Continent to its proper place in the world".(5)

Through more than four years of direct military occupation and another four of tutelage under the high commissioners, the Western Allies and progressively minded Germans had created a democracy capable of attracting the support of most citizens.

Still a third interpretation finds in the 1953 Bundestag election nothing extraordinary whatever. Whatever their recent past, with its Nazi dictatorship and Allied control, by 1953 West Germans were indistinguishable from people in other industrial democracies as far as their voting was concerned. Such ideas would later find a more formal setting within various theories of convergence, according to which differences among national populations, institutions, and processes disappear as they encounter the common phenomenon of industrialization.(6) In the 1950s the argument was narrower: The same things that drive Americans to vote for one candidate or party rather than another also motivate Germans, Swiss, Italians, Swedes, and others.

Proponents of such a cross-national perspective differ widely, however, when it comes to specifying what it is that is primarily responsible for the individual voting decision. For some the crucial element is political issues. West German voters, in this

view, analyzed the positions taken by parties on such issues as rearmament and social welfare, and balloted accordingly on election day. Overseas observers, of course, tended to stress issues of foreign policy. This is the thrust of the entire editorial in The New York Times commenting on the election (and cited in part earlier). The same newspaper headlined its lead article on the first page, "Adenauer Victory Called a Mandate for United Europe"; and in it its author, Clifton Daniels, pointedly noted that the defeated SPD has "put the reunification of Germany ahead of integration". (7) Germans, too, underscored the overriding importance of foreign policy. "Firmer ties with the West or not, a corresponding policy toward European integration, and shaping our relations with the United States", wrote Konrad Adenauer in his memoirs (8), "were at the center of debates during the 1953 Bundestag election".

A second group of electoral analysts say that it is less a rational consideration of issues than the voter's party identification that determines how that individual votes. The basic idea is that individuals learn in their formative years, in the home, at school, or in their place of work, to associate themselves with a particular party; and that in subsequent years they look to their party for cues on how to organize their own thinking and select the candidates for which they will vote. What makes this proposition problematic are the discontinuities in German political history. That is, for people over the age of 40, there was only one party in 1953, the SPD, which could be said to have existed at the time of their birth or early years; and for those whose formative years were during the Third Reich, there was no continuity whatever in party structures. Moreover, the political parties of the 1950s were only more or less the organizational and ideological successors to those of the 1920s. The amount of continuity that did exist, together with the possibility of forming new identifications with postwar parties, seemed to many writers to lend credibility to the mechanisms implied in the notion of party identification. In this view, Germans who had been raised as Social Democrats would vote in 1953 for the SPD regardless of what platform and candidates the party put forward. Those identified with the Center party of Weimar days would experience equally few qualms in supporting the CDU/CSU. The interesting question for proponents of the idea of party identification as the main causal factor in voting would be the 1953 electoral decisions of those who had earlier supported parties which had disappeared or enjoyed no prospects for future success.

In contrast to an emphasis on issue-oriented rationality or else party identification, a third argument stresses the role of the candidates' personalities. People vote for the individual, this argument runs, who seems best able to cope with the broad range of issues likely to face their government, irrespective of the individual's party affiliation or views on some specific issue. The focus of most writers on the 1953 Bundestag election was Konrad Adenauer. His strength of character, expressed in his remarkable rise to power in postwar Germany, guidance of the Federal Republic's first four years, and command of the techniques of electioneering (in marked contrast to his SPD opponent, Erich Ollenhauer, could not help but impress voters one way or another. The mantle of greatness in which publicists of the late 1950s regularly clothed Adenauer was not much in evidence in the accounts of 1953. (9)

There was nonetheless a clear recognition of his key role in the CDU/CSU's victory. As an American correspondent wrote, "the outcome was primarily a tribute to the political skill and personality of the 'old man', as they call him".(10) More significantly and, given Germany's recent past, more disturbingly, some writers noted in the wake of Adenauer's smashing electoral victory the beginnings of political apotheosis. In what the British journalist, Terence Prittie, termed "a flowery and flatulent tribute", for instance, the editor of the conservative *Die Welt*, Hans Zehrer, wrote that "We are witnessing in Germany today a mysterious process by which an entire people is fusing with the person of its Chancellor".(11) Such statements make it easy to accept the proposition that West Germans saw the 1953 election as a struggle for or against a single man, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

Other analysts seeking an explanation for German voting patterns in 1953 deny the importance of such systematic, persistent factors as orientations toward issues, parties, and the personalities of leading candidates. For them, it was a peculiar set of special political circumstances which conspired to give Adenauer and the CDU/CSU its victory. Thus Heino Kaack writes:

"The CDU found itself advantaged vis-à-vis the other parties since it had more campaign funds at its disposal, could capitalize on its position as the party in power, and point to its concrete accomplishments. Moreover, it distinguished itself with respect to other parties through its especially well thought out electoral propaganda, which for the first time rested on the work of opinion researchers".(12)

Then, too, the June 17, 1953 uprising of East German workers made a contribution to the CDU/CSU's campaign. Popular interpretations of uprising, beaten down by Soviet tanks, saw the tragedy as proof that the Soviet Union would not permit the two Germanies to draw closer together, that giving up the prospects for West German rearmament and closer ties with other West European countries in the hope of attaining German reunification was at best chimerical, at worst a guarantee of ultimate Soviet control over the Federal Republic and all of West Europe. Socialist propaganda urging a neutralized, reunified Germany had a hollow ring to many who heard it.(13)

A special circumstance that especially angered Social Democrats was American intervention in behalf of Chancellor Adenauer.(14) American leaders made no bones about their desire to see Adenauer re-elected. The five months before the election witnessed:

- an invitation for Adenauer to visit the United States in April, followed by a triumphal welcome in Hamburg upon his return to West Germany;
- an effort to postpone until after the election a scheduled Four-Power conference (which, Socialists argued, could make progress toward German reunification and thus undercut the CDU/CSU's arguments);
- offers of foodstuffs for East Germans after the June 17th uprising--a humanitarian gesture which, it was argued, the government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was bound to reject, but which would in the meantime dramatize the inhumanity of the GDR régime and the impossibility of working with it;

- a conference in Washington of the Western foreign ministers, who promised to persist in their pursuit of German reunification, but only on the condition that the Soviet and GDR governments were prepared to make substantial concessions;
- a letter of late July from President Eisenhower to Chancellor Adenauer, which supported fully the latter's foreign policy position; and
- a statement on September 3 by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, made at a press conference, which said that Germany's future and its reunification rested upon Adenauer's re-election, as did the future of German-American relations.

For his part, Adenauer did not go much out of his way to deny the allegations, for a main principle of his campaign was that the Federal Republic needed to cooperate with the United States, a task for which he was eminently suited.

A final proposition explains West German voting behavior in 1953 in terms of the sociological characteristics of the voters. The argument is fairly simple: The complexities of politics lead individuals to search for anchoring points on which to base their behavior; the most reliable of these are ultimately the perceptions and behaviors of the social milieu in which these people grew up and/or live as adults. Thus members of the working class, who frequently live in the same area and share common life styles, will vote for "their" party, that is, the one for which all their friends and neighbors vote. Believers, especially Catholics, will vote for the only party which includes "Christian" as part of its name, since the symbolism implies a community of like-minded people. The persistence over time of strong correlations between such social background characteristics and electoral behavior argues strongly for using the former to predict the latter. (15)

Observers looked at the 1953 Bundestag election, then, and saw many things. The typical account appearing in leading newspapers or political magazines included a bit of everything--surprise at the magnitude of the CDU/CSU's victory, delight because of high voter turnout and the orderly way in which the election proceeded or because of the declining fortunes of extremist parties, and explanations that ranged from the importance of particular issues through the force of Adenauer's personality to comfortable knowledge that certain groups, such as workers, "always" vote in a certain way. In terms of a theory of electoral behavior, some of these reactions and proposed explanations are mutually compatible. Others, however, are not. Or, phrasing the concern more precisely, it would be useful to know how much of the electoral outcome was due to a rational weighing of issues and parties' positions, and how much to such nonrational elements as the voter's position in society.

Public opinion data can contribute to our understanding of the political, social, and psychological processes at work in the 1953 Bundestag election as well as the more general phenomenon of West German electoral behavior. What has limited the use of such data in historical analyses has often been their inaccessibility--a term used in a double sense here. First, it is sometimes difficult to locate relevant data, particularly while they are fresh. Those



who commission and pay for surveys are seldom interested in releasing more information than necessary, since it might serve to assist their competitors; and surveying agencies are contractually bound not to release their clients' data until after a specified time (often two years). Even reports in the public domain are difficult to find since few research libraries bother to seek them out or place them in their permanent collections. The raw data, whether on punchcards or magnetic tape, require fairly extensive computational skills and facilities to analyze.

A second type of inaccessibility is more a psychological matter. A scholar studying political developments in the years since World War II sometimes shies away from public opinion data because of unfamiliarity with their scientific bases. At first glance it may seem to be a dubious proposition, for instance, that a sample of a few hundred persons, however well chosen, can accurately reflect the mood of an entire national population. (In 1953, even true believers were still suffering from the setback of five years earlier, when the Gallup organization had predicted Thomas E. Dewey's victory over Harry S. Truman.)<sup>(16)</sup> Similarly, the fact that slight differences in the wording of questions can produce variation in the distribution of responses - and shameless use by politicians and others of questions worded in a way to encourage respondents to give the desired answer - gives rise to other doubts. During the hotly contested elections of the 1970s, when surveying agencies working for rival candidates published mutually contradictory results, it seemed to some more reasonable to ignore the whole surveying enterprise than to inquire into differences in sampling, wording, interviewing, and analytic assumptions that accounted for the varying results.

Such doubts naturally arise in any consideration of public opinion surveys conducted in 1953 in the Federal Republic. If we wish to utilize the results of these surveys in understanding German voting behavior, then we must pay close attention to their validity. Here is clearly not the place to discuss at length the principles and techniques of survey research.<sup>(17)</sup> Of more moment is the task of assessing the validity of a particular set of surveys: those conducted for the United States High Commission in Germany (HICOG) that focus on the 1953 Bundestag election. After exploring several approaches to this task we shall return to the question of what the substantive content of these surveys has to tell us about some of the views of the election expressed above.

#### VALIDATING THE HICOG SURVEYS

Very early in their occupation of Germany, American military officials had understood the usefulness of public opinion surveys for their own purposes. Even before fighting had died down in some instances, social psychologists and sociologists in the Psychological Warfare Division of the U.S. Army entered towns to survey their populations' potential for resistance, attitudes toward Nazism, and expectations about the pending military occupation. By October 1945 informal surveying had been institutionalized by the Opinion Survey Section of the Information Control Division, Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS), which

subsequently conducted 72 major surveys in the American zone of occupation. Topics explored by these OMGUS surveys were as diverse as attitudes toward Hitler, bathing habits, the growing split among the wartime Allies, and readership of newspapers and magazines.(18)

With the formal end of the military occupation in September 1949, the United States High Commission for Germany (HICOG) replaced the Office of Military Government, and the Opinion Survey Section became the Reaction Analysis Staff (later Evaluation Staff) within the HICOG Office of Public Affairs. Surveying operations, under the direction of Dr. Leo P. Crespi, continued unabated. By the end of 1950 the Reaction Analysis Staff had both expanded its sample to include the whole of the Federal Republic and engaged the newly-formed Deutsches Institut für Volksumfragen (DIVO) to conduct the fieldwork. The HICOG staff carried out more than 100 surveys of West German public opinion during its five and a half years of existence, and wrote 237 reports ranging in length from four to 369 pages (with the average report 33 pages long).(19) The Evaluation Staff later became part of the Research Staff of the Office of Public Affairs, United States Embassy, when on May 1955 the Federal Republic attained virtually complete sovereignty.

On December 11, 1953 the HICOG Evaluation Staff issued a 72-page report (Series 2, Report No. 191) discussing "A Survey Analysis of the Factors Underlying the Outcome of the 1953 German Federal Election". It reported data from three sets of surveys: almost two dozen separate pollings from March 1951 to September 1953 which asked respondents about their preferences among the various political parties; a survey conducted in the two weeks before the election, which served as the basis for predicting the electoral outcome (in a separate, unpublished report circulated the day before the election itself); and a pair of post-election surveys carried out in mid-September and late October 1953. The unavailability of data cards for these surveys makes any attempt to evaluate their findings rest primarily on what the Evaluation Staff wrote in its report of December 11.

Reliability of DIVO Surveys. One point that will not be discussed here is the reliability (or reproducibility) of public opinion surveys conducted by DIVO. Like any other commercial polling agency, it used up-to-date procedures for designing, carrying out, and analyzing its surveys. DIVO staff associates worked closely with HICOG officials to develop questions, which were then tried out (or pretested) to make sure that almost all potential respondents would find them unambiguous, and fit the questions into a suitable format or sequence that would, for example, avoid initial questions that might bias responses to later ones. The common technique for selecting respondents was stratified random sampling.(20) An entire population is divided by successive steps into a set of discrete categories - first by region, for example, and then each region by size of community, and each community by sex so that one discrete category might comprise women in large cities in Schleswig-Holstein-from each of which is drawn at random a designated number of respondents. DIVO trained its own interviewers, supervised them during their fieldwork, and verified the thoroughness of their work.(21) Despite the absence in HICOG reports of any searching examination of the procedures used by DIVO, available clues (22)

and the firm's general reputation for competence suggest high quality work on which scholars nowadays can continue to rely.

As important as the reliability of DIVO's surveys is the extent to which its results can be validated by the test of independent data. It is possible, after all, although hardly likely, that basic flaws in its procedures for sampling and questioning the West German population could obviate the usefulness of DIVO's findings, the fact that the agency could reproduce its results with a high degree of accuracy notwithstanding. The following sections will compare the findings reported by HICOG analysts with those drawn from other public opinion surveys (some conducted by other commercial agencies), an official sample of voters conducted at the polling booths on election day, and, as a check on the predictive power of the HICOG data, the actual results of the 1953 Bundestag election.

Pre-Election Surveys. The United States High Commission was not, of course, the only party interested in this election. Closely attuned to business and its techniques for marketing products, and recognizing the potential usefulness of market research for their electoral campaign, CDU/CSU leaders commissioned the Institut für Demoskopie (IfD) in Allensbach-am-Bodensee to conduct continuing surveys of West German political attitudes. More generally, the Allensbach institute has conducted and reported on monthly surveys since 1947.(23) Another commercial agency which has conducted election surveys is the EMNID-Institut GmbH in Bielefeld. It made available to Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber for his study of the 1953 election data cards from three nationwide surveys conducted in early July, mid-August, and late August 1953.(24) Finally, DIVO conducted another election study, separate from its periodic surveys for the High Commission, for the UNESCO Institute for Social Research, Cologne under the direction of Erich Reigrotzki.(25) Fieldwork for the UNESCO survey was performed between July 4 and August 30, with a sample of 3,246 respondents.

Differences among polling agencies in both sampling procedures and the way in which they worded questions about the voters' preferences among parties make any direct comparison among responses difficult at best. A voter might consistently respond to a question, "Would you please tell me which party you like best?" by saying "None", and yet name a party when asked, "For which party will you probably cast your vote at the coming elections?" In all likelihood the same randomly selected sample would respond still differently to yet another question: "If the Bundestag election were to be held tomorrow, which party would you like to see get the largest number of votes?" Even the same question asked at different times of the same sample may, because of events intervening between the two pollings, elicit varying responses.

Taking into account these sources of possible variation, it still makes sense to ask how the HICOG data measured up to those produced in other surveys. Table 2 shows that several ways of asking about party preference in July and August 1953 yielded roughly similar results. The data in this table are based solely upon the responses of individuals who named a particular party; those who indicated that they were not eligible to vote, did not intend to vote, or had no party preference were excluded from the calculations.(26)

Table 2: Comparison of Pre-Election Surveys

Fieldwork Date	Number of Respondents	Giving Party Preference	Of Those Expressing a Party Preference					Avg. Diff. from Vote*
			CDU/CSU	FDP, DP, BHE	Total Coalition	SPD	Other	

HICOG-I

Question: "Would you please tell me which party you like best?"

a. July	625	58.0%	41.4%	15.5%	(56.9%)	37.9%	5.2%	±4.5
b. August	670	58.0	46.6	15.5	(62.1)	34.5	3.5	±3.5
c. Aug 22-Sep 3	664	61.0	50.8	18.0	(68.9)	29.5	1.6	±3.2
Weighted Avg.	1959	59.0	46.4	16.4	(62.8)	33.8	3.4	±3.1

HICOG-II

Question: "For which party will you probably cast your vote at the coming elections?" (Asked of those entitled and intending to vote)

Aug 22-Sep 3	664	65.1	50.3	15.3	(65.7)	29.5	4.9	±2.9
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EMNID

Question: "If the next Bundestag election were to take place now, would you vote? For which party would you vote?"

a. July 3-10	c.2000	63.2	41.8	25.3	(67.1)	27.9	5.1	±3.3
b. August 11-16	c.2000	60.8	38.2	25.0	(63.2)	29.0	7.9	±3.5
c. August 20-28	c.2000	67.2	40.7	25.9	(66.7)	25.9	7.4	±3.7
Weighted Avg.	c.6000	63.7	40.3	25.4	(65.7)	27.5	6.8	±3.4

UNESCO

Question A: "If the Bundestag election were to be held tomorrow, which party would you like to see get the largest number of votes?"

Question B: "If the Bundestag election were to be held tomorrow, for which party would you vote?"

a. Jul 4-Aug 30	1785	81.0	38.3	18.5	(56.8)	32.1	11.1	±3.5
b. Jul 4-Aug 30	1694	72.0	44.4	18.1	(62.5)	30.6	6.9	±0.9
Weighted Avg.	3479	76.6	41.1	18.3	(59.4)	31.4	9.2	±2.2

IFD (Allensbach)

Question: "Which party is closest to your viewpoint?"

Jul-Sep	c.2000*	65.0*	38.5	21.5	(60.0)	29.2	10.8	±3.4
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Election Results

September 6			45.2	18.6	(63.8)	28.8	7.4	
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Sources (for full references, see the footnotes cited below)

HICOG I and II: HICOG, Series 2, No. 191, December 11, 1953, pp. 1-2 (fn.19).

EMNID: Günter Herzig, "Die Befragungen von EMNID und DIVO," pp 426-427 (fn.24).

UNESCO: Reigrotzki, Soziale Verflechtungen, p. 121 (fn.20).

IFD: Noelle and Neumann, Jahrbuch 1947-1955, pp. 252-253 (fn.23).

\* Average of each surveys differences from the actual election results for four categories of votes: CDU/CSU, Other Coalition (FDP, DP, FDP), SPD, Other Parties.

† Figures taken from a graph which cumulates results by quarter.

Whatever the differences shown in Table 2, the tendency is the same for all the surveys: clear electoral predominance for the CDU/CSU, particularly in the event that it should, as it in fact did, create a new coalition similar to that of the First Bundestag. Compared to the actual results of the election, the average survey's reading for each of four categories of votes (CDU/CSU; other coalition parties (FDP, DP, and BHE); SPD; and other parties) differed 3.3 percentage points. HICOG surveys produced responses still closer to the real vote, with differences averaging 3.1 and 2.9 percentage points, respectively. For the HICOG question asked at three different times in July and August, the amount of variation from the final tabulation decreased markedly from one survey to the next.

Without going into details, some other aspects of Table 2 merit attention. One is the popularity among HICOG respondents of the CDU/CSU. As many as a tenth of those who expressed party preferences shifted in favor of Adenauer's party from early July to late August. (Note, however, the static results of the EMNID surveys.) Such data suggest that the Chancellor's campaign was gaining momentum as election day neared. Second, in responses in late August to both HICOG questions, about five per cent more of the committed sample indicated a preference for the CDU/CSU than the percentage of voters who actually cast their ballots for the party. (The UNESCO survey asking about intended votes, in the field during the entire period covered by the three HICOG surveys, produced results in terms of CDU/CSU voting very close to the average of the HICOG pollings; Christian Union adherents were persistently underrepresented among respondents to EMNID surveys). This may simply indicate that CDU/CSU voters made up their minds earlier or felt freer about giving interviewers their views--a possibility the effects of which would be exaggerated by the fact that those still straddling the political fence or reluctant to give information about their party preference would have been omitted in the distribution by party shown in Table 2. Implicit in this possibility is a third point. Numerous voting studies have found that voters supporting fringe parties, particularly communist, ultra-rightist, or other parties which are unpopular in the nation at large, are more likely than others to refuse to give information or even lie about their voting intentions. (27) HICOG surveys vastly underestimated the number of people identifying with the FRG's politically marginal parties: In late August, for example, its sample of 664 West Germans uncovered none supporting the Communist party, whereas only a few days later 2.2 per cent of the electorate voted for the KPD.

Comparing the pre-election surveys of different polling agencies lends some confidence to a more general use of HICOG data. Whatever differences there may be among these surveys, the central fact is that they are basically alike in capturing the voters' mood. Not a single sampling, for instance, gave the Social Democrats a lead over the Christian Union parties; and all found that a continuation of the coalition that the CDU/CSU had forged with other conservative parties (including the Refugee party, which had not existed in 1949 and thus had no representation in the First Bundestag (28)) would rest on an overwhelming majority of votes. The differences that exist are not greater than sampling error or the consequences of alternative phrasings of questions would lead us to expect.

Comparisons over Time. Another strategy can test to see whether or not the differences noted above are merely artifacts of the technology of surveying: looking at how respondents react over time to similar questions asked by different polling agencies. This strategy begins with the assumption that two questions with somewhat different wordings are similar to the extent that they tap the same underlying dimension of attitudes among some set of respondents. Accordingly, a polling agency will elicit virtually identical responses to highly similar questions asked of a single sample or two simultaneous samples drawn on the basis of a standard procedure. (29) If two agencies ask similar questions of their own samples, separately drawn according to possibly varying procedures, then the degree of congruence in the distribution of responses may be used to indicate the degree of similarity in their respective sampling designs.

Figure 1 shows responses, averaged for quarter-year periods from mid-1951 to late 1953, to two questions asked by different polling institutes: (30)

1. HICOG: "Would you please tell me which party you like best?"
2. IfD: "Which party is closest to your viewpoint?"

Let us assume that the two questions are similar. (Whether or not this assumption is valid is, of course, an empirical question: unfortunately, no agency has reported on any attempt to ascertain, in controlled circumstances, the differences in attitudes and predispositions that they arouse among respondents). On this assumption, any substantial variation over time in the responses obtained by DIVO, which performed the surveying for the U.S. High Commission, and the Institut für Demoskopie would be due to other factors, such as differences in sampling designs, that would render their results basically noncomparable.


The longitudinal series of data on party preferences produced by the two agencies are remarkably similar. To be sure, as both Table 2 and Figure 1 show, there is a difference in the level of response to the two questions. The share of HICOG respondents preferring the CDU/CSU averaged 37 per cent for the eight quarters years, as against 40 per cent choosing the Social Democratic party; the averages for IfD respondents were, respectively, 32 and 35 per cent. The more interesting question is whether or not, at the various points in time, the relationship between the paired responses to the questions remains stable. That is, if there is an increase from one quarter to the next in SPD preferences in one series, is there a corresponding increase in the other series? The answer is, yes. For the CDU/CSU, the fit over time between the two sets of responses was quite close: The Pearsonian product-moment correlation coefficient,  $r$ , is equal to +0.87 (on a scale on which  $\pm 1.00$  represents a perfect match between two sets of data and 0.00 a complete absence of any systematic relationship between them); the relationship is significant at the .001 level, which means that, out of every thousand similar sets of data, such a relationship would occur by chance alone no more than once. The fit between relative levels of support for the Social Democratic party was slightly less close ( $r = +0.82$ ,  $p < .01$ ). The changing ratio of CDU/CSU to SPD responses, which for the period as a whole averaged .96 for HICOG and .93 for IfD respondents, was stronger still ( $r = +0.91$ ,  $p < .001$ ). (31)

Figure 1: Comparative Data on Party Preferences, July 1951 to September 1953

Questions

HICOG: "Would you please tell me which party you like best?"

IFD (Allensbach): "Which party is closest to your viewpoint?"



Sources (for full references, see the footnotes cited below)

HICOG: HICOG, Series 2, No. 191, December 11, 1953, p. 1 (fn.19).

IFD: Noelle and Neumann, Jahrbuch 1947-1955, pp. 252-253 (fn.23).

Small differences in levels of response notwithstanding, the longitudinal comparison shows that the HICOG and IfD surveys were quite similar in charting the fortunes in the West German public's eye of at least the two major political parties. This fact suggests, although it cannot by itself prove, that the sampling designs used by the two polling agencies were also similar. (The stability of the relationship between the two sets of data indicates that differences in levels of response were due to the way in which the questions were worded, not to the sampling design.) On the substantive side, it is interesting to note in Figure 1 the reversal in position of the two parties. From mid-1951 through 1952 more respondents favored the CDU/CSU than the SPD. The switch--which came in the first quarter of 1953 according to IfD pollsters, and in the second quarter in the data reported by HICOG--led to a comfortable lead for the Union parties in the summer quarter.

Predicting Electoral Outcomes. Only slightly below the surface of the discussion to this point is the possibility that the HICOG data could have been used before the election took place to predict its outcome. Table 2 even assessed the efforts of various polling agencies in terms of how close their results were to the actual vote on election day. That survey data are often used in this way, and frequently quite successfully so, should not disguise the fact that social scientists have not yet developed a thoroughly satisfactory model for predicting electoral outcomes on the basis of such data. (32) The main problems are gauging the firmness of respondents' announced intentions to vote in a particular way, and determining the likely vote of people who cannot or will not tell interviewers how they intend to vote. The attempt by HICOG analysts to predict how the 1953 Bundestag election would turn out highlights these problems.

In its survey, conducted for the U.S. High Commission and in the field during the two weeks before the 1953 Bundestag election, DIVO included a series of questions designed to permit prediction of the electoral outcome. (33) Initial items asked of 663 respondents found that only 648 were entitled to vote and that, of these, only 562 indicated any intention to cast a ballot (Table 3). Slightly over three-quarters of those who expected to vote (431 respondents) specified the party of their choice. Half of the remaining 131 who said that they had not yet made up their minds gave responses to two further questions that indicated their partisan leaning, leaving only 65 who could not be classified on the basis of their answers.

Moving from such a distribution of responses to predictions requires several assumptions. First is the assumption, which cannot be dealt with here, that respondents are honestly reporting their voting intentions; this assumption has underlain and been repeatedly substantiated by four decades of public opinion research. A second assumption is that a desire to see a particular party win is as strong an indicator of future voting behavior as is a declared intent to vote for that party. More problematic is the question of how people indicating uncertainty about whether or not they will vote actually behave on election day. DIVO analysts assumed that all such persons would not vote. This assumption produced a voter turnout of 86.7 per cent--somewhat higher than the actual rate of 83.2 per cent of eligible voters who turned out at the polls. (34)



**Table 3:** HICOG Data as the Basis for Predicting the 1953 Electoral Outcome

Questions

1. "For which party will you probably cast your vote at the coming elections?"
2. (If no party mentioned) "Would you be more inclined to vote for one of the parties now in office-CDU, FDP, DP--or more inclined to vote for the SPD? Or more inclined toward one of the other parties? Which?"
3. (If no party inclination mentioned) "Well, what do you personally desire: Which party should win--or don't you care at all?"

	First Question	Second Question	Third Question	Total Responses	
				Number	Pct.
CDU/CSU	217	15	6	238	36.7%
FDP, DP, BHE	66	3	--	69	10.6
"Coalition	--	23	--	23	3.5
(Total Coalition)	(283)	(41)	(6)	(330)	(50.9)
SPD	127	12	3	142	21.9
Other parties	21	3	1	25	3.9
Subtotal	431	56	10	497	76.7
Do not intend to vote	26	--	--	26	4.0
Uncertain about voting	60	--	--	60	9.3
No opinion	131	75	65	65	10.0
Subtotal	648	131	75	648	100.0
Not eligible to vote	15	--	--	15	
Total	663	131	75	663	

Source: Data prepared for HICOG but analyzed in DIVO files; reported by Herzig, "Die Befragungen von EMNID und DIVO," pp. 428-429 (see fn.24).

The critical assumption lies in the treatment of respondents who report that they intend to vote but, for whatever reason, are disinclined to divulge their partisan preferences. These respondents comprise a tenth of all eligible voters. The analyst who has some additional information about these respondents, such as the direction and intensity of their attitudes on some key issues, may make some shrewd guesses about their voting choices. It may also be possible to distribute such respondents according to some aggregate characteristic of the electorate as a whole. If, for example, surveys conducted by a particular agency are known to underestimate persistently the percentage of the population that will vote for certain unpopular minority parties, it may be reasonable to "assign" some nominally uncommitted but voting respondents to the ranks of these parties. Any such adjustments will of course require justification by the analyst.

In the absence of any additional information about this elusive tenth of the eligible voters, the analyst has no alternative but to distribute them in the same proportions in which committed respondents identify themselves with given parties. Thus if one out of four voters expressing a partisan preference names a particular political party, it will be assumed that a fourth of the uncommitted will also vote for that party.(35) Table 4 applies this

distributive principle to both the analysis by DIVO of its own data, outlined above, as well as another analysis reported by the HICOG Evaluation Staff. The latter, in all likelihood using the same data, has provided no specific discussion about how its predictions were calculated. (In both cases, respondents who answered "Coalition" to the second question were assigned proportionately into the "CDU/CSU" and "FDP, DP, BHE" categories).

It is with a dash of disappointment that we view the results of these essays in electoral prediction. On the one hand, both analyses were reasonably close on target. They overestimated somewhat the support that the Union parties would obtain and underestimated the strength of the CDU/CSU's coalition partners as well as other small parties; and the average difference between their estimates is as low as  $\pm 0.7$  percentage points. But, on the other hand, the predictions are not noticeably better than those produced by far simpler questions reported in Table 2. In fact, using only the first question listed in Table 3 (reported in Table 2 as "HICOG-II") yielded a better prediction overall than did the DIVO analysts' use of all three questions in the same table (with average differences from the actual vote of  $\pm 2.9$  and  $\pm 3.2$  percentage points, respectively). And neither the DIVO nor the HICOG analysis approached the accuracy of a question asked in the UNESCO survey, "If the Bundestag election were to be held tomorrow, for which party would you vote?"

Table 4: Accuracy of DIVO and HICOG Predictions

	DIVO Analysis			HICOG Analysis	
	Predicted	Diff. from		Predicted	Diff. from
Vote	Vote	Actual Vote		Vote	Actual Vote
CDU/CSU	45.2%	51.5%	+6.3	50.1%	+4.9
FDP, DP, BHE	18.6	14.9	-3.7	15.3	-3.3
(Coalition	(63.8)	(66.4)	(+2.6)	(65.4)	(+1.6)
SPD	28.8	28.6	-0.2	28.8	-0.0
Other parties	7.4	5.0	-2.4	5.8	-1.6
Total	100.0%	100.0%	$\pm 3.2$	100.0%	$\pm 2.4$

Source: Herzog, "Die Befragungen von EMNID und DIVO", pp. 429-430 (see fn.24), and HICOG, Series 2, No. 191, December 11, 1953, p. 2 (see fn.19). Responses specifying solely the "Coalition" have been divided proportionately into the first two categories ("CDU/CSU" and "FDP, DP, BHE").

That a more extensive battery of questions designed to force respondents into committing themselves to a partisan position did not markedly improve the predictive quality of the HICOG data points less to weaknesses in the data themselves than in the predictive model that interpreted them. In the years since then public opinion analysts have greatly refined their predictive models. (36) Other approaches seek to use more indirect methods to ascertain the probable voting behavior of those reluctant to express their

preferences and verify that of announced partisans. Even so, an empirically valid theory of electoral prediction remains to be developed.

Comparisons of Population Groups. A final test of the HICOG data's validity rests on comparable studies showing how groupings within the West German population vote. Do simultaneous, independently drawn samplings suggest a common behavioral pattern for men? How about young people, or workers, or those with advanced education? Unfortunately, available studies for comparison with the HICOG surveys are not ideal for answering such questions completely. There are nonetheless two studies that can provide an approximate comparison: the EMNID pollings of July and August, 1953, and a representative sampling by the Federal Statistical Office of voters at the polling booths. All three sets of data provide some information on the voting intentions or behavior of subgroups within the West German population.

The three studies are different in several respects, not the least important of which is the time at which they were conducted. The EMNID surveys, as we have already seen, sought to find out before the election how people intended to vote. Of relevance here is its series of three surveys carried out in the weeks of July 3-10, August 11-16, and August 20-28, each with a sample of approximately 2,000 respondents. The key question asked, "If the next Bundestag election were to take place now, would you vote? For which party would you vote?" For the present purpose the three EMNID surveys have been treated as one, with a sample of about 6,000 West Germans.(37) Nor is there anything remarkable about the two post-election surveys conducted by DIVO in behalf of the U.S. High Commission, which were in the field from September 14 to September 27 (interviewing 1,270 respondents) and from October 22 to November 2 (with 904 respondents). Since each asked the same question-- "Would you please tell me for the candidate of which party you voted?" --HICOG analysts combined into a single table the responses to both.(38) Supplementary tables in their report show how various subgroups in the West German population answered the question.

The Federal Statistical Office's representative statistics are derived not from responses to questions posed by interviewers employed by commercial agencies, but rather from data gathered by election officials from the voter who is casting a ballot.(39) Before the election the Statistical Office, using a stratified random procedure, selected a sample of 513 electoral districts, representative of the entire Federal Republic and including 1.5 per cent of all eligible voters. As it turned out, the survey could not be conducted in either Bavaria or the Rhineland Palatinate. The final sample, then, contained 370,543 eligible voters (1.5 per cent of those in the 369 districts included), of whom 319,818 voted. Each of the latter was given a special ballot, different from what other West German voters got only in that it contained spaces in which those voting were to indicate both their sex and the age category to which they belonged. Such information, federal officials feel, does not violate the principle of the secret ballot. And the assistance that it gives to government officials, scholars, and others who wish to understand German voting behavior justifies the small added cost of printing and counting the special ballots.(40)

Table 5: Basis for Comparing HICOG, Federal Statistical Office, and EMNID Data

	CDU/ CSU	FDP BHE	Total Coali- tion <sup>1</sup>	SPD	Other Par- ties	Total or Average <sup>1</sup>
<u>Actual Election Results</u>						
September 6	45.2%	15.4%	(60.6%)	28.8%	10.6%	100.0%
<u>HICOG Survey</u>						
Sept 14-Nov 2	54.0%	13.5%	(67.5%)	26.1%	6.4%	100.0%
HICOG-Results	+8.8	-1.9	(+6.9)	-2.7	-4.2	± 4.4
<u>Representative Statistics (excludes Bavaria and Rhineland Palatinate)</u>						
Official Results <sup>2</sup>	43.9%	15.8%	(59.7%)	30.3%	10.0%	100.0%
Rep. Stat. (Sep 6)	43.3%	17.0%	(60.3%)	29.9%	9.8%	100.0%
Rep. Stat.-Results	-0.6	+1.2	(+0.6)	-0.4	-0.2	±0.6
HICOG - Rep. Stat.	+10.7	-3.5	(+7.2)	-3.8	-3.4	±5.4
<u>EMNID Survey</u>						
Jul 3-Aug 28	39.8%	21.5%	(61.3%)	26.1%	12.6%	100.0%
HICOG - EMNID	+14.2	-8.0	(+6.2)	±0.0	-6.2	±7.1

<sup>1</sup>Total or average calculations do not include figures for the "Total Coalition" category. Nonvoters and respondents naming no party are excluded from the table.

<sup>2</sup>The "Official Results" reported in this line are the same as the "Actual Election Results" reported above, except that the former adjust the latter to exclude votes cast in Bavaria and Rhineland Palatinate, where the representative statistics survey was not carried through.

Sources (for full references, see the footnotes cited below)

Actual Results: Horstmann, "Die Wahl", p. 389 (see Table 1).

HICOG: HICOG, Series 2, No. 191, December 11, 1953, p. 3 (fn.19).

Rep. Stat.: Horstmann, "Wahlbeteiligung", p. 10 (fn 39).

EMNID: Herzig, "Die Befragungen von EMNID und DIVO", pp. 426-427 (fn.24).

The problems of comparative analysis of such sets of data cannot be ignored. There are, first of all, the issues discussed earlier, including variations due to the phrasing of questions, selection of samples, interviewing, procedures, and other aspects of the surveying process. The failure of Bavaria and Rhineland Palatinate to carry out the survey designed to obtain representative statistics adds another small bias. As Table 5 shows, the "official results" against which the representative statistics are compared vary somewhat (an average of ± 1.0 percentage points for the four vote categories included in the table) from the actual vote totals since the former figures must exclude votes cast in the two states. Any comparison of the HICOG's survey results with the representative statistics must take into account the possibility of this one per cent error.

Second, the timing of the surveys makes a difference. EMNID performed its fieldwork at a time when many voters were doubtless making up their minds and others were reluctant to commit themselves publicly to a choice among the parties. The Federal Statistical Office had direct access to the ballots of individuals on the day they voted. This fact, besides enabling federal officials to know how people actually voted rather than how they said they were planning to vote, eliminated the category of respondents who were either undecided or unwilling to state their preferences. These people simply did not show up at the polls. (As Table 5 shows, the average difference between the tallies recorded by the Federal Statistical Office and the final vote for the corresponding electoral districts covered in the Statistical Office's survey was  $\pm 0.6$  percentage points for the four vote categories). The HICOG survey, by contrast, was conducted well after the election itself. Questions asked retrospectively to determine how a population voted almost always encounter distortion, whether deliberate or not. A larger percentage than actually voted for the winning party usually recalls having done so, and the reverse is true vis-à-vis the losing party. In this case there was a surplus of +8.8 percentage points for the victorious CDU/CSU and a deficit of -2.7 percentage points for the defeated SPD. The passage of time also seems to enhance the operation of the phenomenon mentioned earlier of suppressed support in face-to-face interviews for minor and perhaps unpopular parties. In the HICOG's post-election survey, only 6.4 per cent of the respondents who said how they voted could recall having voted for one of the minor parties, whereas 10.6 per cent of the actual vote was cast for these parties. How can we take into account variations probably due to differences in timing? As in the earlier discussion on changing views over time, comparisons of questions from before and after the 1953 election must be viewed in terms not of differences of level in the responses, but rather variability under ceteris paribus conditions, that is, when differences of level are held constant. The means to do this will be discussed later.

Third, since available data for the three surveys are fragmentary, mostly in the form of either percentage distributions or simple cross-tabulations of data, it is not always possible to mesh social groupings as defined by the surveying agencies. The representative statistics, for example, present breakdowns of voters' ages in three categories (under 30, 30-60, and 60 and over) while the HICOG surveys use six (21-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65 and over). Reconciling such differing operational procedures by distinct agencies requires some assumptions about the nature of the data. To separate most simply the category of respondents aged 25 to 34 in the HICOG surveys into sets of respondents under and above the age of 30, the cutting point for the Federal Statistical Office, it is necessary to assume that the number of respondents between the ages of 25 and 29 roughly equals the number aged 30 to 34 (41), and that the political attitudes (or at least voting dispositions) of the two age categories are roughly similar. As will be seen, the problems caused by varying definitions of occupational categories in the EMNID and HICOG surveys are thornier still.

A final and less troublesome problem deserves attention because it makes the material discussed in this section a bit less comparable

with what went before. Earlier tabulations of the category of votes for the coalition included the German party (DP) as well as the Christian Union parties (CDU/CSU), Free Democrats (FDP), and Refugee party (BHE). Available analyses of the EMNID surveys and federal representative statistics do not give separate data for the German party, even though it got 3.2 per cent of the vote in the 1953 election. Tables 5 and 6, and the discussion based on them, likewise consider the DP a part of the "other parties" category of votes. Internal consistency within this section, however, does not obviate interpretive problems that would arise if, let us say, figures from Table 6 were to be contrasted with those from Table 4.

The procedure used to examine differences between the HICOG surveys on the one hand and, on the other, the representative statistics and EMNID surveys will be similar to that followed earlier in assessing the similarity of longitudinal data. Since it seems reasonable to expect that the timing of the three surveys will by itself and in conjunction with other factors produce a systematic bias in the level of responses, in what follows it will be necessary to neutralize this element. One way to do this is to look not at the absolute level of responses but at their deviation from the responses that we might expect in the knowledge of how much bias is in the data. In slightly more technical language, we want to control for known bias as a means to check the stability of the responses otherwise.

As a baseline for the expected amount of bias we shall use for each paired set of data (HICOG vs. representative statistics, and HICOG vs. EMNID) the overall difference between them in each category of votes (CDU/CSU, FDP/BHE, SPD and other parties). Table 5 shows that the representative statistics recorded in the voting districts sampled that 45.3 per cent of the ballots were cast for the CDU/CSU. HICOG surveys several weeks later found 54.0 per cent of their sample who expressed themselves recalling that they had voted for the CDU/CSU. The difference between these two figures (54.0% - 45.3% = +10.7 percentage points) maybe taken as the amount of bias normally to be expected from differences in the two studies. In like fashion, we might normally expect that the HICOG report on recalled votes for the Social Democratic party would be 3.8 percentage points less than the estimate based on the representative statistics (26.1% - 29.9% = -3.8 percentage points).

These baseline figures of expected variation can then be compared against the actual amount by which some grouping in the population, such as women or people under the age of 30, differs in the two surveys vis-à-vis a given party. If the representative statistics show that 47.2 per cent of West German women voted for the CDU/CSU, then we would expect that, in the later HICOG survey, the share of women recalling that they voted for the Union parties would be 10.7 percentage points greater, or 57.9 per cent. (42) In fact, though, 59.3 per cent of the women responding to HICOG interviewers claimed this. The deviation from the norm in this case is +1.4 percentage points. By way of interpretation, we might say that, taking into account biases introduced by the circumstances of the surveys, the share of women who remembered voting for the CDU/CSU was 1.4 percentage points greater than we would have expected on the basis of the representative statistics.

Table 6: Variations Among Population Subgroups in Reported Votes<sup>1</sup>

	CDU/ CSU	FDP BHE	Total Coalition <sup>2</sup>	SPD	Other Parties	Aver- age <sup>2</sup>
<u>HICOG Survey Results vs. Representative Statistics</u>						
Expected variation (HICOG - Rep. Stat.)	+10.7	-3.5	(+7.2)	-3.8	-3.4	±5.4
Deviation from expected variation, by Sex						
Men	-0.3	±0.0	(-0.3)	+0.8	-0.5	±0.4
Women	+1.4	-0.6	(+0.8)	-0.3	-0.5	±0.7
Average	±0.9	±0.3	(±0.6)	±0.6	±0.5	±0.6
Deviation from expected variation, by Age						
Under 30	-2.9	+3.2	(+0.3)	-1.9	+1.6	±2.4
30-60	+0.9	-1.9	(-1.0)	+1.5	-0.4	±1.2
60 and older	+3.6	+1.9	(+5.5)	-4.5	-0.9	±2.7
Average	±2.5	±2.3	(±2.3)	±2.6	±1.0	±2.1
Average deviation (HICOG - Rep. Stat.)	±1.8	±1.5	(±1.6)	±1.8	±0.8	±1.5
<u>HICOG Survey Results vs. EMNID Survey Results</u>						
Expected variation (HICOG - EMNID)	+14.2	-8.0	(+6.2)	±0.0	-6.2	±7.1
Deviation from expected variation, by Education						
Elem. school only	-0.9	+3.6	(+2.7)	-4.3	+1.7	±2.6
More than elem. school	+4.3	-3.7	(+0.6)	-1.8	+1.1	±2.7
Average	±2.6	±3.7	(±1.7)	±3.6	±1.4	±2.7
Deviation from expected variation, by Religion						
Protestant	-0.1	-1.4	(-1.5)	-0.1	+1.6	±0.8
Catholic	+0.3	+2.1	(+2.4)	-4.2	+1.8	±2.1
All religions	+0.8	+0.5	(+1.3)	-2.1	+0.8	±1.1
Average	±0.4	±1.3	(±1.7)	±2.1	±1.4	±1.3
Deviation from expected variation, by Occupation						
Workers	+0.1	+3.9	(+4.0)	-6.5	+2.4	±3.2
Employees (whitecollar)	-2.5	-4.9	(-7.4)	+6.6	+0.9	±3.7
Farmers, farm workers	-0.5	+4.2	(+3.7)	-8.3	+4.8	±4.5
Prof., self-employed	+9.9	-12.9	(-3.0)	-1.7	+4.7	±7.3
Other, retired, etc.	-6.6	+5.3	(-1.3)	-0.6	+1.9	±3.6
Average	±3.9	±6.2	(±3.9)	±3.4	±2.9	±4.5
Average deviation (HICOG - EMNID)	±2.6	±4.3	(±5.4)	±3.6	±2.2	±3.2
<u>Overall Deviation from Expected Variation</u>						
	±2.3	±3.4	(±4.1)	±3.0	±1.7	±2.6

<sup>1</sup>See the text for an explanation of how the scores for "deviation from expected variation" were obtained.

<sup>2</sup>Total or average calculations do not include figures for the "Total Coalition" category.

Source: See Tables 1 and 5, and footnotes 19, 24, and 39.

Table 6 shows a range of indicators of unanticipated variance (as we shall term deviation from expected variations) for the West German population. In two cases, in which the entire sample is divided into subsamples based on sex and age, HICOG findings are contrasted with those of the Federal Statistical Office's representative statistics. The remaining three cases show the amount of unanticipated variance between HICOG and EMNID surveys when the entire sample is broken up according to the respondents' (dichotomous) level of education, religion, and occupation. With one exception, the average amounts of unanticipated variance are well within the normally accepted limits of sampling error.

The exception comprises comparisons of the HICOG and EMNID surveys of occupational subgroups. The reason for this doubtless lies in the agencies' nonequivalent definitions of occupations, which in turn produced categories of unequal size in the two samples. The HICOG survey classifies 13.6 per cent of its respondents (excluding housewives) as "whitecollar workers", whereas 14 per cent of the EMNID sample are listed as employees and an additional four per cent as civil servants and employees in government offices. The extent to which the categories are congruent cannot be determined on the basis of available information. It seems likely, for instance, that some in EMNID's groupings might have been in the HICOG's category of semi-skilled workers. Similarly, EMNID put housewives into the occupational category of the head of the household, HICOG into a separate category altogether (not included in Table 6). The occupational classifications shown in Table 6, then, are only roughly equivalent for the two surveys, and render very tentative conclusions based on the groups thus classified.

The main import of the data shown in Table 6 is that, once we account for the main source of variation, the different surveys produce remarkably similar results. This remains true despite the need for caution imposed by the numerous potential sources of error noted earlier. In fact, the conclusion may even be conservative, since most of these sources of error, if they played a role at all, should have exacerbated variance from expected findings. The strategy followed in this section is more generally a harsh test of the validity of the HICOG data. A basic principle of sampling theory is that smaller samples produce greater variation in results, all other things being equal, than do larger samples. With the one major exception discussed in the last paragraph, breaking down the entire West German sample into subsamples based on several demographic criteria did not produce dramatic discrepancies between HICOG data and either the Federal Statistical Office's representative statistics or another sample survey conducted by a competing polling agency. Finding stable relationships where instability seems more likely enhances our sense that the HICOG data accurately tapped important dimensions of West German political attitudes.

Validity of the HICOG Data. Given limitations on the data available for reanalysis of the HICOG's 1953 election study, there is no way directly to validate its findings. We cannot return to the respondents interviewed for it, to check the responses or obtain additional information, nor, as we have seen, can we rely completely on the predictive power of any survey, especially the earlier ones, as a test of its validity. The procedure followed here was indirect



validation. Much as geologists test theories about the nature of the earth's interior at whatever outcroppings they can find, our procedure compared elements of the HICOG study that intersected with data from other empirical studies of the 1953 federal election in West Germany. Such comparisons are hampered severely, however, by imprecision and nonequivalencies in the instruments used by various agencies to investigate German electoral behavior.

The streams of evidence reviewed here consistently support the proposition that the surveys conducted for the HICOG's 1953 election study accurately mirrored public attitudes at the time. Several kinds of comparison with data from other surveys reveal no need for defensiveness on the part of HICOG professionals responsible for the High Commission's survey research. The results of their pre-election survey even closely approximated the actual outcome of the election. Moreover, once differences due primarily to its timing had been controlled for, the HICOG post-election survey proved to be extremely close (average unanticipated variance =  $\pm 1.5$  percentage points) to results, broken down by the sex and age of the respondents of the government's official statistics, based on the ballots of a representative sample of almost 320,000 West German voters. The conclusion seems inescapable that the surveys conducted for the HICOG election study were valid, that is, they in fact indicated about West German thinking on the election what those who had developed and used the surveys said they did.

Returning to a concern expressed early in the paper, we may reasonably be optimistic, if its 1953 election study can serve as an indicator, about the more general value of HICOG's public opinion surveys for understanding West German political attitudes. Their findings about the public's view on rearmament, the East-West conflict, European integration, reunification, and other issues may be taken at face value as indications of what the mass public was actually thinking. But such a statement lends itself easily to misunderstanding. There is a basic difference between an election study and public opinion on other vital topics. Most public opinion analysis rests on the electoral principle of "one man, one vote". That is, responses to questions are tallied, percentages of yeas and nays are reported, and the data are intercorrelated to test some more subtle notions. In the case of an election, majority opinion on one side, behind one party, wins the day for that party. Majority opinion on one side of a public issue not subject to a referendum, however, may easily be outweighed by the views of an articulate minority--and even, as Chancellor Adenauer showed time and again, by the strong feelings of a single man in a position of power. Public opinion is one desideratum, but only one, in the process by which governments make policy. To recognize the value of public opinion analysis for understanding policy and the policymaking process is not to mistake it as the sole dimension of these phenomena. Properly understood, the wide range of public opinion data collected and analyzed by the U.S. High Commission constitutes an important contribution to scholarship on the political development of postwar West Germany.

TOWARD RESOLVING CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS  
OF THE 1953 BUNDESTAG ELECTION

The data contained in the HICOG's 1953 election study, however brief a document it may be, can also make a concrete contribution to understanding both the election itself and West German electoral behavior. For one thing, it should be abundantly clear by now that the magnitude of the CDU/CSU's victory could have come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the HICOG or other pre-election surveys. Polls throughout the two months before the election revealed that the parties most likely to join in a coalition government under Adenauer would receive an overwhelming majority of the votes, and that the CDU/CSU by itself would outpoll the Social Democratic party by somewhere between a quarter and a third of the latter's votes. And, on the day before the election, HICOG analysts circulated a report predicting both that the CDU/CSU alone would get 46.0 per cent of the vote (it got 45.2 per cent) and that the coalition governing the First Bundestag, that is, the CDU/CSU, FDP, and DP, would obtain 60.9 per cent (somewhat above its actual total of 57.9 per cent).(43) If observers of the West German political scene were in fact surprised by the electoral outcome, then it was because they either had no knowledge of the polls or did not put much stock in the accuracy of poll results.

A second interpretation, that the election demonstrated the secure foundations of West German democracy, turns out upon analysis to be more rhetoric than anything else. It was of course not uncontested. Some pointed out that one supposed proof of the new attitude, a high turnout of voters, was a characteristic of pre-1933 German elections as well, including some in which anticonstitutional parties such as the Nazis and KPD enjoyed striking success. High rates of participation may be more a function of the voters' interest in the campaign (in which case, the more hotly contested the election, the higher is the turnout) than their desire to demonstrate loyalty to a political system. Others noted that the second proof was equally ambiguous: The 1953 election, they said, could not have served as a genuine test of the population's democratic sentiments since only parties committed to the maintenance of the constitutional order could take part.(44) The neo-Nazi Socialist Reich party, for instance, had already been banned by the Federal Constitutional Court; and officials of the Justice Ministry had already initiated proceedings that in 1956 would dissolve the Communist party as well. More to the point is the fact that West Germans had enjoyed ample opportunity during the preceding four years to demonstrate any basic antagonism toward the political system established under the Federal Republic. Few had chosen to do so.

Although the HICOG's 1953 election study does not deal directly with the question of whether or not West Germans enjoyed a solid sense of democracy, its other studies provide a wealth of relevant data. These data, along with findings reported by other polling agencies, showed that the mass of the population had accepted the principles and practices of democracy long before the 1953 election.(45) This is not to say that all antidemocratic sentiments had disappeared. This was not the case, nor is it for any other nation. Rather, in the early 1950s West Germans were increasingly satisfied with their

government, with the progress that it was making in reconstructing the German economy and regaining a measure of international recognition for their country. The continuing series of HICOG studies, in chronicling this development, suggests that the election was merely another marker in the path toward democracy and complete sovereignty. (46)

A third interpretation saw nothing remarkable in the 1953 Bundestag election, but rather people behaving much as they do in other industrial democracies when choosing among parties and candidates. The question shifts, then, from a societal to an individual level, from a concern with what the election meant for Germany as a whole to an interest in why people voted as they did. This paper outlined earlier five possible sources of West German electoral behavior (as well as that in similar countries): political issues, party identification, the candidates' personalities, special political circumstances, and the sociological characteristics of the voters. Here we can only summarize those main findings of the HICOG's 1953 election study which have a direct bearing on such explanations of voting behavior. A full analysis must be left for later.

Political issues in any specific sense were not overwhelmingly salient in the voters' responses to questions about their reasons for voting as they had. CDU/CSU voters stressed general feelings about the way things were going: Adenauer's personality and prestige in the world (mentioned by 30 per cent), religious reasons (21%), the economic gains of the years previous (19%), and satisfaction with the achievements of the CDU (17%), or simply their belief that the CDU/CSU "is the best party" (9%). Those who said that they had voted for the SPD were only slightly more oriented to specific issues. The top three reasons volunteered to explain why they had cast ballots for the Social Democrats were their belief that the SPD advocates the cause of the workers (69%), economic and social gains that could be expected from an SPD government (9%), and only in third place (with 7 per cent) the issues named by most observers as having been the key factors in the election--SPD opposition to German remilitarization and the European Defense Community (killed during the following summer by the French parliament, and ultimately replaced by a plan providing for West German membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). As Table 7 shows, even if they were given a list of possible reasons for voting and asked to say which of them weighed heaviest in their own minds, HICOG respondents shied away from responses oriented to issues. (47) A question asking why the CDU/CSU had done as well as it did in the election brought similar expressions. The three most frequently cited reasons were Adenauer's personality and achievements (29 per cent of all voters, 31 per cent of those who had voted for the CDU/CSU, and 27 per cent of those who had not), the Christian, that is, Catholic character of the party (21%), and its success in reviving the German economy (16%).

Nor did many German voters worry about the special political circumstances that were said to have favored the Christian Union parties. Only six per cent of all voters attributed the party's success to its more effective election campaign, and only four per cent cited poor propaganda as a cause of the SPD's relatively poor showing. Asked whether or not they had anything to criticize

Table 7: Reasons given for Voting for a Particular Party

Question: "There are, of course, various reasons which cause one to vote for a party, but in most cases one reason is more important than another. Can you tell me now which of these reasons was the most important one for your voting for the (CDU or SPD)? And what would be in second place? And what in third place?"

	<u>First Place</u>	<u>Second Place</u>	<u>Third Place</u>
<u>Reasons for Voting for the CDU</u>			
The CDU is a Christian party	40%	7%	6%
Adenauer has acquired respect, friends, and prestige for Germany throughout the world	18	24	17
Adenauer is a great leader	16	20	11
The CDU led us to prosperity and economic recovery	11	17	18
The CDU best advocates German reunification	7	15	12
The CDU had the most capable candidate in my constituency	2	2	4
The CDU is for our military participation in the EDC --the European Defense Community	1	4	4
The CDU is for a political union of West Europe	*	4	10
The CDU had the best solutions for important issues in my constituency	-	*	4
My most important reason for voting for the CDU is none of the above reasons, but ... (supplied by respondent)	3	1	2
No opinion	2	6	12
Total	100%	100%	100%
<u>Reasons for Voting for the SPD</u>			
The SPD has always been the workers' party	57%	14%	5%
The SPD is against our military participation in the EDC--the European Defense Community	14	21	11
The SPD has the best economic and social programs	11	11	16
The SPD is independent of church influence	6	22	11
Because I'm dissatisfied with my economic circumstances	3	5	8
The SPD best advocates German reunification	2	8	9
Because I'm dissatisfied with Adenauer and the Federal government	1	6	8
The SPD had the most capable candidate in my constituency	*	*	4
The SPD had the best solutions for important issues in my constituency	*	-	3
Ollenhauer is a great leader	-	*	2
My most important reason for voting for the SPD is none of the above reasons, but ... (supplied by respondent)	3	2	3
No opinion	3	11	20
Total	100%	100%	100%

\*Less than one-half of one per cent.

Source: HICOG, Series No. 2, Report No. 191, December 11, 1953, pp. 17, 19.

about the parties' campaigns, two-thirds (66%) responded negatively and a quarter (24%) offered criticisms. Half of the latter group complained in general about the mudslinging campaign tactics (7%) or the waste of money in campaigning (5%), but many of the remaining respondents focused more narrowly on the propaganda of one party or the other. The charges were directed in roughly equal proportions to the two major parties.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's pre-election remarks, which were widely interpreted as an overt indication of American backing for Chancellor Adenauer and the CDU/CSU, seemed to have had some but not an overwhelming effect on German voters: Whereas in July only one in six (16%) felt that the United States supported the CDU/CSU, the post-election survey in September found that 28 per cent held this view. Among the electorate as a whole, 40 per cent felt that America did not support any particular party. Almost a third (30%) of CDU/CSU voters thought that their party had received American support, and five of six of these respondents approved the American behavior. Of the 45 per cent of SPD voters who saw their rivals receiving such support, two in nine (10%) approved of it anyway and three times that number (30%) disapproved. No one among the 1,270 respondents in the nationwide poll seems to have responded to an open-ended question about the reason for the CDU/CSU's success with the charge that it was due to American intervention.

In short, although there was consensus among experts at the time and later historians of the period that the CDU/CSU ran a more "modern" political campaign and that the United States had intervened rather directly to encourage support for the party, and although Social Democratic leaders at the time complained loudly that both circumstances were working to the SPD's disadvantage, the popular perception was considerably less clearcut. Only small minorities felt that the CDU/CSU's putative advantages paid off in terms of votes, and a minority even among the Social Democratic supporters objected to what they thought they saw. This is not to say that these circumstances did not help the Christian Union parties. Indeed, the fact that their presence was not commonly recognized may have enhanced their effectiveness in winning votes for the CDU/CSU. The point here is that there was no strong popular perception of any special political circumstances that worked to the advantage of Chancellor Adenauer and his party.

Looking at voters in different social groupings, we find that the CDU/CSU emerged from the election with a nearly clean sweep. HICOG analysts divided respondents into 33 categories according to sex, level of education, age, income, occupation, origin (natives vs. expellees or refugees from the East), and religion. In only four of these--two of them (19 people professing a religion other than Protestantism or Catholicism, and 41 professing no religion at all) comprising too few respondents for the results to be considered statistically significant--did the number of SPD voters outweigh those who reported having voted for the CDU/CSU. The two clearly deviant categories were semi-skilled laborers (34 per cent for the CDU/CSU, 37 per cent for the SPD) and skilled laborers (35 and 36 per cent, respectively). To discuss the sociological correlates of voting behavior, then, means to focus attention primarily on differences in the degree to which groupings supported the Union parties rather than the Social Democrats.

Those most likely to support the SPD were semi-skilled and skilled workers, lower-middle income groups, people aged 35 to 54 years, Protestants, those with only an elementary school education, and men. Unfortunately, the HICOG report does not provide us with additional data, such as cross-tabulations, that would enable us to carry this sociological analysis further. To do that we must turn to Juan Linz's reanalysis of the study performed in July and August 1953 by DIVO for the UNESCO Institute for Social Research. (48) The UNESCO data reinforced the essentially impressionistic judgment based on the HICOG study that social class and religion are the most critical variables accounting for voting behavior. Workers tended to support the SPD, and so did Protestants, particularly if they were not too active in the church. Protestant workers who went to church regularly were more likely than other Protestant workers to vote for the CDU/CSU. Likewise, Catholic workers, subject to cross-pressures because of their membership in social groups with opposing political tendencies, would in all likelihood follow the path indicated by their church affiliation if they went to Mass fairly frequently, but vote for the SPD if they were estranged from the church. These relationships remained fairly stable through at least the early 1960s. (49) In the parliamentary elections since 1969, however, the religious element has been disappearing as a correlate of voting behavior. (50)

The most difficult of the five "explanatory" variables to discuss in the framework of the HICOG's 1953 election study is party identification. Data noted above suggest a hard core of adherents of each major party, but how large or solid these groups were is impossible to determine. In effect, the HICOG study used as its sole indicator of party identification a question about how respondents had voted on September 6--a problematic procedure, as we have seen since misremembered votes or nonresponsiveness skewed the overall distribution of responses in the direction of the most successful party. Whether or not those identified as "CDU/CSU voters" had enjoyed a longtime commitment to that party (or its predecessor, the Center party of Weimar Germany) or were voting for it as a protest against the leadership of the party to which their hearts really belonged cannot be determined. This problem is not unique to the HICOG study. German electoral analysts are continuing to debate the existence in the Federal Republic of a party identification equivalent to that found by students of United States elections. (51)

The scholarly value of the HICOG study, then, depends upon the uses to which scholars want to put it. On the one hand, as this paper has sought to demonstrate, it is a valid reflection of the state of West German public opinion in the late summer of 1953. The survey conducted in the two weeks immediately before the election even formed the basis for a reasonably accurate prediction of how that election would turn out. Historians interested in the political development of the Federal Republic in the early 1950s will find it and other surveys conducted by the High Commission an important source of information.

For theorists of electoral behavior, on the other hand, the study leaves much to be desired. The main reason for this is doubtless the fact that HICOG analysts were interested in the practical

uses of the surveys--to develop information and predictions that could be used for planning United States policy--and only marginally in developing and testing theory about society and individual behavior.(52) The questions asked in the various surveys that comprised the HICOG's 1953 election study did not reflect the latest theoretic developments, as carried on, for instance, at the Survey Research Center of The University of Michigan. Nor did the way in which the data were presented render the study of great use for those interested in expanding a systematic framework for understanding how people vote and why. Even so the social scientist oriented toward theory will find in the study data and ideas that say something about the extent to which certain lines of questioning and techniques for conducting surveys are useful cross-nationally. For the period of the early 1950s, when data were scarce and the possibilities for organizing electoral studies in countries other than the United States were just as rare HICOG's 1953 election study stands as a milestone. Moreover, by extending our confidence in the validity of the election study to other surveys conducted for the United States High Commission in Germany, it opens up new vistas for students of modern social and political history. This may be the greatest contribution of the 1953 election study.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The official positions of foreign governments cited in this paragraph are taken from The New York Times, September 8, 1953, pp. 2-3
2. Cited in Anthony Leviero, "Eisenhower Hails Trend in Germany", The New York Times, September 8, 1953, p. 1; in the same issue, Clifton Daniel (in an article entitled "Adenauer Victory Called a Mandate for United Europe", p. 2) wrote that "Dr. Adenauer himself was 'astonished' by the magnitude of his electoral success and his supporters were equally surprised".
3. Heino Kaack, Geschichte und Struktur des deutschen Parteien-systems (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1971), p. 218.
4. Data from information provided in Kaack, Geschichte und Struktur, pp. 210-215. The percentages given in the text include the election of December 3, 1950 for West Berlin's House of Representatives; if we exclude this election on the grounds that West Berliners could not vote in the 1953 Bundestag election, then the figures are 31.7 per cent for the SPD and 29.4 per cent for the CDU/CSU. The election of November 30, 1952 for the Saar State Parliament is excluded since the region was not yet part of the Federal Republic. It may be added that Kaack's argument loses strength if we consider the success of the CDU/CSU's coalition partners (FDP, DP, and BHE) in their previous elections at the state level. They got a total of 21.3 per cent of the vote, which, when added to that obtained by the CDU/CSU, gave the coalition partners an absolute majority of 50.5 per cent.
5. "The Adenauer Triumph", The New York Times, September 8, 1953, p. 30.

6. For a particularly interesting expression of this argument, in this case comparing trends in the Soviet Union and United States, see Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: The Viking Press, 1964).
7. The New York Times, September 8, 1953, p. 1; see also Henry C. Wallich, Mainsprings of the German Revival (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 327.
8. Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1953-1955 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GmbH, 1966), p. 199.
9. See, for example, responses to the question asked periodically by the Institut für Demoskopie: "What great German has in your view accomplished the most for Germany"? Adenauer, mentioned by none in January 1950, three per cent in August 1952, and nine per cent in November 1953, was outranked in each year by Bismarck, Hitler (except in 1953, when both got nine per cent), and various emperors, kings, and generals. Not until the late 1950s did Adenauer take a commanding lead in responses to the question. See Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1947-1955 (Allensbach-am-Bodensee: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1956), p. 132.
10. Daniel, "Adenauer Victory", p. 2.
11. Terence Prittie, Konrad Adenauer, 1876-1967 (Chicago, Ill.: Cowles Book Company, 1971), p. 212.
12. Kaack, Geschichte und Struktur, p. 218; see also Klaus Schütz, "Der Wahlkampf", in Wähler und Gewählte: Eine Untersuchung der Bundestagswahlen 1953, ed. Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber and Klaus Schütz et al. (Berlin and Frankfurt -am-Main: Verlag Franz Vahlen GmbH, 1957), pp. 26-35.
13. See Schütz, "Der Wahlkampf", pp. 142-143. Prittie, in Konrad Adenauer, p. 210, argues, however, that the sensational events had no direct effect on the West German election.
14. The role of the United States is described in detail by Schütz, "Der Wahlkampf", pp. 125-140; and Henry L. Bretton, "United States Foreign Policy and the Election", in German Democracy at Work: A Selective Study, ed. James K. Pollock (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1955), pp. 150-173.
15. In this view, party identification mediates between primary group associations (the most important of which in West Germany, as will be discussed below, are social class and religion) and the individual's actual vote.
16. Frederick Mosteller, Herbert Hyman, Philip J. McCarthy, Eli S. Marks, and David B. Truman, The Pre-election Polls of 1948: Report to the Committee on Analysis of Pre-election Polls and Forecasts, Bulletin 60 (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1949).
17. The standard text on sampling is Leslie Kish, Survey Sampling (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965); for a highly readable introduction, see Morris James Slonim, Sampling: A Quick, Reliable Guide to Practical Statistics (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1960). On survey methodology more generally, see Charles H. Backstrom and Gerald D. Hursh, Survey Research (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963); Morris Rosenberg, The



- Logic of Survey Analysis (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1968); and, for a brief but excellent introduction, chapters 5 and 6 in Barbara Leigh Smith, Karl. F. Johnson, David Warren Paulsen, and Frances Shocket, Political Research Methods: Foundations and Techniques (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), pp. 123-178. See also Herbert H. Hyman, Secondary Analysis of Sample Surveys: Principles, Procedures and Potentialities (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972).
18. The OMGUS reports are summarized and discussed in Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970).
  19. For summaries and a discussion, see Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany: The HICOG Surveys, 1949-1955 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979).
  20. A brief discussion of the sampling procedure used by DIVO is contained in HICOG Series No. 2, Report No. 69, "The West German People View Defense Participation, Neutrality and Related Issues", March 29, 1951; see also Erich Reigrotzki, Soziale Verflechtungen in der Bundesrepublik: Elemente der sozialen Teilnahme in Kirche, Politik, Organisationen und Freizeit (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1956), pp. 253-271.
  21. One problem that had worried OMGUS officials but which their HICOG successors could avoid was potential bias due to the American sponsorship of the survey; see Leo P. Crespi, "The Influence of Military Government Sponsorship in German Opinion Polling", International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research, 4:2 (Summer 1950), 151-178.
  22. Such clues appear, for example, in reports on the use of "split-halves" sampling, in which a sample is divided randomly into two equal groups, the same question is asked of both halves of the sample, and the amount of variation is noted.
  23. Data are reported in the Allensbacher Berichte, issued thrice monthly, and occasional yearbooks, such as Noelle and Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch 1947-1955. Technical information on the IfD surveys will be found in the introduction to the above volume, pp. xi-xxxix.
  24. Technical information on the EMNID surveys will be found in Günter Herzig, "Die Befragungen von EMNID und DIVO", in Wähler und Gewählte, ed. Hirsch-Weber and Schütz et al., pp. 413-430.
  25. See Reigrotzki, Soziale Verflechtungen, pp. 253-271, and also Herzig, "Die Befragungen", pp. 413-430.
  26. Note that omitting people who did not name parties from the overall distributions implies an electoral model that distributes such respondents proportionately among the other response categories; see below, p. 18.
  27. See Ronald A. Francisco, "The Beleaguered Party: Ideological Political Parties in Adverse Environments", Ph. D. thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1977.
  28. An IfD question asked after the election sought to determine whether voters would be willing to accept a coalition that included the BHE. Given a choice of various constellations

that could form a coalition, 32 per cent opted for a continuation of the existing coalition (CDU/CSU, FDP, and DP), and 33 per cent for the existing coalition with the addition of the BHE. (A CDU/CSU-SPD coalition was favored by 29 per cent). See Noelle and Neumann, Jahrbuch 1947-1955, p. 179.

29. See, for example, variations in responses to two different questions asked in the UNESCO survey (Table 2).
30. Wordings in German are, for the HICOG study, "Würden Sie mir bitte sagen, welche Partei Ihnen am besten gefällt?" and, for the IfD survey, "Welche Partei steht Ihren Ansichten am nächsten?"
31. Incomplete reporting did not permit similar calculations for the Union's coalition partners. For all parties other than the CDU/CSU and SPD, however,  $r = +0.82$ ,  $p < .05$ . Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients are  $r_s = 0.90$  for the CDU/CSU,  $r_s = +0.82$  for the SPD,  $r_s = +0.88$  for the ratio of CDU/CSU to SPD responses, and  $r_s = +0.89$  for all other parties.
32. See Frieder Naschold, Wahlprognosen und Wählerverhalten in der BRD (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag (Urban-Taschenbücher, Reihe 80, Bd.808), 1971).
33. The questions are listed in an appendix to HICOG Report No. 191 of Series No. 2, "A Survey Analysis of the Factors Underlying the Outcome of the 1953 German Federal Elections", p. 60. The description of how the data were transformed into a prediction is based on Herzig, "Die Befragungen", pp. 428-430. The data in the DIVO files that Herzig analyzed included only 663 respondents, in contrast to 664 as reported by HICOG. Unfortunately, the HICOG report lists final predictions without giving the calculations that went into them; Herzig's description of the DIVO data yields predictions at variance with those in the HICOG report (see Table 4).
34. A more realistic assumption, not testable with available data, is that some portion (perhaps half) of those expressing uncertainty about whether they would vote did in fact go to the polls; if this is true, then approximately a twelfth of the sample of eligible voters reported an intention to vote but did not in fact do so.
35. Another way of achieving the same effect in estimating probable outcomes is simply to ignore those voters who refuse to indicate any partisan leaning; this principle underlay the calculations reported in Table 2.
36. For a particularly innovative technique, see Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P. Abelson, and Samuel Popkin, Candidates, Issues & Strategies: A Computer Simulation of the 1960 and 1964 Presidential Elections (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1965).
37. For the overall changes from one EMNID survey to the next, see Table 2. For changes within demographic groupings, see Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber, "Die Stimmabgabe einzelner Bevölkerungsgruppen", in Wähler und Gewählte, ed. Hirsch-Weber and Schütz et al., pp. 189-293.

38. This point suggests two limitations to the HICOG's procedure of presenting its data. In the process of combining the two sets of responses, the size of the sample is reduced from 2,174 to 1,921 respondents, but no information is given as to why this was done. Second, by collapsing the data into a single table, it is not possible to see how the distribution of recalled votes changed from late September to late October. For present purposes, however, neither of these problems is overwhelming.
39. The procedures for collecting the representative statistics are described in Kurt Horstmann, "Wahlbeteiligung und Stimmabgabe nach Geschlecht und Alter sowie die Art der Kombination der Erst- und Zweitstimmen", Wirtschaft und Statistik, 6:1 (January 1954), 9-13.
40. The collection of these representative statistics has a history in Germany (and elsewhere) that dates back to the beginning of our century. Their availability for each electoral district separately makes it possible to analyze them through the technique of ecological correlation, in which the aggregate characteristics (e.g. percentage of Catholics or workers) of districts are compared; see, for example, David P. Conradt, The West German Party System: An Ecological Analysis of Social Structure and Voting Behavior, 1961-1969 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE Publications, Inc. (Sage Professional Papers, Comparative Politics Series, 01-028), 1972).
41. It would also be possible to adjust the figures according to the actual numbers of people in the appropriate age categories (3,625,000 in the 25-29 category (50.06%) and 3,616,800 in the 30-34 category (49.94%)), but since we do not know whether or not the exact breakdown by age in the representative sample reflects that of the national population, such extra precision is doubtless superfluous.
42. The procedure described in the text implies an additive model, in which the normal amount of variance is added on to the base figure (that is, the figure given in the representative statistics). It would also be possible to use a multiplicative procedure. If the representative statistics reported that 43.3 per cent of the voters cast ballots for the CDU/CSU and the HICOG study showed that 54.0 per cent of the respondents recalled having voted for the CDU/CSU, then the difference between them (+10.7 percentage points) would be viewed as a percentage increment of the base figure ( $+10.7 \div 43.3 = +24.7\%$ ). Representative statistics for each subcategory of the population would be changed by the same percentage. Thus if the representative statistics showed that 47.2 per cent of the women in the sample voted for the CDU/CSU, then we would expect the corresponding HICOG figure to be 58.9 per cent (that is,  $47.2 + (47.2 \times +24.7\%) = 47.2 + 11.7 = 58.9$ ). Since the reported HICOG figure is 59.3 per cent, the deviation from the expected would be +0.4 percentage points. The average deviations for each demographic category, according to the multiplicative procedure, are as follows:

	<u>CDU/</u> <u>CSU</u>	<u>FDP</u> <u>BHE</u>	<u>SPD</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Parties</u>	<u>Average</u>
Sex	±0.6	±0.4	±0.9	±0.5	±0.6
Age	±2.4	±2.0	±2.6	±0.8	±2.0
Education level	±2.3	±1.0	±3.1	±1.0	±1.8
Religion	±2.9	±0.6	±2.1	±0.5	±1.5
Occupation	±6.2	±3.7	±4.7	±2.4	±4.3
Average	±3.5	±1.9	±3.0	±1.3	±2.4

A rapid comparison of the figures presented above with those in Table 6 shows some differences, most of them insignificant in magnitude. The multiplicative procedure in general supports the conclusions reached in the text.

43. HICOG series No. 2, Report No. 191, p. 2, notes that the predictions were presented on the afternoon of September 5 (the day before the election) to the director of the Office of Public Affairs. A visiting American scholar, Daniel S. McHargue, reports that he was shown these predictions later in the same day. (see his "Note on Public Opinion Polls", in German Democracy at Work, ed. Pollock, pp. 176-178). Given the closeness of Secretary Dulles's relations with Adenauer, it is reasonable to assume that basic information about the election's probable outcome was communicated to the Chancellor (no doubt merely confirming what he was hearing from the Institut für Demoskopie, under contract during the election to the CDU/CSU). It is in any event difficult to credit Adenauer's statement (as reported by Daniel, "Adenauer Victory", p. 2) that he was "astonished" by the size of his party's victory--unless the time frame he had in mind encompassed the period after mid-1951, when his popularity and that of the CDU/CSU were at a very low point (see Figure 1; and Noelle and Neumann, Jahrbuch 1947-1955, pp. 172-173).
44. Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber, "Zusammenfassende Bemerkungen", in Wähler und Gewählte, ed. Hirsch-Weber and Schütz et al., pp. 408-409. He also notes that the parties in power during the First Bundestag had changed the electoral law to make it more difficult for small parties to secure representation (and, more generally, to discourage them from participation in parliamentary elections).
45. These findings are reported in extenso in Merritt and Merritt, Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany; Noelle and Neumann, Jahrbuch 1947-1955; and, more specifically, Richard L. Merritt, "Digesting the Past: Views of National Socialism in Semi-sovereign Germany", Societas, 7:2 (Spring 1977), 93-120.
46. In September 1953, 44 per cent of the HICOG sample expressed their opinion that democracy in West Germany had grown stronger during the preceding years (5 per cent thought it weaker); half (50%) believed that Germans could govern themselves democratically, as against 15 per cent who thought not. HICOG Series No. 2, Report No. 191, p. 47.

47. HICOG analysts even expressed concern on one point: that as many as 77 per cent of the sample claimed no knowledge of the platform of the extreme rightwing German Reich party (DRP).
48. Juan J. Linz Storch de Gracia, "The Social Bases of West German Politics", Ph. D. thesis, Columbia University, 1960.
49. Erhard Blankenburg, Kirchliche Bindung und Wahlverhalten: Die sozialen Faktoren bei der Wahlentscheidung Nordrhein-Westfalen 1961 bis 1966 (Olten and Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter-Verlag, 1967).
50. Werner Kaltefleiter, Zwischen Konsens und Krise: Eine Analyse der Bundestagswahl 1972 (Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 1973), writing after the 1972 election, termed the diminishing importance of religion in voting decisions a part of West Germany's trend toward modernity.
51. Max Kaase, "Party Identification in West Germany", in Party Identification and Beyond, ed. Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, and John Fairlie (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1976).
52. This was particularly true after January 1953, when John Foster Dulles, who had little use for public opinion analysis, became Secretary of State. During his stewardship, the surveying operations of the U.S. High Commission were sharply curtailed, and their focus shifted from politics to U.S. operations.