

Missile defence in the post-ABM Treaty era: the international state of the art

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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Forschungsbericht / research report

Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Kubbig, B. W. (2007). *Missile defence in the post-ABM Treaty era: the international state of the art*. (Forschung DSF, 10). Osnabrück: Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-260346>

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Missile Defence in
the Post-ABM Treaty Era:
The International State of the Art

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Gestaltung, Satz und Herstellung: atelier-raddatz.de und DSF
Druck: Günter-Druck GmbH, Georgsmarienhütte
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Printed in Germany 2007

Spendenkonto der Deutschen Stiftung Friedensforschung:
Sparkasse Osnabrück, Konto 1230, BLZ 265 501 05

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DSF Forschung is published irregularly. The authors alone are responsible for the content of the publications.

Abstract¹

The main emphasis of this report is on the domestic scenery with respect to both comparing and explaining the individual missile defence policies of 16 democracies. These 16 case studies give answers to the following three research questions: 1) How the missile defence (MD) policy in each country has developed as a response to the proliferation problem in the context of the broader security and foreign policy; 2) how it is located in the overall domestic setting and 3) how the MD policy can be explained.

The seven major findings are the following:

- The unilateral termination of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by the Bush administration in 2002 was by all major states grudgingly accepted and cautiously welcomed, with resentments alive in Russia.
- An American territorial umbrella has few strong supporters and is not broadly legitimised, as is shown by continuous criticism in several democracies.
- Almost all democracies share a consensus on theatre missile defence for the protection of troops/small areas.
- Missile defence is a firm part of military thinking – but its relevance as a viable response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains, despite some variance, all in all limited.
- Due to several structural and situational reasons, a broad debate on missile defence has hardly taken place in most of the democracies (with no difference in Russia). The analytical insights into the domestic settings reveal a variety of sub-structures and political/strategic cultures, featuring in many cases a strong executive branch, a hardly controlling parliament, and a congruence of public opinion and government policies in three cases.
- The United States is almost non-comparable and remains second to none. As the dominant power it has structured the entire missile defence issue area to a considerable degree by applying its unique range of foreign policy instruments. The security concept of the almost unconstrained and ambivalent hegemon with both benign and imperial aspirations is no longer treaty-based in the missile defence field.
- Comparing the explanatory factors for the paramount missile defence-related issues of the 16 democracies reveals a combination of four major determinants: 1) foreign policy identity; 2) domestic power constellations; 3) the United States as an external driver and 4) threat perceptions.

What accounts for the variety of missile defence policies of the democracies? In a nutshell, it is neither their formal status as a democracy, nor their different quality as a democratic country within the spectrum of the stable, new, and deficient democracies in the cases of Turkey and even more so of Russia. The two traditional explanatory factors – the role of

1 I would like to thank Ms. Shiva Behzad, Axel Nitsche and Ms. Susanne Pihls for their valuable assistance. This report summarises the results of the 16 case studies by 17 scholars from 14 countries for the Special Volume of 'Contemporary Security Policy' on 'The Domestic Politics of Missile Defence', Vol. 26, No. 3 (December 2005), edited by Bernd W. Kubbig and Axel Nitsche, with contributions of J. Marshall Beier, Mark Smith, Radek Khol, Jørgen Dragsdahl, Ronja Kempin/Jocelyn Mawdsley, András Rácz, Philip Everts, Rafal Domisiewicz/Sławomir Kamiński, Isil Kazan, Rajesh Rajagopalan, Reuven Pedatzur, Taku Ishikawa, Alla Kassianova, Byung-joon Ahn as well as Bernd W. Kubbig/Axel Nitsche.

military alliances such as NATO and the geographical/geopolitical position of the democracies examined – are secondary. In the final analysis it is the combination of the foreign policy orientations in connection with the particular domestic power constellations (in some cases strong economic and bureaucratic interests), the role of the US and the relevance of perceived threats that account for either a sceptical/critical or a supportive policy (threats defined mostly as missiles from non-democratic adversaries, but to a lesser extent as the US menacing the basic foreign policy orientations of other democracies).

The research report finally lists several major problems ahead associated with missile defence systems. To mention two of them: In the case of basing radars or interceptors on Central European territory, Russia in particular would be affected. What if Moscow chooses to obstruct those kinds of missile defence plans, establishes stronger ties with Beijing, intensifies its arms trade in the rocket area with countries of concern, bypasses arms control agreements, continues to intensify its arms build-up and aims its nuclear-tipped missiles at Polish strategic targets? In addition, ecological and social risks are probably associated with the interception of an atomic, biological or chemical warhead which falls on European territory.

The report concludes with research perspectives. They focus on the conflict potential to be assessed in view of rising nations (economically and technologically) and in terms of their 'rising' rocket and space-faring capabilities. Here, Brazil, China, India, and Iran are the case in point. Finally, the research question is raised: What role is missile defence likely to play in the context of a ballistic missiles free zone? Would missile defence enhance or hamper such a zone? It is finally suggested that the pool of expertise presented in the Special Volume of 'Contemporary Security Policy' on 'The Domestic Politics of Missile Defence'² would be a solid base for the establishment of a multilateral study group on a rocket free zone in the Broader Middle East/Persian Gulf region.

2 For follow-up analyses on the developments see PRIF's internet project 'Ballistic Missile Defense Research', available at: <http://www.hsfk.de/abm>.

Zusammenfassung³

Der Fokus dieses Forschungsberichtes liegt auf der gesellschaftlichen Debatte in 16 Demokratien, deren jeweilige Raketenabwehrpolitik miteinander verglichen und erklärt werden soll. Die einzelnen Fallstudien möchten die folgenden drei Forschungsfragen beantworten: 1) Wie hat sich die jeweilige Raketenabwehrpolitik im Kontext des umfassenderen außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Konzepts als Antwort auf das Proliferations-Problem entwickelt? 2) Wie ist Raketenabwehr in den Gesamtzusammenhang der politischen Diskussionen und Kräftekonstellationen des jeweiligen Landes einzuordnen? 3) Wie lassen sich die auf die ersten beiden Fragen gefundenen Antworten erklären?

Die sieben zentralen Resultate lauten:

- Die unilaterale Aufkündigung des Raketenabwehrvertrages durch die Bush-Administration im Jahre 2002 wurde von allen einflussreichen Staaten mit Skepsis zur Kenntnis genommen, aber letztlich akzeptiert. Deutlichere Vorbehalte gegenüber der US-Entscheidung lassen sich bis heute in Russland finden.
- Von den analysierten Staaten befürworten nur einige einen amerikanischen Schutzschild. Er steht deshalb – wie die heftige Kritik in einer Reihe von Demokratien zeigt – auf keiner soliden Legitimationsbasis.
- Fast alle Demokratien teilen den Wunsch, vor allem Soldaten bei Auslandseinsätzen durch ein taktisches Raketenabwehrsystem schützen zu wollen, wenn diese Aktivitäten in einem Umfeld mit feindlichen Massenvernichtungsmitteln durchgeführt werden.
- Die Raketenabwehrpolitik ist ein bedeutendes Element im sicherheitspolitischen Denken der untersuchten Staaten. Als Antwort auf die Gefahr der Proliferation von Massenvernichtungswaffen werden die Raketenabwehrsysteme – trotz einiger Unterschiede zwischen den betrachteten Staaten – aber kaum gesehen.
- Auf Grund von strukturellen und situativen Gründen konnte sich eine breite Debatte über die Aspekte einer Raketenabwehrpolitik ausnahmslos nur sehr bedingt entwickeln. Die Analyse des politischen Gesamtkontextes, in dem der jeweilige Diskurs ausgetragen worden ist, unterstrich die Bedeutung der auf Länderebene unterschiedlich ausgeprägten politisch-strategischen Kulturen. Sie gründete in vielen Fällen auf der starken Stellung der Exekutive und einem Parlament, das seiner Kontrollfunktion nur begrenzt nachkam. In nur drei Fällen war die öffentliche Meinung mit der Position der Regierung deckungsgleich.
- Die Vereinigten Staaten stellen eine Ausnahme dar, sie sind mit den anderen Ländern kaum zu vergleichen. Als Supermacht hat Washington die unterschiedlichsten Instrumente seiner Außenpolitik eingesetzt und somit die gesamte Raketenabwehrdebatte zu einem beträchtlichen Grad geprägt. Der fast entfesselte und ambivalente Hegemon, der seine Sicherheitspolitik sowohl mit

3 Dieser Bericht fasst die Ergebnisse der 16 Fallstudien von insgesamt 17 Experten aus 14 Ländern zusammen, die in dem Schwerpunktband 'The Domestic Politics of Missile Defence' der begutachteten Fachzeitschrift 'Contemporary Security Policy', Vol. 26, Nr. 3 (Dezember 2005), erschienen sind, welcher von Bernd W. Kubbig und Axel Nitsche herausgegeben wurde. Der Sammelband umfasst Beiträge von J. Marshall Beier, Mark Smith, Radek Khol, Jørgen Dragsdahl, Ronja Kempin/Jocelyn Mawdsley, András Rácz, Philip Everts, Rafal Domisiewicz/Sławomir Kamiński, Isil Kazan, Rajesh Rajagopalan, Reuven Pedatzur, Taku Ishikawa, Alla Kassianova, Byung-joon Ahn und Bernd W. Kubbig/Axel Nitsche.

gutmütigen als auch imperialen Mitteln durchführt, will sich nicht länger durch Verträge einschränken lassen.

- Ein Vergleich zwischen den in den Fallstudien herausgearbeiteten Erklärungsfaktoren für die jeweilige Raketenabwehrpolitik ergibt eine Kombination von vier zentralen Handlungsursachen: 1) Außenpolitische Identität (die jeweilige außenpolitische Orientierung); 2) die politischen Machtverhältnisse innerhalb des Staates (in einigen Fällen existieren starke ökonomische und bürokratische Interessen); 3) die USA als äußerer Motor; und 4) die Bedrohungen, die primär von nicht-demokratischen Ländern ausgehen.

Sowohl der formale Status aller Länder als Demokratie als auch die Unterschiede in der Qualität der demokratischen Verfasstheit – die Türkei und Russland nehmen als defizitäre Demokratien einen Sonderstatus ein – scheiden als mögliche Erklärungen aus. Die Erklärungskraft des Allianzfaktors (sprich der Eingliederung in militärische Bündnisse wie der NATO) und der geographischen Lage eines Staates sind sekundär.

Der Forschungsbericht nennt schließlich eine Reihe von Problemen, die im Zusammenhang mit den Raketenabwehrsystemen zu erwarten sind: Zum einen die Reaktion Moskaus auf die Stationierung von Radarsystemen oder Abfangraketen in Zentraleuropa: Was geschieht, wenn sich Russland entschließt, derartige Pläne verhindern zu wollen und daher seine Beziehungen mit Peking intensiviert, den Waffenhandel – auch im Raketenbereich – mit „Problemstaaten“ ausbaut, Rüstungskontrollabkommen ignoriert, eigene Rüstungsbemühungen weiterhin erhöht und seine Raketen mit Nuklearsprengköpfen gegen strategische Ziele in Polen oder Tschechien richtet? Zum anderen kommen ökologische Risiken hinzu, die mit dem Abschuss eines atomaren, biologischen oder chemischen Sprengkopfes über europäischem Gebiet verbunden sein dürften.

Darüber hinaus zeigt der Forschungsbericht zu bearbeitende Forschungsfragen auf. Sie konzentrieren sich auf das Konfliktpotenzial, das mit dem erhöhten Raketen- und Weltraumpotential aufstrebender Mächte (in wirtschaftlicher und technologischer Hinsicht) verbunden ist. Brasilien, China, Indien und der Iran sind hier zu nennen. Zudem sollte die Forschung eine zentrale Frage beantworten: Welche Rolle kommt Raketenabwehrsystemen im Zusammenhang mit raketenfreien Zonen zu – würden sie die Entstehung solcher Zonen begünstigen oder blockieren? Abschließend legt der Forschungsbericht nahe, dass das Wissen der im Sammelband⁴ vertretenen Experten eine optimale Basis für die Einberufung einer Multilateralen Studiengruppe zu einer raketenfreien Zone im Nahen Osten/Persischen Golf ist.

4 Hintergrundanalysen zu neueren Entwicklungen im Bereich der Raketenabwehr finden sich im Internet-Projekt „Ballistic Missile Defense Research“, in: <http://www.hsfk.de/abm>.

1. The Research Design: Comparing Missile Defence Policies of 16 Democracies⁵

1.1 Missile Defence – Still Relevant, Still Controversial

With the unilateral abrogation of the American-Soviet/Russian Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 by the George W. Bush administration in 2002, a new phase in the history of missile defence (MD) began.⁶ When the Republican Bush government came to power in January 2001, the long period of consensus building on MD in the United States came by and large to an end. Terminating the ABM Treaty was, under those domestic constellations, the logical step since the principal aim of that agreement – to forbid the deployment of a continental shield – was not compatible with the opposite goal of the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, passed by both Houses of Congress and signed by President Clinton into law in July 1999. When the treaty ceased to exist in June 2002, the American-Russian disputes about the fate of the bilateral agreement ended.

The supporters of a determined MD policy, who had prevailed in the controversies, regarded the bilateral agreement as harmful to US interests, since in view of the changed security environment the United States needed in the first place to deploy a continental shield as a means of countering the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – atomic, biological, and chemical weapons – as well as of ballistic missiles. This continental umbrella was to become part of a global defence architecture which would protect America's allies and interests as well. The multi-layered shield would consist of theatre missile defence systems (TMD) in two variants: for regional or nationwide protection or in terms of point defence for the protection of soldiers who were conducting their military activities in WMD hostile environments.

Since the US-Soviet/Russian dimension dominated this entire policy field, it is not surprising that the bulk of the rich MD literature has been devoted to the East-West aspects and above all to the United States.⁷ The special focus on the US was due to the fact that it has been the major player whose policies in this field are relatively easily accessible for research purposes. The debates about all variants of MD throughout its history after the

5 I am indebted to two anonymous reviewers of this research report as well as to Axel Nitsche, Mirko Jacobowski, Alexander Wicker, Martina Glebocki, and Sven-Eric Fikenscher as well as to David Garrick for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this study. I also wish to thank two anonymous reviewers of an earlier and shorter version of this study which was published as the 'Introduction' of the Special Volume of 'Con-temporary Security Policy' on 'The Domestic Politics of Missile Defence', op. cit. All authors who are subsequently mentioned without the titles of their contributions are part of this Special Volume.

6 As far as the terminology is concerned, missile defence (MD) and ballistic missile defence (BMD) are used interchangeably as broad terms. MD was introduced by the George W. Bush administration, while BMD was used by the preceding administrations. MD/BMD is composed of National Missile Defense (NMD) referring to the American continent and of TMD (theatre missile defence) meaning point defence (protection of soldiers/individual buildings or small areas); sometimes TMD is used by various actors such as NATO in the sense of regional defence. Unless otherwise indicated, the term regional defence refers to the protection of wide areas (which for small countries such as Israel, Japan and South Korea could mean a nation-wide shield) or even of a region such as Europe. In a clever move, the term NMD was abolished by the Bush administration for political reasons, as it did no longer want to be the target of criticism by its allies, who feared two asymmetrical zones of security favouring the protection of the American continent.

7 It is not possible to do justice to the huge quantity of studies and articles. A reliable point of access to the literature is for instance to check the corresponding list of publications in 'Arms Control Today'. A comprehensive list of references can be found in the bibliography of Bernd W. Kubbig, *Wissen als Machtfaktor im Kalten Krieg. Naturwissenschaftler und die Raketenabwehr der USA* (Frankfurt am Main/New York: Campus, 2004), pp. 676-717; see also: <http://www.hsfk.de/abm>.

Second World War have often been intense, emotional, dichotomous, and ideology-laden. Even attempts of a principally comparative nature which examined the MD issue area beyond the antagonism between Moscow and Washington resulted in a dichotomous constellation of America versus Europe.⁸

With the end of the ABM Treaty the major political and academic controversies within the United States ended, too. The discourse changed. For many institutes and lobby organisations the fight was over and they turned to other issues. MD disappeared from the headlines of the newspapers and became a subject of more normal political discussions. MD continued to be widely noticed only when a test had failed or when the budget was up for consideration in the American Congress.

However, the United States and Russia have been only part of the MD story. Now that the bilateral perspective of the MD issue has become obsolete, its multinational – in fact global – character has more clearly come to the surface. Although in many ways connected to the United States, the MD-related activities in several countries have developed their own dynamics, and they have preceded the George W. Bush era as well as the impulses that this MD-committed administration has given way to, so far. The authors of the DSF-sponsored project⁹ – involving proponents, sceptics, and critics of (all or specific) MD variants alike – aim to provide a more differentiated picture by pursuing a fresh and pluralistic approach. Covering basically the time-span of the George W. Bush era since 2001, their analyses deal with the MD policies of 14 countries in addition to the US and Russia.

1.2 The Comparative Approach – Reflecting the Specifics and the Complexity of MD Policies

In the era of globalisation a comparative country-based approach seems outdated – at first glance at least. But that is yet what the 16 case studies of this project do. They give answers to the following three research questions, namely:

- how the MD policy in each country has developed as a response to the proliferation problem in the context of the broader foreign and security policy,
- how it is located in the overall domestic setting, and
- how it can be explained.

The contributions have been part of a project which aimed at providing research results on the specifics of the particular country in the issue area of MD for decision-makers and the interested public. This policy-oriented objective of transferring expertise on a politically relevant, and in several cases contentious subject was the decisive criteria for selecting the countries, (actually only Australia and Taiwan are missing, while Italy and Spain are less important), and methodological reasons did not play a role;¹⁰ the second yardstick was the countries' status of being a democracy.

8 See Colin S. Gray, *European Perspectives on U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense* (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 2002), available at: <http://www.nipp.org/Adobe/europe.pdf>.

9 The project was funded by the Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung (DSF, German Foundation for Peace Research).

10 The two most prominent comparative concepts are not needed and inapplicable, respectively. The 'structured, focused comparison', mainly developed by Alexander George, is not needed, since this collection of contributions includes – with the exceptions of Australia and Taiwan – all relevant democracies. See on this Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge/London: MIT Press, 2005.) The 'fuzzy-set/qualitative comparative analysis' developed by Charles Ragin focuses on two juxtaposed dimensions, whereas the MD policies examined in the 16 democracies consist of eight essential aspects, as

Such a country-based approach does not need to be anachronistic at all, provided that the democracies are not treated as insulated entities. In fact, the contributions of the Special Volume on 'The Domestic Politics of Missile Defence' put the domestic processes systematically into the international context for several reasons: The individual democracies respond to security challenges from the regional or global environment; cooperate with other democratic nations in this policy field; are active for instance in multilateral regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime or strive for international solutions to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles as possible means of delivery. The explanatory factors offered by the authors to explain the MD policy in their respective countries can in part be found on the international level. (Comparing the MD politics of 16 countries by 17 experts from 14 different nations from almost all regions is in itself organisationally and conceptually an – admittedly small – globalised endeavour.)

Nevertheless, the major emphasis of the contributions is on the domestic scenery with respect to both comparing and explaining the individual MD policies of the 16 democracies. These states are not treated as unitary actors, even if the executive branch is the constitutionally granted major centre of action which actually implements MD policy. The domestic setting has proved to be a viable level of analysis in many policy fields (including MD, as this project would like to show), if it is not reduced to the executive branch or parliament as the major elements of the political system.

Therefore, the comprehensive and differentiated examinations of the domestic settings in each individual country follow the well established research tradition of domestic politics (or domestic structure) and its indisputable analytical results.¹¹ It allows for the identification of the crucial dimensions of comparability, while at the same time giving the authors enough leeway in presenting (and explaining) the individual MD policies in the context of the traditions of their political and strategic cultures. (Foreign) political culture is understood in most contributions (usually more implicitly than explicitly) in two ways: First, in a broad sense as the major foreign policy orientation(s) of the given country, including its preferences for a specific foreign policy setting (unilateral, bilateral or multilateral), the instruments used (ranging from diplomacy via sanctions to military means) as well as for the objectives and world order visions. The terms strategic (or security) culture are often used in this project to describe the rules and views of the major actors mainly regarding the relationship between defensive and offensive weapons in the context of deterrence and arms control. The likewise central term of self-understanding (identity) is also often used as a synonym for the basic foreign policy orientations with the global role of a given country usually included.

In addition, the comparative approach with the focus on the domestic setting allows us to take the power and discourse constellations of the major organisational and institutional actors into consideration. This regards the societal level, the political system and the relations between them, including those between the executive and legislative branches or between both of them and military firms; as a densely knotted network of determined actors with vested interests, such a structure would amount to a military-industrial complex (MIC). The debates (if there were any) serve as an analytical instrument to open the 'black

mentioned below. See Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Explaining Government Preferences for Institutional Change in EU Foreign and Security Policy, *International Organization*, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Winter 2004), pp. 137-174. I wish to thank Wolfgang Wagner for drawing my attention to the second approach.

11 See my presentation of German and American representatives and their achievements in: Kubbig, Wissen als Machtfaktor im Kalten Krieg, op. cit., pp. 45-52.

box' of the country by displaying the domestic structure as well as the scope, intensity, and (contentious or consensual) dimensions of the MD issue.

After all, the ensemble of 16 compared nations share the crucial feature that they are democracies: old and stable, or new ones such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. In two cases – Russia and Turkey – the quality of democracy needs to be relativised. Isil Kazan characterises Turkey as an improving multi-party parliamentary democratic system; one would like to add that Turkey could be categorised as a democracy with human rights violations. Concerning Russia, it seems appropriate to go one step further by categorising its political system during the Putin era more precisely as a non-liberal and decorative democracy, or alternatively as an elective monarchy and as soft authoritarianism – characteristics used by Alla Kassianova in her article.

Following the two major categorisations of comparative democracy research – parliamentary versus presidential democracies, and majoritarian versus consociational democracies¹² – we arrive at the following types: First, the majority of parliamentary systems in a republican form (Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom being formally monarchies) with two presidential systems (South Korea, US) and one semi-presidential variant (France). Second, majoritarian democracies in the Westminster style for instance in Canada, France, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States; and consociational democracies, e.g. the Netherlands. And third, a mixture of both types in the cases of Denmark and Germany.

The three research questions help structuring the contributions on MD written by experts who base their analyses on sources in the individual language of the country examined. The comparative approach as a whole demonstrates: The collective findings reveal much more than the particular results and insights of individual case studies despite their empirical richness. This is the major added value of this comparative research design, as the following presentation of seven major findings will show (this approach will also generate new research questions and perspectives). The downside of this bundling of results is that I cannot do justice to the multitude of empirical results in each contribution.

MD means different things in different countries. To give a broad orientation, the eight major dimensions are listed below – in one form or another they will appear in the presentations of the major findings and have to be taken into account accordingly:

1. Views on the fate of the ABM Treaty.
2. General position on the continental US missile defence shield/multi-layered defence system.
3. The official, visible and active participation in the continental umbrella of the United States (e.g. by hosting a radar on one's territory).
4. The supporting/favouring or rejecting of technological participation in American programmes by governments and/or firms.

12 See Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press, 1999); Manfred G. Schmidt, *Demokratiethorien: Eine Einführung* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1995), pp. 217-252.

5. Attitudes on the first variant of theatre MD, i.e. regional or nation-wide defence (nation-wide would refer to small countries such as Israel, Japan, and South Korea).
6. Position on the second variant of TMD, i.e. point defence/protection of troops.
7. Scope of indigenous activities, including development of one's own MD systems, and foreign procurement options (purchase/import).
8. Export of MD/TMD technologies/systems.

On a comparative basis, the following major findings, which combine analytical and policy-oriented elements, will provide bundled information on the

- state of the still controversial essential aspects of MD;
- variations of behaviour of the 16 democracies (with the two mentioned reservations);
- structure of this issue area;
- similarities and differences as regards the domestic structures and the issue of debates or non-debates, and
- major factors explaining the essential dimensions of MD policies.

2. Major Findings: The Varying Behaviour of Democracies and its Explanations – The Delicate State of Missile Defence

2.1 First Finding: ABM Treaty Termination – Grudgingly Accepted, Cautiously Welcomed, With Resentments Alive in Russia

For most of the examined democracies – many of them faithful and longstanding US allies – the ABM Treaty had a symbolic and a stability-related relevance. It stood for *détente*, co-operation and the support of the agreement-based variant of arms control and its major achievements, i.e. accountable partners, technically verifiable and politically irreversible results, as well as a predictable relationship between (antagonistic) countries. Many of these traditional US allies – notably Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands – have internalised these norms, they have become part of their foreign policy culture. This explains why many democracies behaved as if they were formal partners to this bilateral agreement. Although the treaty is formally dead for them, the politico-diplomatic values and the thinking it represented are still alive – and may constitute a major reason (often more implicit than explicit) for a clash with the United States in other policy areas.

The overwhelmingly positive attitude towards the ABM Treaty was not norm-determined as such, but intertwined with interest-driven elements. Those non-nuclear allies were scared that a unilateral withdrawal would lead to a renewed arms race and to increased regional and global instability. For the two medium nuclear powers, France and Britain, which feared that such a race could damage their own nuclear deterrent, the shattering of the ABM Treaty implied a specific security concern. Facing a Bush administration that was determined to terminate the treaty, the democratic countries had to decide whether to support Washington's policy or to risk a major conflict with their most powerful ally. Canada, in geographic terms the closest US ally, was the only country that decided to give priority to the politico-symbolic ABM Treaty norm (and the interests associated with it), as J. Marshall Beier emphasises in his contribution.

Faced with that dilemma, other countries took a different course. In view of the foregone nature of its options and the asymmetry of power, the red-green Schröder/Fischer cabinet began its constant and gradual withdrawal from its maximalist arms control position, to accept grudgingly Washington's position, as the article by myself and Axel Nitsche on Germany outlines. The willingness of the Bush administration to conclude a formal arms control 'equivalent' (instead of a 'handshake' agreement) facilitated Berlin's final policy position (and that of other democracies such as Denmark). But the biggest help came from Moscow itself, especially for Britain, which was confronted with a US request to upgrade the Fylingdales radar on its territory as part of the American umbrella. In fact, the potential conflict of interests between preserving a co-operative treaty and being a loyal American ally was resolved (or at least mitigated) not only for Britain but for other countries by the 'startlingly muted' (Mark Smith) Russian and Chinese reactions to the announced abrogation of the ABM Treaty.

Indeed, especially Russian President Putin's mild statement set the tone for the rest of the international community.¹³ Putin called Bush's decision to withdraw a 'mistake', and stated that it did not pose a threat to Russian security. However, this was not the real view, as

13 A collection of international reactions to the abrogation of the ABM Treaty can be found at: <http://www.hsfk.de/abm>.

Kassianova explains. Faced with the American MD activities, this benign assessment was later reversed in other official Russian statements, indicating the special situation for the ABM Treaty partner. Russia's deeper concern has been how to deal as a 'vanished superpower' with the 'sole superpower'. The resentment is still alive in Russian MD politics. In fact, it has been shaping the confrontational strategy of one Russian coalition of actors; if they prevail over those groups which are interested in co-operating with the West, this could lead to complications, for instance, if Washington decides to put MD-related installations on Polish territory (see below).

Other countries were not looking back in anger, but with great expectations ahead. New NATO member Poland turned out to be the closest American ally. Following the official line of reasoning in Washington, Warsaw regarded the US withdrawal from the treaty as a necessary precondition for MD deployment which in turn was seen as an overdue response to the missile threats the international community faces. The argumentation in the Czech Republic was somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, Prague was cautious on US attempts to terminate the treaty for fear of an arms race. On the other hand, Czech official policy acknowledged new opportunities for participation in the American project. Also forward looking was the government in New Delhi (which continued the tradition of preceding Indian cabinets in displaying little faith, or even distrust in arms control treaties). It believed that the Bush administration (with which it shared this scepticism) would be willing to change its arms control policy in a way that would benefit India – provided that, as Rajesh Rajagopalan remarks, New Delhi could demonstrate a strong political commitment to deeper ties with Washington. Therefore, Indian support for the US position on withdrawing from the ABM Treaty appeared to be not only a good move to indicate the increasingly concordant strategic visions of both countries, but promised direct rewards for a similar Indian programme in the future.¹⁴

2.2 Second Major Finding: An American Territorial Umbrella Has Strong Supporters, But is not Broadly Legitimised

The attitude of the examined countries towards the fate of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is already a strong indicator of how they regarded the necessity to deploy a global shield essentially for territorial protection. As envisioned by the Bush administration, a multi-layered umbrella¹⁵ would not only include the North American continent, but also the entire population (or at least major metropolitan areas) in different regions such as allied territory in Europe and in Asia.

The range of arguments used by the supporting or sceptical and critical/opposing democracies are all well known: They cover technological feasibility and financial affordability in addition to the already mentioned arms control and stability-related aspects. But the key factors are the different, in fact opposite and hardly reconcilable perceptions of the (potential) threat/risk from WMD-tipped missiles launched by autocratic/hostile states. The supporters hold that the threat justifies deployment as soon as possible. The sceptics and

14 The contentious atomic US-Indian atomic deal is of course the case in point. See David Frum, *Our Friends in New Delhi*, Washington, D.C. (American Enterprise Institute, 7 March 2006), available at: http://www.aei.org/includepub_print.asp?pubID=24009; The White House, Fact Sheet: *The United States and India: Strategic Partnership*, Washington, D.C., available at: <http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060302-13.html>; Daryl G. Kimball, *Seeing Through the Spin: 'Critics' Rebut White House on the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Plan*, Washington, D.C. (Arms Control Association, 9 March 2006).

15 See my article on the United States in the Special Volume.

critics/opponents emphasise that if terrorism is the major challenge in the post-9/11 world, then no variant of MD provides an answer – they are anachronistic. In fact, investing heavily in MD reflects the pre-9/11 world and may harm the democratic West's interests and security. The supporters counter with the argument that one option should not exclude the other. Based on several contributions, there are four additional major areas of contention and political deficits:

- The proclaimed strategy of denial: From the sceptics' and critics' point of view it is hard to find a concrete example where MD works as a new and effective arms control concept by demonstrating to would-be-proliferators that their missile efforts are futile because of the existence of an impenetrable shield. The major examples of North Korea and Iran support this critical view. There seems to be no counter-argument from the supporters' side.
- The (increasing) strategic and conceptual importance of MD: For MD proponents the huge spending levels, at least in the United States, are justified in view of the current and evolving threat. The critics, however, point to the actual growing relevance of offensive weapons – and are in fact confirmed in their view, especially by US official policy (see fourth major finding below). Moreover, they stress that, now that Iraq's WMD potential has turned out to be a myth, American diplomatic successes (impressively implemented together with Great Britain towards Libya) have enormously reduced (if not undermined) the prospective importance of MDs.
- The assessment of the technological basis especially for a territorial shield: From the sceptics' and opponents' perspective the technology is not sound. They criticise for instance that the methods of testing American MD components does not reflect the conditions of a real attack. The MD supporters, while acknowledging the merely rudimentary capability of the currently fielded interceptors in the United States, counter by stressing that the 'fly while we buy approach' is explicitly based on incremental improvement.
- MD as an impediment for a country to go nuclear: This would be a compelling argument in favour of MD. Japan and South Korea are the cases in point. Here again, the findings are ambivalent at best. Taku Ishikawa has observed for his country that only some pro-BMD analysts who represent a minority view have suggested that MD could be a useful substitute for a nuclear deterrent. South Korea is a clear-cut case for a strong mood in the public to go nuclear if the reconciliation process with the North fails; MD is simply not seen as an efficient option to counter Pyongyang's arsenal. MD supporters seem not to have convincingly addressed this issue.

The 'pro-camp' which principally favours the US multi-layered architecture consists of: the new democratic members of the North Atlantic Alliance – Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary (the latter albeit with reservations, when it comes to the willingness to host MD-related facilities); the old NATO ally Denmark and India as the possibly evolving strategic American partner in Asia (as can be derived from New Delhi's pragmatic position on the abrogation of the ABM Treaty); and probably Israel (Reuven Pedatzur does not explicitly mention this aspect). By contrast, in the 'basket' of the sceptics, critics and outright opponents are: Canada, France, Germany, Japan and South Korea (both as tacit sceptics), Russia, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

The two European nuclear powers need additional attention. An especially interesting case is France. Contrary to its traditional America-critical stance and harsh rhetoric, as Ronja Kempin/Jocelyn Mawdsley put forward as their central thesis, Paris is undergoing a 'silent revolution': The argument has moved from the 'theological to the technological', and now focuses on the feasibility rather than the desirability of MD. Since the French arms industry favours all forms of co-operation with the United States on continental MD issues, Paris has muted its criticism on the American MD plans.

The initially criticised American hegemony project is now, in a conceptual u-turn, constructed as a potential key part of the French Revolution in Military Affairs in order to make it compatible with French-centred thinking. The position of Great Britain remains differentiated, too. Although London (like Copenhagen) has already become an active part of the American MD system by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which allows for upgrading the radar systems at Fylingdales, Smith makes clear: Britain's 'Yes' to the US request was due to the fact that London took the military security of its major ally into consideration. The MoU was not concluded for the protection of Great Britain's territory.

Unlike London and Copenhagen, the liberal Paul Martin government in Canada rejected a corresponding US request. It announced in early 2005 that it would not participate in a continental BMD architecture involving the joint Canada-North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Different from the cases of Denmark, the UK and the new European NATO members, Canadian participation is operationally not necessary, since Washington would go ahead with its MD plans anyway, and there would be an equivalent to NORAD regardless of Ottawa's participation, with Canadian airspace strongly involved in any case. Nevertheless, Ottawa's clear 'No' position was meant to be not only a politically powerful signal to its powerful southern neighbour, but also to the international community, aimed at the questionable principles of Washington's hegemonic foreign policy in general and its MD policies in particular.

This signal concurs with that of the other above mentioned open and sometimes vocal sceptics or critics of a continental umbrella with a global range. They did not do what the US actually wanted its allies to do: to legitimise the Bush MD plans. To get such international support for its activities, which have increasingly been questioned at home, was the political motive of the Republican administration in inviting nations to join its programme. There have been no decisions so far, however, by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey regarding a general participation in developing US technology for territorial defence.

Even the inconsistent and ambivalent positions taken by Germany and France could not be used for legitimisation purposes. To be sure, the Schröder/Fischer government with its basically sceptical position towards Washington's plans to build a continental shield, actually undermined this critical stance by concluding a Memorandum of Understanding with Washington in order to develop (together with Italy) the tri-partite Medium Extended Area Defence System (MEADS). Needless to say, this system includes the participation of German companies. But it was politically 'sold' as participation in the tactical – and not in the continental – parts of the American MD architecture. In the case of France, its strong interest in a comprehensive co-operation with the United States did not translate into a public legitimisation of the American activities, simply because the already mentioned revolution in the MD area is a silent one. And as to Russia, its interests in co-operating with the United States (and other NATO members) has been restricted to the tactical level only.

This differentiation follows the traditional lines of the 1972 ABM Treaty and the clarifying 1997 Demarcation Agreement which, broadly speaking, forbid 'bad' strategic interceptors but allowed 'good' sub-strategic/anti-tactical missiles.

2.3 Third Major Finding: Almost All Democracies Share a Consensus on TMD for the Protection of Troops/Small Areas

It will not come as a surprise that the nations which favour a territorial umbrella, also explicitly or implicitly support the development, production and fielding of theatre MD systems mainly for the protection of soldiers in military operations (including interventions) in a hostile environment of ballistic missiles equipped with atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. In some other cases the declared objective is defence of small areas – depots in a military intervention or a few outstanding buildings on one's own territory. With the probable exception of Canada, all of the examined democracies which are sceptical or even critical of the American territorial shield, favour or support in one way or another anti-tactical ballistic missiles (ATBM). This result reflects a deep split among the examined countries along the line of a continental shield versus point defence.

Some of the states which are critical of an American global shield have indigenous capabilities in the TMD area as shown by the Russian SA-300/400, the French Aster, the French/Italian SAMP/T project, and the US-German-Italian development of MEADS. One of the states critical of an American territorial umbrella and without having a domestic capability is the Netherlands, which has been a long-standing importer of US Patriot missiles (like Germany). Turkey is considering several import and co-development possibilities, among them projects with the United States and Israel, as Kazan reports. India is weighing several options, too. New Delhi's indigenous effort, as Rajagopalan writes, is centred around the domestically designed Akash long-range surface-to-air missile, which is still under development (Rajagopalan adds, that despite several changes of government since the mid-1990s India's pursuit of MD has all in all not wavered, though it has not progressed very far).

These kinds of weapons systems have not only been sold (the United States being by far the largest exporter), they have also been delivered in order to protect allies in a war against hostile missiles. Germany has done so in both Gulf Wars (1991, 2003) when it sent its Patriot systems to Israel; The Netherlands did so, too, in 1991. In addition, in the context of the last war against Iraq, Berlin delivered its Patriots to NATO member Turkey, where they were operated by Dutch soldiers.¹⁶

Many of the examined democracies began their TMD activities during the Cold War and most of them, as already mentioned, preceded the George W. Bush government. Here again, the spirit of the ABM Treaty was alive and still is. Those countries which regarded the continental defence plans by the most powerful democracy, the United States, as 'bad', considered their own TMD activities as 'good', because they did not violate the agreement and did not raise concerns of instability. The clearest sign that this benign view of anti-tactical missiles has survived the abrogation of the agreement, at least at the government level, is: Actually none of the criticism on the territorial shield is applied to TMD. They are regarded as affordable weapons systems, albeit involving conflicts of priorities among military projects, not to mention civilian ones. Anti-tactical systems are also seen as

16 See on this the articles by Kazan, Kubbig, Nitsche, and Everts in the Special Volume.

technologically feasible, although the results for instance of the last war against Baghdad revealed severe problems – the Patriots shot down several aircraft belonging to their own forces, and neither detected the five Silkworm Cruise Missiles nor Frog short-range rockets. In addition, if would-be-proliferators turn increasingly to these kinds of weapons or to smaller ones, ATBMs will become less important, as they are by design powerless against those weapons. The war against Lebanon in summer 2006 has shown this: Israel's Arrow system was not able to intercept the incoming rockets launched by the Hezbollah.

All governments consider TMD in principal to be part of the solution to the proliferation problem – and rarely as part of the problem. Only some German experts in the Foreign Ministry have raised concern that the increasing TMD co-operation and export activities may contribute to the proliferation of delivery vehicles because of the technological affinity between missiles and anti-missiles. Pedatzur also reminds us that the political importance of the Patriot during the 1991 Gulf War should not be underestimated because they helped to keep Israel out of the conflict. On the other hand, this author is extremely critical of Israel's Arrow programme: Pedatzur cites a leading supporter of this project, according to whom it will not be a reliable component in the country's strategic defence planning against nuclear-tipped missiles.

The major deficit and future challenge for the TMD supporters is to present credible scenarios for the operations of troops in hostile WMD environments. This was at least the case in the German debate on MEADS, but Everts reminds us that this credibility gap is not restricted to the Federal Republic. The number of countries with missile programmes – some 24 states – with a range up to 1,000 kilometres is frightening at the first glance. Fortunately, this number can be considerably reduced if one links these weapons to the (potentially) hostile character of non-democratic or authoritarian states. Syria and Egypt appear to be the only delicate candidates in this category.¹⁷ There is also a good clear-cut message: Proliferation is not necessarily an automatically upwards winding spiral – Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya do not constitute any longer a tactical missile threat.

2.4 Fourth Major Finding: Missile Defence as a Viable Response to WMD Proliferation Remains, Despite Some Variance, All in All Limited

At issue here is progress and yardsticks for the entrenchment of the MD idea. Given the long-standing efforts with all MD variants, especially since the George W. Bush administration came to power, one might expect major progress in establishing MD not only in the military thinking, but also in doctrines and operations. As the corresponding articles make clear, the answer is ambivalent at best, however. This applies even to those democracies which favour one or all of the MD variants presented. This ambivalent result is based on the analyses of two major dimensions: first, the relationship between defence and deterrence; second, the relevance of defence as an anti-proliferation tool which is also a part of the broader diplomatic and military instruments.

Concerning the first dimension, the relationship between defence and deterrence: There is a virtual consensus that nuclear deterrence is no longer sufficient and that it needs to be enhanced by (tactical) MD – yet on the conceptual/doctrinal and operational level, a revitalised deterrence concept in the context of pre-emption/prevention has prevailed. MD is

¹⁷ See Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats* (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2nd edition, 2005), pp. 105-117.

much more than merely introducing new weapons systems. Many of its supporters have started from the assumption that it is morally superior to and helps to overcome and finally replace the current nuclear deterrence-based security structure of mutual assured destruction by providing a new security arrangement aimed at mutual assured survival. This would amount to a truly profound revolution in military affairs across the board – including thinking, doctrine, and operations. If the coming into being of the nuclear age is any guide for the development of MD, there must be a revolutionary military innovation at some point such as the nuclear bomb as a minimum precondition – yet a silver bullet has not been found in the MD area.

As various contributions make clear, the ambitious ‘replacement paradigm’ is nowhere present anymore, the major reason being that the underlying revolutionary philosophy of a ‘bullet hits a bullet’ has technologically not been put into reality. The already mentioned rudimentary ground-based MD system that has been fielded by the Bush administration is living proof of the technological difficulties and deficiencies. The editorial of ‘The New York Times’ reflecting the state of the art by highlighting the gap between false promise and cruel technological reality is in fact a verdict over the entire MD programme in the United States:

‘In a rare moment of candor this week, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged that he’s not sure if the U.S. MD system is ready to work. When asked if the shield could protect the United States from a North Korean missile attack, Rumsfeld said he’d need to see a full test of the system “end to end” before he could answer.

Rumsfeld, we suspect, may have been trying to lower expectations as the Pentagon prepares for its first significant test of the troubled system in 18 months. But his comments should invite a serious discussion on Capitol Hill about what the United States is getting for the nearly \$9 billion it is spending this year to develop ballistic MDs and the \$9 billion it is likely to spend next year.

[...] Stopping a ballistic missile in mid-flight is a very hard thing to do. So is switching technologies or killing off a bad system when you’ve already sunk billions into hardware. What’s needed here is an honest assessment of whether the current system has any chance of working and how much more will have to be spent before it does.

As the Pentagon prepared to launch a target missile from Alaska and an interceptor from California this week, defence contractors and Pentagon officials were insisting that the goal was not to shoot anything down, just to make sure the “kill vehicle” could find what it was looking for. No matter how that turns out, we’re hoping that Rumsfeld’s sudden candor about the program starts to catch on.’¹⁸

At the same time, several articles elaborate that most of the governments examined regard the traditional concept of nuclear deterrence (as we have known it from the Cold War) as

18 ‘The Missile Defense Mirage’, editorial of ‘The New York Times’/‘International Herald Tribune’, in: International Herald Tribune, 1 September 2006.

no longer sufficient. Therefore, in strategic thinking, MD has assumed the role of enhancing deterrence by complementing it and thereby providing synergetic effects. The frictions of traditional deterrence which have led to the dominant 'enhancement paradigm' were already evolving before 11 September but they have been endorsed by the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. The major assumption of conventional deterrence theory that one would have to cope with rational, i.e. deterrable actors regarding the use of WMD at the state and the sub-state level is fundamentally doubted by all supporters of the three continental, regional and point defence variants of MD.

What does this mean for MD? There have been efforts in the United States and in Russia to translate the issue beyond rhetoric into doctrines and organisational changes. But these efforts are limited – and they show that MD is the actual loser. Even the United States as the unprecedented motor, initiator, and promoter of all variants of MD has not lived up to its original promise. This is best and authoritatively reflected in the Pentagon's spring 2005 draft of its 'Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations' which incorporates the Nuclear Posture Review and other important directives. This new doctrine describes MD as an instrument to protect military troops only. It mentions defence of the population only three times and always in a secondary role after protection of military forces.

This reversal of priorities stands in contrast with President Bush's former policy when he announced the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in December 2001, emphasising that defending the American people was his 'highest priority as commander in chief', and that 'I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses'.¹⁹ One objective of protecting military forces is to enhance US offensive nuclear strike capabilities. The new doctrine reaffirms an aggressive nuclear posture of modernised atomic weapons maintained on high alert. Planning for regional nuclear-strikes is seen by some observers as an 'increasingly expeditionary aura that threatens to make nuclear weapons just another tool in the toolbox. The result is nuclear pre-emption, which the new doctrine enshrines into official U.S. joint nuclear doctrine for the first time [...]'.²⁰

Kassianova mentions the efforts of Russia to modernise its own MD (triggered by the role of air and space threats in the military interventions in Yugoslavia and Iraq), and to translate this increased military importance into doctrinal and organisational changes. Defences could be combined with space activities in an Aerospace Defence concept. The strategic developments in France sound like an echo of the normally criticised American hegemon, as far as nuclear developments are concerned. Traditional nuclear deterrence is not considered to be sufficient any more. The 9/11 attacks against the United States had a major impact on French thinking about security, as Kempin/Mawdsley summarise. In the future, France, like the US, wants to be able to oppose proliferation threats and the potential use of WMD with preventive military actions. What is more, France has left open the possibility of building 'mini-nukes'. Again, here is the major dynamic which does not ex-

19 Quoted in Hans M. Kristensen, *The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons: New Doctrine Falls Short of Bush Pledge*, in: *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 35, No. 7 (September 2005), p. 18.

20 *Ibid.*, p. 13; see also p. 18. The major strategy papers of the Bush administration of early 2006 reaffirm by and large the secondary importance of MD. See U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington, D.C., 6 February 2006; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Washington, D.C., 13 February 2006; The President of the United States of America, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, D.C., 13 March 2006. For an informative analysis, see Jan Helmig, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Ein Überblick über das amerikanische Strategiepapier und seine Bedeutung für die Raketenabwehr*, Bulletin No. 54, Ballistic Missile Defense Research International, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, available at: <http://www.hsfr.de/abm/bulletin/pdfs/helmig.pdf>.

clude the previously mentioned warming up to a firm and yet limited role of theatre MDs to meet the new challenges of the new security environment.

From the perspective of the British nuclear power, which takes an active role in the American umbrella, the role of MDs above the TMD level has been and remains limited, too – a sobering result from a supporter’s point of view. As Smith summarises, it seems that Britain has strong faith in its strategic and sub-strategic nuclear capability over expensive and thus far unproven MD systems. But support even for TMD systems in the United Kingdom is to be contingent on the assumption that those weapons can be relied upon not to shoot at British aircraft, as happened during the last Iraq war. Among the non-nuclear countries South Korea – the state closest to the North Korean missile arsenal – is the most astounding democracy in this respect. Seoul bases its military policy solely on its conventional deterrence capability, as Byung-joon Ahn reports in his article. An indigenous MD capability is considered to be an option only. The governments in Seoul have been very reluctant to initiate South Korean-American MD co-operation. Therefore, they have not followed Tokyo’s bilateral collaboration model.

As to the second yardstick for the entrenchment of the MD idea, namely the relationship between defence and diplomacy, there is a virtual consensus that diplomatic measures are no longer sufficient as anti-proliferation tools and that they need to be complemented by (tactical) MD – and yet, they continue to be important for many democracies. As several analyses of this project reveal, all governments have reassessed the importance of their diplomatic instruments, either as part of their (bilateral) foreign policies with problem states or as an element of their activities in multinational regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.²¹ The comparative picture lists the United States, Israel and India as the countries with the greatest mistrust in diplomacy. By contrast, the traditional multilateralist-minded civilian/trading powers such as Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands can be found at the other end of the spectrum.

On the basis of this collection of articles, it is not always easy to differentiate between mere well-sounding lip-service and serious engagement in diplomacy. In the case of Germany the frictions between ‘text book’ positions and the reality became evident. Above all, Japan and Russia have emphasised the importance of non-military means to tackle the proliferation problem. And Japan’s policy shows the conceptual coexistence of diplomacy and defences: When Chinese and North Korean WMD-tipped missiles are perceived as a direct threat, it seems, as Ishikawa remarks, that diplomatic non-proliferation measures are hardly believed to be a substitute for BMD. This is not to say, the author goes on, that Japan has made no diplomatic efforts to curtail or restrict the missile capabilities of those two non-democracies.

Despite these trends and examples, the continuing importance of diplomacy is underlined by the already mentioned successful US-British policy towards Libya. And maybe the coordinated efforts especially of France, Britain, and Germany to convince Iran to embark on a clear policy of not developing the nuclear bomb will in the end turn out to be another proof of the relevance of diplomacy.

21 See Mark Smith, Preparing the Ground for Modest Steps: A Progress Report on the Hague Code of Conduct, in: Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 73 (August-September 2003), available at: <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd72/72op4.htm>.; id., Assessing Missile Non-Proliferation, in: Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt (eds), Fighting Proliferation: European Perspectives (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004), available at: <http://www.iss-eu.org/chailot/chai/66e.pdf>.

2.5 There Was Hardly a Broad MD Debate in Most Democracies (With No Difference to Russia)

2.5.1 Preliminary Remarks – Normative Assumptions

The presentation of this finding starts from the following normative premises: The introduction of weapons systems with a potentially considerable impact are to be broadly discussed in order to be legitimised by the *demos*; the decision-making process should be transparent, with the institutions properly exercising their constitutionally granted tasks – the parliaments in particular should control the executive and the military; the decision-makers are to be held accountable for their position or voting behaviour; and the final result should reflect the overwhelming attitude or mood of the public.

If regime type is important for the issue of debate, then the difference between the strong traditional democracies and Russia, should be visible. We shall see, whether the scope and intensity of the debates are different in a (semi-)presidential, parliamentary, majoritarian, and consociational democracy. In all these cases the eight dimensions of the entire MD policy field become again relevant for the individual democracies. The analytical insights into the domestic settings reveal a variety of sub-structures and political/strategic cultures, featuring in many cases a strong executive branch, a hardly controlling parliament, as well as a congruence of public opinion and government policies in three cases.

2.5.2 No Broad Discourse Across the Board – Limited Participation of the Public

In virtually all contributions there is a consensus that in the time-span covered, the various aspects of the MD issue did not lead to intense, nationwide debates including the mobilisation of people. In the late 1960s this had been the case in the United States when the ‘No Bombs in the Backyard’ movement protested against the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles in their vicinity for fear that they might become the target of incoming rockets from the Soviet Union or China. Jørgen Dragsdahl for instance presents the opposite situation for Denmark and Greenland: Popular opposition did not manifest itself in the form of demonstrations, meetings or even letters in newspapers.

The same holds true for the Netherlands where the debate has remained primarily an elite and expert affair. Political parties or other societal groups, let alone the public at large, were not very active in this area. The lack of controversy and public debate is reflected by the absence of any opinion poll. This description by Everts of The Netherlands is exemplary for many other democracies analysed in this project. Kempin/Mawdsley provide a variation on the theme and maybe go one step further regarding France, by asking whether in fact ‘debate’ is the correct word. The limited and concentrated character of the discussions holds also true for the new democracies of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary as well as for Russia.

An easy answer to the general phenomenon of the limited scope and low intensity of the discourse could be: The MD topic was simply not relevant enough. But such an answer would be incomplete, analytically not adequate and actually misleading, as this broad phenomenon is due to a number of different factors which reveal the specifics of the individual case studies.

2.5.3 Hurdles For MD Debates – Structural and Situational Ones

There is a consensus in all contributions which address the topic of discussion that the technical nature and the secrecy aspect combined are a considerable obstacle for debating the MD issue (in this regard, MD reflects in particular what applies to the entire area of military security in general). Being an old or a new democracy such as Poland does not make a difference, as Rafał Domisiewicz/Sławomir Kamiński mention, although they cite specific structural/cultural factors that have to do with the fact of being a new democracy. They argue it needs time to develop a political culture of discussing security issues such as MD.

The situation of a limited debate in the old or new democracies is not different from what Kassianova says about the specific structural/cultural factors in Russia with its 'uneven democratisation process' where the policy process is 'largely developing autonomously' of the existing public discussion, and even of expert analysis. Neither can the absence of a minimally transparent decision-making process on defence and security be ignored, nor the general weakness of the mechanisms of public control. Nevertheless, the liveliest though narrowest (mostly technical and professional) grassroots debate in Russia has been taking place on the internet, 'the all-powerful *samizdat* of the 21st century'. This phenomenon may be best explained by the influence of the past which has created a large number of industrial, scientific and bureaucratic actors with their vested interests.

Another structural hurdle to a broad public debate is systemic, i.e. democracy-related (regime type), but here again the specifics of MD as part of the broader realm of security come into play. In their case study on France, Kempin/Mawdsley argue that the largely unnoticed MD discourse is due to the fact that security policy is seen as a presidential domain as part of a densely knit security community; this *structure dirigiste* means that parliamentary involvement is minimal and not seen as particularly influential.

For other case studies the key word is consensus: Dutch defence policy in the post-Cold War era, for instance, has been built on consensus, MD is not an exception. Everts emphasises the relative strength of the defence consensus in this area even outside parliament; the latter factor reflects the fact that the Netherlands is a consociational democracy, i.e. a society that is strongly divided internally, and constitutionally organised along the lines of a representative, proportional democracy. The concomitant party system tends to reproduce a political culture in which much trust is put in the benefits of building consensus across party lines. The consensus aspect applies to the British system as well, although the United Kingdom is the model of a majoritarian democracy – Smith emphasises that defence policy has a relative immunity to inter-party or ideological dispute. This striking cross-party consensus is true for most or all major issues of substance when the parties are in power.

The same can be said for the German debate on MEADS.²² The political system is also oriented towards consensus. Here, the government and the parties supporting it are interlocked with the hierarchically structured parties displaying a high degree of loyalty;

22 See Bernd W. Kubbig, Als Entscheidungsgrundlage für das Raketenabwehrprojekt MEADS ungeeignet. Eine Analyse der Dokumente von BMVg und Berichterstättergruppe, HSFK-Report 2/2005 (Frankfurt am Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 2005); id., Raketenabwehrsystem MEADS: Entscheidung getroffen, viele Fragen offen, HSFK-Report 10/2005 (Frankfurt am Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 2005).

they voted like a monolithic bloc. France can easily be added. Kazan adds a variation to the theme by underlining that for Turkey consensus can be tacit, and this explains why there has been no controversy or any opposition to the fielding of TMD systems, because a potential threat from the missiles of neighbouring countries is being broadly perceived.

The system-related factor of consensus has been enhanced by the following situational obstacles to a broad debate, to refer to the Dutch example on the basis of Everts' article again: First, the fact of shifting coalitions and parties jockeying for new positions and new potential allies mitigated polarisation. Second, outstanding issues are either decided or deliberately depoliticised at the time of the formation of a new government and settled, thus making it more difficult for parties to defect at a later stage. Third, there was the public perception of the seemingly more pressing topics of international terrorism, US unilateralism, and the dispatch of troops to particular crisis areas where the soldiers were not exposed to a serious ballistic missile threat.

The Dutch case is not the exception by any means, especially concerning more pressing and country-specific aspects. Denmark is an additional case. 'Was there an open and thorough discourse in Denmark, which perceives itself as an open grassroots democracy?', Dragsdahl asks.²³ His answer is rather sceptical, citing among the constraining factors a focus on the Danish involvement in Afghanistan/Iraq and a perception that only far away Greenland would be affected by upgrading the Thule radar.

In the case of Israel with its opaqueness of the unique development and decision-making processes of the Arrow MD system, the non-existent public debates on security issues (MD and the Arrow therefore included) are a traditional part of the Israeli security culture. Israel, a relatively liberal democracy in all aspects of civilian life, is in respect of the entire security and defence realm a limited or restricted democracy, as Pedatzur qualifies the regime type in his country.

Whether structural or situational – in none of the democracies was the executive or legislative branch pushing for a public debate. Both actors of the political system were either deliberately passive or were restraining or even impeding a discussion. To refer to Denmark again: The discourse remained largely confined to the legislative branch. Political parties made no discernable efforts to take their debate out of parliament by mobilising public opinion, Dragsdahl observes. The short German discussion about whether to start the co-development of MEADS reveals a similar situation (to say the least, since neither branch was interested in a thorough discussion). The three governments in Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest appear to be impeding a discussion, as long as they have not received an official US invitation to host MD-related facilities on their territory.

Especially in the Polish case, as Domisiewicz and Kamiński underscore, there seems to be a high level of support for potential US hardware on Polish territory which the government does not want to jeopardise by prematurely issuing for instance a public discussion paper as London did. Radek Khol and András Rácz point out that in the Czech Republic, and even more so in Hungary, unleashing a debate could be very problematic for the governments. For in both cases the parliaments, reflecting the deep divisions among the public, have a strong constitutional role in the stationing of MD facilities.

23 See on this the longer original version of Dragsdahl's article, available at: <http://www.dragsdahl.dk/A20050814.htm>.

Rácz explains the almost non-existent debate in Hungary by emphasising that the population is more concerned with domestic issues. Deep divisions and constant political infighting between the government and the opposition parties has led to 'large-scale apathy' among the public. Foreign policy issues are hardly on their political radar. In stark contrast to the Polish people, there are strong anti-American feelings, which the government in Budapest does not want to ignite. (Yet, the authors from the three new democracies predict that the MD debate will gather momentum, once Washington comes up with a concrete proposal for their respective countries.)

Meanwhile, NATO plans have become known according to which the Alliance envisages the building of three fixed air defence radars with initial theatre ballistic MD capability for Poland as well as two and three fixed radar systems for the Czech Republic and for Hungary, respectively.²⁴ The conference 'The domestic and international dimensions of US MD – Implications for Central Europe' organized by the Institute of International Relations Prague in the capital of the Czech Republic on 19 October 2006 was a reaction to the fact that MD had meanwhile become a hot issue in the political debate in the Czech Republic due to unveiled US plans to establish an interceptor base and a radar facility on Czech territory or in Poland. Conference organiser Radek Khol, who invited the experts to this conference, reaffirmed his above mentioned prediction that the US plans would lead to an extensive political debate, at least among experts in the last quarter of the year 2006.

2.5.4 Governments, Security Establishments and the MD Issue Area – A Tendency Towards Autonomy at the Expense of Transparency and Parliamentary Control

Across the board, the executive branches appear to be the strongest actors in the entire policy field (with qualifications especially for Israel and France, but for Germany and the United States as well since they are part of a broader, densely knotted network of actor alliances – whether it is called defence establishment or military-industrial complex does not matter in the final analysis). The strong position of the executive branch has to do with the traditional division of labour between government and parliament, with the latter acting as legislator and legitimator (or critic) but not as a co-decision-maker. What is true for the UK is applicable to all democracies examined in this project: British government policy is implemented under the supervision of parliament but it is almost never made there, as Smith puts it succinctly. All in all the executive branches have retained a free hand in dealing with the various MD dimensions, be they the acquisition of the Patriot (as was the case in the Netherlands), the co-development of MEADS (in Germany) or the negotiations with the United States on hosting a MD facility (in Poland).

The fact that (missile) defence decision-making includes a high share of military and technical knowledge, again becomes relevant in this context, making these issues somewhat different from the normal pattern of democratic control. The considerable and constitutionally granted freedom of *manoeuvre* enjoyed by the government in this area is increased by the fact that members of parliament are or often feel ill-equipped to critically assess the facts and arguments which the minister of defence may present. This was the case especially in the Netherlands (procurement of Patriot) and in Germany (MEADS).

²⁴ See NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency, Acquisition Overview, by John D. Edell, Director of Acquisition, 15 June 2006. I am indebted to Hermann Hagen for providing me with a copy of this power point presentation.

What is more, the executive branch can exert its prerogative – in fact give it further weight – by using special argumentation, i.e. by emphasising the defensive nature of the Patriot systems, be it during the acquisition process, or when confronted with the decision to deliver them in order to assist allies in the context of a war (the cases of the Netherlands and Germany could be cited once more). The government retains an information monopoly, as shown by Pedatzur in the Arrow case which again displays unique Israeli features. Information about this system is known only to a very few. This gives the defence establishment a tremendous advantage in its battle to win over public opinion. The monopoly on information implies that there are no alternative figures, and that no one asks critical questions.

Which additional factors account for this strong role of the government? For India, as Rajagopalan analyses, the relative autonomy of the state from public policy debates might be due to the lack of institutions that bring New Delhi's decision-makers and strategic policy analysts together. The 'complete autonomy' of the security establishment is taken to the extreme in Israel where the ministry of defence is even excluding other civilian ministries from participation in long-range planning (a situation different from the administration and the military in Ankara, as Kazan has analysed). This is due to a number of factors, including the compliance of the press which has voluntarily accepted censorship as an inevitable fact of life. Virtually no parliamentary body with oversight function regarding the development and procurement process exists in Israel, as Pedatzur underscores. As far as is known, no decision-making forum has ever held a comprehensive discussion about the Arrow.

And yet, the debate in a democracy can lead to positive results. This can be said for Germany where the unforeseen discourse led to a vote by the Budget Committee itself which imposed several conditions that amount to somewhat greater transparency, accountability, and parliamentary control with respect to the MAEDS development. The fact that the government for the first time in the history of this weapons programme was forced to present its budget figures publicly can indeed be described as a small revolution in transparency.

2.5.5 Congruence of Public Opinion and Government Decisions: The Cases of Canada, South Korea, and Japan

The decision of Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin not to participate in the American BMD system took the overwhelming attitude of the Canadian public into account – both the left-of-centre New Democratic Party and the separatist Bloc Quebecois made, according to Beier, Canadian non-involvement in MD central planks in their campaigns. South Korea's 'Sunshine Policy' of reconciliation with Pyongyang (which implies a 'No' to MD) reflects the mood of many South Koreans who tend to regard dialogue as the best way of easing tensions and threats, as Byung-joon Ahn has observed.

As far as Japan is concerned, Ishikawa has pointed out that there has not been a major debate on BMD as part of the broader issue of Japan's foreign policy identity change, i.e. the country's willingness to assume a greater role in global politics. What is more, Tokyo's defence activities are accepted by the public to a considerable degree. This is somewhat surprising, Ishikawa admits. The reason for this acceptance is that the government could convince the public that MD is purely defensive and hence compatible with the Japanese Constitution.

In sum, the aspects of this major finding can be best explained by the structural/cultural predispositions and constellations of the individual domestic setting and not by the status of old and new democracies or the regime type in terms of a (semi-)presidential (France), majoritarian (e.g. United Kingdom), consociational (the Netherlands) democracies or a mixture of the last two variants (Germany), as illustrated by the discussion on the consensus aspect. Moreover, the expected difference especially between the strong traditional democracies and Russia did not become visible in this regard.

2.6 Sixth Major Finding: The United States Has Structured the Entire MD Issue Area to a Considerable Degree

The MD issue area, as presented in this comparative undertaking, comprises major countries in three continents where this topic is relevant. The United States as the 'sole super-power' is in the unique position of being present in all these political and geographical entities and of enjoying a technologically superior position which is second to none. Its MD budget of some \$ 10 billion per year is many times higher than the expenses of all its partners in this military field combined²⁵ (Germany for instance will spend some € 120 million per year for co-developing the anti-tactical MEADS with the United States and Italy). What is more, the George W. Bush administration has continuously and energetically enhanced and enlarged its co-operative security and technological relationships.

The structure of US-initiated activities is that of a wheel with spokes – all lead to the American hub in the centre, while collaboration among US partners remains limited or is even sanctioned for non-proliferation and/or economic reasons (one illustrative case was Israel's interest in pushing the sale of its partly US-financed Arrow system to India, which Washington forbade; in addition, Washington has unmistakably made clear to the Turkish government, which has been considering various TMD-options, that it would prefer to sell its Patriot to Ankara).²⁶

Economic interests are, however, only one element of Washington's policy in this area. Regional and global interests are at least as important from the perspective of the super-power. Its co-operative plans with Japan and its interest in selling Patriot weapons to India can be seen as steps to enhance and forge strategic alliances with democracies in view of the rise of China. As far as the 'Old Continent' of Europe is concerned, Washington has applied its 'coalition of the willing' approach to negotiating the establishment of MD-related facilities in the new democracies in Poland, the Czech Republic, or Hungary. This was also a way of using the backing of the new loyal Alliance members to put MD on the agenda of the 2002 NATO Summit Meeting in Prague – and to put pressure on the old and sceptical NATO allies to come to terms with this issue. Washington's interest in multilateralism with its focus on NATO has been secondary.

25 Statement of Ronald T. Kadish before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Defense Subcommittee, Regarding the Fiscal Year 2005 Defense Appropriations Ballistic Missile Defense, Washington, D.C., 21 April 2004, p. 4 (typescript); The White House, National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense Fact Sheet, Washington, D.C., 20 May 2003, p. 2 (typescript); Statement of Henry A. Obering (III), Missile Defense Program and Fiscal Year 2006 Budget, Before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., 7 April 2005, pp. 5-14, (typescript); Statement of General Henry A. Obering (III); USAF, Director, Missile Defense Agency; Missile Defense Program and Fiscal Year 2007 Budget, Before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., 9 March 2006 (typescript).

26 See on this the article by Kazan in the Special Volume.

All in all, the United States is in the process of building a new hegemony in the post-Cold War era, consisting of a system of 'coalitions of the able and willing' and based on a technology which is to a high degree unproven and not thoroughly tested. In constructing or expanding these security relationships with smaller democracies around the globe, Washington has been using the uniquely broad range of foreign policy instruments which complement its unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty; this has been judged as an imperial act by myself or as a manifestation of 'America's Imperial Ambition' (G. John Ikenberry). The primacy of bilateralism expresses itself in several formal government-to-government agreements, but also in activities between corporations or study groups. In its dialogue with the Czech Republic, for instance, the United States has been described either as the traditionally liberal and benevolent/benign, or as the coercive hegemon – benign meaning exerting soft power attraction to combine the MD plans with exploring concrete options. This did include negotiation tactics of playing an ambiguous game with a possible preference for the other two Visegrad states. But unlike the case of Iraq, Washington was not bullying for support, as Khol recalls.

From the perspective of a new democracy, the US as the classical supply- and compromise-oriented hegemon offered on the one hand protection in exchange for support. The coercive feature of the United States became visible, on the other hand, when it applied pressure in its talks with Denmark/Greenland on the Thule radar; Dragsdahl in fact characterises the overall relationship between the US and Greenland as an informal empire.²⁷ In two instances the United States' conduct towards Japan was coercive, too: It pressed Tokyo to introduce the PAC-3 and to move on to the development phase in the TMD area together with the United States. In its negotiations with the Germans and Italians on MEADS, Washington was able to achieve a highly restrictive deal as far as the sharing of its cutting-edge technology with the European junior partners is concerned; this was an outcome which reflects the strictly asymmetrical transatlantic relationship in this area.

Nevertheless, under the current Bush administration the United States is not the traditionally liberal hegemon anymore in the MD issue area: Security is no longer treaty-bound and not predominantly implemented multilaterally. MD for the protection of soldiers in military interventions may be legitimised by the US as an element of its pre-emptive strategy. All of this amounts to the virtually unconstrained American hegemon; it has not only distinct imperial ambitions but the hegemony has an ambivalent or hybrid character.

What is more, the United States has also acted, in the time-span covered in this project, as the 'knowledge-based hegemon'. Its competing domestic actors inside and outside of government circles have served as the major points of reference for the corresponding groups in all countries (and for several authors of this project as well) – and as a major source for their arguments which have been used in some cases against American official policy. This shows in this respect, too, that the considerable US influence remains in the final analysis limited. Last but not least, for a number of democracies the United States has become part of their foreign policy identity, or their major point of reference; this does not only apply to Russia, but, as we shall see in the next section, also to those democratic countries which have distanced themselves from Washington by rejecting bilateral MD co-operation.

27 See on this the longer original version of Dragsdahl's article, available at: <http://www.dragsdahl.dk/A20050814.htm>.

2.7 Seventh Major Finding: The Compared MD-policies of 16 Democracies Reveal a Combination of Four Major Determinants

By offering several factors for explaining the MD policy of their individual countries, the authors of this project concur with most other security-related case studies: One-dimensional explanations of such a complex phenomenon like MD are in this collection of articles deemed to be analytically inadequate, too. This does not, of course, exclude a possible ranking of the factors according to their relevance. This section summarises the major reasons for the variety of MD policies (i.e. their major individual dimensions only) in the 16 examined democracies.

I will demonstrate that in this regard, again, the compared ensemble is more than its individual parts, by trying to square the circle and by offering the major determinants of the MD policies on the country-level, while clustering the individual groups of democracies, whenever possible, according to their paramount features. This procedure allows us in a couple of cases to compare countries within a cluster or among different groups. The United States, which is one of the explanatory factors and has already been described in greater detail, is not discussed below. The following four single explanatory factors have been mentioned most often and, in accordance with the rejection of a one-dimensional approach, will be mingled in a number of cases:

- The broad foreign policy orientation/culture in terms of preferences for settings, instruments and goals, with the past being present in shaping MD policies (the strategic/security cultures being the military nucleus of the broader foreign policy culture). It is often, as mentioned earlier, a synonym for the self-understanding or the foreign policy identity of the countries analysed, especially when associated with their role in world politics – and as such indeed a major explanatory factor. As foreign policy identities, however, do not develop in a vacuum, they are in several cases explicitly linked with the next explanatory factor.
- The domestic politics/structure defined as the power and discourse constellations can now be enriched by earlier findings, be they the relevance of the state either in its (relatively) autonomous role or as part of a security/defence establishment (military-industrial complex); the democratic aspects presented in connection with the sixth major finding will come into play, too.
- The threat perception mostly in terms of WMD-tipped ballistic missiles as the most discernible menace as part of a changing security environment. These assessments regard never rockets as such but are linked to a non-democratic regime which is seen as a real or potential adversary. In two clear cases (Canada and South Korea, and in part Russia) it is not missiles from neighbouring hostile regimes but the (neighbouring) United States which is regarded as the main menace.
- The activities and influence of the United States as an external power in shaping the MD policies of several countries – the already mentioned relevance of the US as an element of the foreign policy identity in a number of democracies will be specified (see 2.7.1-2.7.5).

Several authors have discussed additional explanatory factors that I have offered to them. These have been elaborated in the research context of the Democratic Peace Theory in which the genesis of this comparative project can be seen. Among these factors are the role of military alliances and the regime type with a focus on the relationship between the

executive and legislative branches (the other two factors being the already mentioned role of identity and the military-industrial complex).²⁸ In addition, for this comparative endeavour I have offered the outstanding role of the United States and the geographical/geopolitical position of the democracies examined as two additional possible explanatory factors.

2.7.1 Maintaining Their Foreign Policy Identity by Distancing Themselves from the United States: Canada, South Korea, and (in Part) Russia

- Canada: The only MD-related decision that needs to be explained is Canada's 'No' in early 2005 to participate in the American umbrella of militarised US global hegemony, as J. Marshall Beier puts it. He points to the nexus of a situational and a structural/cultural factor: First, the weak Paul Martin government had lost its parliamentary majority. Second, there was Canada's interest in maintaining its foreign policy identity as a middle power with a distinct striving for multilateralism as the central means of addressing international problems ('middlepowerhood'), including WMD proliferation. The decision means distancing itself from the hegemonic policy of its southern neighbour. Beier implicitly cautions that there is a second strand in Canadian (foreign) policy culture which might have led to a Canadian 'Yes' to participating in a joint shield with the US, had Martin clearly won the elections: The threat to be countered in this case issues not from ballistic missiles, but from the possibility of alienating the United States.²⁹
- South Korea: According to Byung-joon Ahn three decisive factors determine Seoul's adamant 'No' to co-operation in the MD area with the United States, and also its low interest in an indigenous MD capability: First, the reconciliation with North Korea ('Sunshine Policy') as the paramount and continuous foreign policy objective to which all other goals are subordinated (this priority is, as earlier mentioned, deeply rooted in the public). Second, the advent of democracy (people are expressing their views and feelings), combined with asserting their Korean identity of 'Wounded Nationalism', i.e. national aspiration of the new generation to recover a sense of self-confidence and pride in their country. This implies being opposed to Washington's 'Offensive Realism' which the new generation of decision-makers regards as more of a threat than Pyongyang. Third, conventional deterrence is enough; a defence system in co-operation with the US would jeopardise the paramount goal of reconciliation.³⁰
- Russia: At issue is not whether this country's own anti-tactical rocket capability should be expanded (also for export purposes). Rather, as Alla Kassianova explains, it is the challenge of how to cope with the 'unsettled identity' of post-Soviet Russia with the United States as the major (albeit ambivalent) point of reference. Reflecting an almost autonomous state amidst rival actor alliances with different vested interests and foreign policy orientations (including nationalist groups), this situation manifests itself in two competing strategies towards the West/US: a confrontational, dual-pronged variant of combining counterbalancing

28 See PRIF, Research Group I: Arms Control and Disarmament, Project 'Contradictions in the Relationship Between Democracy and Arms Build-up' (directed by Harald Müller). I am indebted to Harald Müller and to Una Becker for a number of suggestions and recommendations in this context.

29 For different views on Canadian MD policy see the position of James Fergusson and Frank Harvey in: James Fergusson, J. Marshall Beier, Frank Harvey, Ann Denholm Crosby, and Douglas A. Ross, Roundtable: Missile Defence in a Post-September 11th Context, *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Winter 2002), pp. 111-130.

30 See in this context also Vernon Leob and Peter Slevin, Overcoming North Korea's "Tyranny of Proximity", *Washington Post*, 20 January 2003.

and the organisation of AeroSpace Defense; and a co-operative variant which includes tactical ballistic MD.

2.7.2 Traditional Civilian and Trading Powers (Mostly in Transition) with a Strong Atlanticist Foreign Policy Orientation: Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, and Japan

- Denmark: The major theme in the debate was not MD, but the Inuits' attempts to use the upgrading of the Greenland-based Thule radar to enlarge Home Rule, with independence from the former colonial power in Copenhagen being the final aim. No single factor in the process of the debate was more important than this heavy historical baggage, Jørgen Dragsdahl explains. The concerns expressed by politicians from Greenland about Thule becoming a target and Greenland having co-responsibility for world peace, were real. But the likelihood of having any influence on Washington's plans were considered negligible, while a window of opportunity to further independence *vis-à-vis* Denmark was seen very clearly. Copenhagen was caught in a dilemma. It needed to square the circle of over-coming its colonial past by granting more sovereignty to Greenland – and enhance the foreign policy shift of becoming a strategic actor by demonstrating its willingness to behave as the closest US ally. This resulted in Copenhagen's 'Yes' to upgrading the Thule radar, but the government was also forced to accommodate demands directed against its own sovereignty.³¹
- The Netherlands: The long-standing procurement policy of Patriot missile systems from the United States for distinct out-of-area missions which only a few members could fulfill within the North Atlantic Alliance has been the major MD topic for the Dutch. Philip Everts explains this policy by pointing to the Netherlands as a strongly internationalist, multilateralist trading state with a distinct Atlanticism and a role conception as a reliable junior partner of the United States.
- The Federal Republic of Germany: The delivery of German Patriots to help Israel, Turkey, and the United States during the looming Iraq war had to be decided on. The same applies to the co-development of the MEADS System. Both topics touch upon the changing role of Germany as a selective exporter of security in international affairs (delivery of the Patriot), cautiously displaying a willingness to take a more active role in international affairs (MEADS). Would the system mainly designed for the protection of troops in out-of-area activities be necessary, efficient and affordable in view of the long-lasting economic crises and unprecedented social restructuring? Legitimising MEADS in view of the double domestic and foreign policy transition of the trading power was the nucleus of the brief but intense debate. The decision in favour of co-development was mainly due to the 'mini' military-industrial complex which successfully opted for a follow-on system.³²
- Japan: The central MD issue – Tokyo's extensive co-operation with Washington – has to be explained in the context of the country's changing foreign policy identity from the restraints of the past as a loser of the Second World War, to gradually taking a more active role in the international arena, and thus, rather cautiously, becoming a 'normal country', as Taku Ishikawa notes. (The parallels to Germany

31 See on this Kristian Sjøby Kristensen, Negotiating Base Rights for Missile Defense: The Case of Thule Air Base in Greenland, in Bertel Heurlin and Sten Rynning (eds), *Missile Defence. International, Regional and National Implications*, London/New York 2005 (Routledge), pp. 183-208.

32 Kubbig, *Als Entscheidungsgrundlage für das Raketenabwehrprojekt MEADS ungeeignet*, op. cit.

are striking in this respect, putting these two non-nuclear states into the same sub-category.) Another sign of its changing identity is Japan's more active military role in Asia. Tokyo's strong commitment to MD is part of its relationship with the United States as the major external driving force. Yet MD has strong supporters in Japan as well, especially in the government bureaucracy and in the major parties. The missile capabilities of North Korea and of rising China as the major concerns of Tokyo's changed security environment have made it easier to legitimise Japanese MD programmes as counterbalancing efforts.³³

2.7.3 The Three New Democracies in Europe: 'America First!' for Poland and the Czech Republic, with Equidistance to the US and Europe in Hungary

- Poland: Warsaw's extraordinary interest in becoming the host country for an MD facility as part of the US multi-layered umbrella with a global range is due to four facts: First and foremost, as Rafał Domisiewicz and Sławomir Kamiński underscore, this interest appears almost natural, given the historically and culturally deep rooted Polish-American 'special relationship' as the country's most important policy orientation (additionally underlined by a 10 million strong ethnic group in the United States). Second, Poland's special status as the most faithful US ally in Europe includes political affinities with the Bush administration; they contain threat perceptions and the particularly contentious American policy, and military concepts (exporting democracies worldwide and military pre-emption). Third, the Polish elite was desperately waiting for a US offer to host MD-related installations as a long-term investment not only in its security, but in its economy as well. Fourth, being tied to the United States appears to be a good precondition for playing the European card successfully.³⁴
- The Czech Republic: As underscored by Radek Khol, the past is present in two of the three major factors explaining the principal interest of large parts of the Czech political establishment in accepting an early warning radar or a tracking station on its territory as part of the American umbrella (an interceptor facility is unlikely, because of the considerable reservations within major parties which will have a major say on hosting such facilities): First, history is present in its distinct Atlanticist orientation ('Instinctive Atlanticism') with a strong strategic interest in the American presence in Europe and a grateful attitude to Washington's extraordinary role in the enlargement of NATO. Second, there was no bad historical experience with the United States in the past. The third explanatory factor for Czech MD policy is the perception of the increasing ballistic missile threat.
- Hungary: This new democracy, for a certain time-span the third candidate for MD installations, ticks at least in part differently than the other two Visegrad states. Budapest has pursued a more balanced policy towards the US and Europe. In recent years the pro-European foreign policy orientation has become stronger,

33 On Japan see also Ken Jimbo, A Japanese Perspective on Missile Defence and Strategic Coordination, *The Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 57-58; Michael Swaine, Rachel Swanger, and Takashi Kawakami, *Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001), pp. 29-32; Masamitsu Yamashita, Susumu Takai, and Shuichiro Iwata, *TMD: Sen'iki Dandō Misairu Bōei* (Tokyo: TBS Britannica, 1994), pp. 201-222.

34 On Poland see Marcin Zaborowski and Kerry Longhurst, *America's protégé in the east?*, *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 5 (October 2003), pp. 1009-1028; see also Anke Groll, *Raketenabwehrsysteme für Australien und Polen*, *Bulletin No. 53*, *Ballistic Missile Defense Research International*, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, available at: <http://www.hsfk.de/abm/bulletin/pdfs/groll.pdf>.

while the relations to the United States have been increasingly ambivalent. The security perception differs, too, in that the primary focus is on domestic issues, as András Rácz emphasises, whereas proliferation of WMD and of missiles is seen as less of a problem. From a Hungarian perspective, such an installation would be a burden rather than a help for the troubled economy. An American MD facility as a strictly bilateral topic and not part of the North Atlantic Alliance is likely to face considerable opposition both within society and within the parties in parliament. There are still strong anti-NATO feelings – the planned radar on Hungarian territory as part of the Alliance's integrated air defence system (and more than 90% financed by NATO) has already caused a lot of political trouble.

2.7.4 The Two European Nuclear Powers Great Britain and France: Missile Defence Cuts Across Traditional Positioning Towards the United States

- France: Participating or not participating in the traditionally criticised US global shield while pursuing its own consensual TMD-related activities: This question has been clearly answered by the state (intimately intertwined with the strong and influential industrial sector) showing that it is extremely interested in participating in the US umbrella. This technological-economic interest is not at variance with the first major traditional foreign policy goal of *la grande nation nucléaire*: maintaining the status of a medium nuclear power with selective global aspirations and preserving (even enhancing) its nuclear status in view of a perceived increasing missile threat. But those interests conflict definitively with the second objective: autonomy and the refusal to subordinate to other powers. According to Ronja Kempin/Jocelyn Mawdsley this inconsistency explains both the French interest in participating in US defence missile programmes and the way of presenting it in a silent way as a genuinely French project. The United States remains the ambivalent point of reference as an open competitor and covert partner.³⁵
- Great Britain: Three major issues have to be explained: 1) Why a British 'No' to the US request regarding the upgrading of the Fylingdales radar was not a real option; 2) Why the protection of UK territory is not a priority, while 3) there is a consensus that theatre MD is necessary. Mark Smith's answer can be summarised as follows: Maintaining the British status of a medium nuclear power with selective global power projection capabilities by an 'Instinctive Atlanticism', i.e. a traditionally close relationship to the, in principle, undisputed United States. At the same time, contrary to France, a military-industrial complex is absent in the MD area, and Britain has a more cautious view of an evolving missile threat environment. The small influence of the arms industry combined with a growing Europeanist trend in recent years has had a remarkable effect, namely that British 'Instinctive Atlanticism' has not directly translated into a strong MD policy at the continental and the theatre level – in fact, British MD policy is much closer to that of many of its European allies than to its major transatlantic partner.³⁶ The fact that the other European nuclear power, France, is in this policy field, paradoxically much closer to the United States is largely due to the different importance and influence of the military-industrial sector.

35 See also Justin Vaïsse, *French Views on Missile Defense* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2001), available at: <http://www.brookingpp.edu/fp/cusf/analysis/missd.htm>.

36 See also Jeremy Stocker, *Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence 1942-2004* (London: Frank Cass, 2004); Gray, *European Perspectives on U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense*, op. cit.

2.7.5 Two Traditional US Allies in Conflict Regions and a Likely Strategic Partner: Turkey, Israel, and India

- Turkey: Which TMD option should Ankara pursue? As Isil Kazan explains, the possibilities which the government is considering should be seen in the context of the following factors (with different positions both in the military and between the General Staff and the Foreign Ministry): The self-perception of Turkey as a geopolitical 'buffer' at the crossroads of several conflict-bound regions and its view of the growing threat from ballistic missiles in neighbouring countries. The people in the south-eastern part of the country have also had direct experience of stray missiles during the last Iraq War in 2003. The Turkish-based military industry has not played an important role in weighing those TMD options. Both the United States and the European Union remain important, though ambivalent strategic and economic/cultural partners, respectively, accentuating NATO's role for Turkey.³⁷
- Israel: Its geographic position is even more exposed to direct missile threats from hostile non-democratic neighbours. But, as Reuven Pedatzur has emphasised, it is not Israel's location *per se* which led to the development and deployment of the Arrow system. It was, first and foremost, the events of the Gulf War in 1991 in which Saddam Hussein broke with the central unwritten 'rule of the game' followed by all Arab states, namely not to fire missiles against civilian targets. And second, the Arab countries and Iran have accelerated their process of missile procurement. Especially the Gulf experience radically changed the attitude of the crucial actors – the ministry of defence, the military industries, and later the Israeli Defence Forces – which constitute Israel's autonomous security establishment. These efforts have to be seen in the overall strategic culture of Israel which has been undoubtedly offence-dominant.³⁸
- India: The primary interest of this non-aligned – and rising – democracy in acquiring theatre MD systems is almost exclusively determined by Pakistan's missile capabilities, part of a long history of intense conflict, while the Chinese and the North Korean arsenals are not regarded as a (serious) threat. Rajesh Rajagopalan has analysed that the MD plans of the Bush administration are the second driving force, and New Delhi's warming up to MDs may be seen as a way of improving its relationship with the United States and as part of a possible strategic partnership against the rise of the non-democratic Chinese rival. From a comparative perspective the three Asian democracies demonstrate how different the threat perception is: South Korea fears the United States as a menace to its identity, Japan is afraid of North Korea and Chinese missiles, while India's concerns are Pakistan-centric. A crucial factor for explaining this variance of threat perception seems to be the above mentioned different foreign policy orientations and the historical conflict pattern in the case of India.

To summarise, what accounts for the variety of MD policies of the democracies analysed on an aggregate level? In a nutshell, it is not their formal status as a democracy and not their different quality as a democratic country within the spectrum of the stable, new, and

37 See Hikmet Sami Turk, Turkish Defense Policy, speech held at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3 March 1999 (transcript), available at: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=34>.

38 See Patrick J. Garrity, Does the Gulf War Still Matter? Foreign Perspectives on the War and the Future of International Security, CNSS Report No.16 (Los Alamos, NM: Center for National Security Studies, Los Alamos National Laboratory, March 1993).

deficient democracies in the cases of Turkey and even more so of Russia. The two additional explanatory factors – the role of military alliances such as NATO and geographical/geopolitical position of the democracies examined are secondary. In the final analysis it is the combination of the foreign policy orientations in connection with the particular domestic power constellations (in some cases strong economic and bureaucratic interests), the role of the US and the relevance of the perceived threats that account for a sceptical/critical or for a supportive MD policy (threats defined mostly as missiles from non-democratic adversaries, but to a lesser extent as the United States menacing the basic foreign policy orientations of other democracies).

3. Prospects and Problems Ahead

The incremental, continuous, but not so orderly introduction of a great variety of complex and new MD technologies, as well as the mental and strategic changes associated with it, are likely to have both promising and problematic impacts. It is interesting to note that a number of pressing problems have been mentioned especially by the Polish authors Domisiewicz/ Kamiński who are the most fervent MD supporters in this project. Virtually all of the issues raised by them, and in other contributions, apply to the Middle East/Persian Gulf region and to Asia as well. To name the most relevant problems:

- MD technologies introduced in democracies have an impact on the decision-making processes in other democratic countries, and democratising or authoritarian neighbours. In the case of basing radars or interceptors on Central European territory, Russia in particular would be affected. What if Moscow chooses to obstruct those kinds of MD plans, establishes stronger ties with Beijing, intensifies its arms trade in the rocket area with problem states, bypasses arms control agreements, continues to intensify its arms build-up and aims its nuclear-tipped missiles at Polish strategic targets? Domisiewicz/Kamiński, in their thoughtful analysis, consider such developments as not inconceivable. They are indeed supported on this point by Kassianowa's remarks, insofar as she considers it to be not yet determined which of the competing Russian MD-related strategies – oriented towards co-operation or confrontation – will prevail. (The likely prospect of a defence-offence arms race outside of Europe is underscored by Rajagopalan in the Indian-Pakistani context.)
- The bilateral MD track preferred by the United States could prove to be a challenge for the West European states and NATO, as it looks like the Alliance is being bypassed. Yet this form of determined bilateralism may result in a push for NATO in the MD area. Its feasibility studies on the territorial defence of Europe, addressed several times in this project, may be an occasion to discuss the issues of co-ordination between the American and the Alliance MD-related activities. From the democratic point of view the issue of a probable challenge to parliamentary control needs to be debated in this context, too.³⁹
- Ecological and social risks are probably associated with the interception of an atomic, biological or chemical warhead which falls on European territory; in the assessment of the two Polish authors, those risks could be extremely high.
- The decision-making procedures concerning the possibly extremely short lead-times for intercepting a hostile missile over European territory have to be discussed and fixed with the owner on whose territory the interceptors are located, and possibly within the NATO framework as well. The strong concerns reportedly expressed by the current Polish government⁴⁰ are likely to become relevant for all countries hosting MD-related installations in the future.
- The term defensive, which in its literally non-offensive meaning is doubted by a number of experts in this project, needs to be assessed by the democracies in-

39 See Ian Davis, NATO and Missile Defence: Stay Tuned This Could Get Interesting, BASIC Notes: Occasional Papers on International Security Policy (London: British American Security Information Council, 30 June 2004), available at: <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/2004NATOMissileDefence-IstanbulSummit.htm>; see also Kubbig, Raketenabwehrsystem MEADS: Entscheidung getroffen, viele Fragen offen, op. cit.

40 See Der Spiegel, No. 31, 31 July 2006, p.87.

involved. Everts implicitly notes that the interpretation of this meaning can be questioned, although its 'purely defensive' nature ought to be obvious in order to be accepted by the public, be it in principle or in concrete situations. This regarded for instance the delivery of German Patriots to Israel and Turkey in the context of the last Iraq war.

But this does not mean that 'purely defensive' scenarios are not possible in principle – the Patriots fielded in Israel during the last two Gulf Wars with the Israeli government being passive would be an example. Beier juxtaposes the relatively passive and explicitly defensive posture of NORAD (which has the support of the Canadian people) and the potentially offensive character of MD schemes (to which the majority of the public in Canada has objected). This contrast becomes even more true, if one puts the seemingly defensive posture of MD in the context of military pre-emption, as Domisiewicz/Kamiński do with respect to MD bases in Poland, which could become engaged in a pre-emptive attack for instance against Iran. If this became reality – would such interventions, especially if they were not authorised by the UN Security Council – not pervert 'purely defensive' systems into utterly offensive ones? This in turn raises the question of the conditions under which democracies equipped with all variants of MD would become intervention-prone.

The broader and much more principled question has to be seen against this backdrop: Are MD schemes conceivable that live truly up to the standard of being 'purely defensive' and that constitute a basis for the foreign policy identity of democracies or an ensemble of democratic states in the framework of NATO or the EU? This broader and much more principled question follows from the 'purely defensive' scenarios. Two aspects are relevant. First, some countries will at some point face this question when the issue of integrating their systems into the global architecture as envisioned by the United States is on the agenda; this applies for instance to the Netherlands and Germany, which have embarked on anti-tactical systems such as the Patriot or MEADS for the primary protection of troops. For it is this very architecture which raises the old question of triggering an arms race again especially with China.

Second, the defensive feature of democracies is linked to the question of war and peace, defined as the inclination to intervene.⁴¹ This does not only apply to the pre-emptive/preventive concept of the almost unconstrained US hegemony, but especially to the foreign policy identity in transition of formerly clear-cut civilian/trading powers. Not only has the traditional hegemon ceased to exist. Many civilian/trading powers as we have known them have, too. Their civilian predisposition being the subject of transformation processes, have become weaker. Even Denmark understands itself as a strategic, i.e. militarily more active democracy, not to mention Germany and Japan who want to resume a greater role by dispatching their troops protected with MD. Whether this variant of MD makes a country more intervention-prone or leads to greater scepticism in the debates and decision-making processes at home - as it may generate a false sense of security for the soldiers in WMD hostile environments - remains an open question.

41 In this respect the comparative MD project does not only add specific aspects to the arms control/race behaviour of democracies, but to their willingness (not) to intervene as well. On the latter aspect see Anna Geis, Lothar Brock, and Harald Müller, *Democratic Wars. Looking at the Dark Side of Democratic Peace* (Houndmills/Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

4. Research Perspectives

The findings and problems presented in this project could and should be extended (and maybe corrected or complemented) by including other democracies such as Australia and Taiwan, and to a lesser extent Italy and Spain. One interesting aspect that has not been examined here is whether the politico-ideological affinity especially between the Bush administration and some smaller democracies could turn out to be an additional factor in explaining the MD policies of democracies.

The problems listed above and the two major key terms in several contributions – rising China and outer space – suggest a research setting that goes beyond the linear extension of democracies by including the interaction with non-democratic states which are seen as a threat to the democratic countries. Not only China (as mentioned in several contributions), but Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea may be examined in this connection. The issue area of missiles and defences should, as (indirectly) suggested in a number of articles, be extended to the topic of space and its weaponisation/militarisation.⁴²

Three major research questions, which also put the democracy topic into new contexts, come to mind:

- How is the conflict potential to be assessed in view of the rising states (economically and technologically) and in terms of their 'rising' rocket and space-faring capabilities (China,⁴³ India,⁴⁴ Iran⁴⁵): Are those theories right which automatically associate major risks with such rising powers?⁴⁶ Does it make a difference for the risk analysis whether these rising states are democracies or not?
- Given the unique position of the United States and the range of foreign policy options available to secure its monopoly position,⁴⁷ and in view of the possible

42 See Götz Neuneck and André Rothkirch, Rüstungskontrolle im Weltraum: Technologie, Transparenz und Vertrauensbildung, in: Götz Neuneck and Christian Mölling (eds), *Die Zukunft der Rüstungskontrolle* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), pp. 367-383; *Space Security 2004 and 2005. Executive Summary*, available at: www.spacesecurity.org.

43 See for instance Gill Bates and Gudrun Wacker (eds), *China's Rise: Diverging U.S.-EU Perceptions and Approaches* (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2005).

44 See in this context Gautam Adhikari, *India and America: Estranged No More*, in: *Current History*, Vol. 103, No. 672 (April 2004), pp. 158-164 (Special Issue on South and Southeast Asia); Gurcharan Das, *The Indian Model*, in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4 (July-August 2006), pp. 2-16; Benjamin Schreer and Christian Wagner, *Amerikanisch-indische Sicherheitsbeziehungen. Aufbruch zu einer neuen „Ära“?* (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2005).

45 See for example Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, *Iran's Nuclear Program: Debating Facts Versus Fiction* (no place of publication indicated, 2006); Cirincione with Wolfsthal and Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenals*, op. cit., pp. 83-118; Andrew Feickert, *Ballistic Missile Proliferation*, in: Steven A. Hildreth (Coordinator), *Missile Defense: The Current Debate*, pp. 6-10 (Washington, D.C.: Report of the Congressional Research Service, July 2005); Shannon N. Kile (ed.), *Europe and Iran: Perspectives on Non-proliferation*, SIPRI Research Report No. 21 (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); various contributions in: Bernd W. Kubbig, Axel Nitsche, Carolin Anthes, and Sascha Knaus (eds), *The Nuclearization of the Broader Middle East as a Challenge for Transatlantic Policy Coordination. Documentation of the Second Transatlantic Conference on the Broader Middle East in Berlin, March 2006* (organised by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt – Documentation is available at PRIF); National Intelligence Council, *National Intelligence Estimate: Ausländische Raketenentwicklungen und die Bedrohung durch ballistische Raketen bis 2015* [Washington D.C., Dezember 2001 (public summary), available at: <http://www.hsfk.de/abm/back/docs/nie2001.pdf>].

46 See on this representatives of the (neo-)realist International Relations Theory such as Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987); John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York/London Norton, 2001).

47 See Bernd W. Kubbig, Introduction: *The US Hegemon in the 'American Century.'* The State of the Art and the German Contributions, in: id. (Guest Editor.) *Toward a New American Century? The US Hegemon in Motion*, *Amerikastudien/ American Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 4, 2001 (Special Issue), pp. 495-524; David A. Lake, *Entangling Relations. American Foreign Policy in its Century* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 24-31; Niall Ferguson and Robert Kagan, *The United States Is, and Should Be, an Empire. A New Atlantic Initiative Debate*, (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, July 17, 2003, available at: <http://www.aei.org/events/>

risks from rising states: Which are the best strategies to reduce or avoid conflict without jeopardising the security of the democratic countries? Which problems and prospects arise for the policy co-ordination of the 'sole superpower' and traditionally civilian/trading powers?

- What are the conditions of and chances for arms control in the missile (defence) and space area? Is it conceivable that the proliferation of missiles and of MDs could advance at such a great pace (and get increasingly intertwined) that it becomes attractive to revitalise the current Missile Technology Control Regime and the Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles – or that far-reaching and radical proposals such as Ronald Reagan's global zero option for missiles across the board as well as regional approaches for missiles free zones become part of a serious agenda? How about the prospects for corresponding arms control proposals in space? What role is MD likely to play in the context of a ballistic missiles free zone? Would MD enhance or hamper such a zone?
- It would be in the co-operative spirit of the authors of this DSF-funded project if these pressing problems could be tackled in a multilateral follow-up project, too. For instance, the pool of expertise which is present in the 'Special Volume' would be a solid base for the establishment of a multilateral study group on a rocket free zone in the Broader Middle East/Persian Gulf region.⁴⁸

[filter.all,eventID.428/transcript.asp](#).

48 See the outline of such an endeavour in Bernd W. Kubbig, Closing Remarks - Results and Perspectives: A Call for a Ballistic Missile Free Zone, in: id., Axel Nitsche, Carolin Anthes, and Sascha Knaus (eds), *The Nuclearization of the Broader Middle East as a Challenge for Transatlantic Policy Coordination*. Second Transatlantic Conference on the Broader Middle East: Documentation, March 2006, pp. 122-125 (organized by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt – Documentation is available at PRIF).

Appendix

List of Abbreviations

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ATBM	Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile
BASIC	British-American Security Information Council
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defence
BMVg	Bundesministerium der Verteidigung/Federal Ministry of Defence
DSF	Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung/German Foundation for Peace Research
EU	European Union
HSFK	Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung
MD	Missile Defence
MEADS	Medium Extended Air Defence System
MIC	Military-Industrial Complex
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NMD	National Missile Defense
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
PAC	Patriot Advanced Capability
PRIF	Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
SAMP/T	Sol-Air Moyenne Portée/Terrestre
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UN	United Nations
TMD	Theatre/Tactical Missile Defence
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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- Glebocki, Martina/Jacobowski, Mirko/Kubbig, Bernd W./Wicker, Alexander, Raketenabwehrpläne in historischer Perspektive – Variationen über ein Thema amerikanischer Politik, in: Die Friedenswarte, Vol. 76, No. 4 (2001), pp. 361-390.
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