

Religiosity and gender equality: comparing natives and Muslim migrants in Germany

Diehl, Claudia; Koenig, Matthias; Ruckdeschel, Kerstin

Postprint / Postprint

Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:

www.peerproject.eu

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Diehl, C., Koenig, M., & Ruckdeschel, K. (2009). Religiosity and gender equality: comparing natives and Muslim migrants in Germany. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 32(2), 278-301. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870802298454>

Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden Sie hier: <http://www.peerproject.eu> Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an.

gesis
Leibniz-Institut
für Sozialwissenschaften


Terms of use:

This document is made available under the "PEER Licence Agreement". For more information regarding the PEER-project see: <http://www.peerproject.eu> This document is solely intended for your personal, non-commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain all copyright information and other information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the document in public.

By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated conditions of use.

Mitglied der

Leibniz-Gemeinschaft



RELIGIOSITY AND GENDER EQUALITY. COMPARING NATIVES AND MUSLIM MIGRANTS IN GERMANY

Journal:	<i>Ethnic and Racial Studies</i>
Manuscript ID:	RERS-2008-0007.R2
Manuscript Type:	Original Manuscript
Keywords:	Europe, Religion, Gender, Immigration, Integration, Islam



1
2
3 Claudia Diehl
4 Matthias Koenig
5 *University of Göttingen, Germany*
6

7
8 Kerstin Ruckdeschel
9 *Federal Institute for Population Research, Germany*
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27 **RELIGIOSITY AND GENDER EQUALITY.**

28
29 **COMPARING NATIVES AND MUSLIM MIGRANTS IN GERMANY**
30
31

32
33
34 **Abstract**
35

36
37 In European public debates, Islam is often described as an impediment to gender
38 equality. By using data from surveys conducted in Germany, we analyze the role of high
39 levels of individual religiosity in explaining Turks' and Germans' approval of gender
40 equality and the way Turkish and German couples share household tasks. Results
41 suggest that for both groups, individuals with strong religious commitments are less
42 likely than secular ones to hold egalitarian gender role attitudes. At the behavioral level,
43 this correlation between religiosity and gender egalitarianism only holds true for
44 Turkish respondents. Furthermore, strong religious commitments contribute to
45 generational stability in attitudinal and behavioral gender-traditionalism among Turks.
46 However, when explaining Germans' more egalitarian gender-related attitudes and
47 behaviors, religiosity turns out to be just one factor among others – and not a
48 particularly important one. Further research is needed to disentangle the different
49 cultural and religious aspects of Muslim migrants' attitudes and behaviors.
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 *Word count: 7875 (including endnotes and references)*
9

10
11
12
13 *Keywords: Europe, Religion, Islam, Gender, Immigration, Integration*
14

15
16
17 June 2008
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

For Peer Review Only

Introduction

The religious dimension of migrants' integration receives growing public and academic attention in Western immigration countries. European debates notoriously focus on the integration of Muslims. Not unlike Spanish in the US (Zolberg and Woon 1999), Islam is publicly conceived as major symbolic boundary distinguishing both Christian and secular Europeans from their immigrants (Césari 2004; Alba 2005; Casanova 2006; Koenig 2007). Of crucial importance for this symbolic boundary is the perceived incompatibility of Islam with the modern principle of gender equality. Alleged violations of this principle belong to the standard repertoire of those who ask for less tolerance vis-à-vis Muslim claims for recognition, as evinced by recurrent controversies over the Muslim headscarf that is often seen as a symbol of female oppression. Given its prominence in public discourse, this presumably negative relationship between Islam and gender equality merits close attention. In this article, we investigate how high levels of individual religiosity affect gender attitudes and gender role behaviour among first and second generation migrants from countries with a predominantly Muslim population. In order to grasp the specifics of Muslim religiosity, we compare these migrants with a native, predominantly Christian control group.

We focus on the situation in Germany where increasing public visibility of approximately 3 million Muslims is subject to growing controversy. Most of them are of Turkish origin, having either immigrated as low-skilled labor migrants during the period of 'guest-worker' recruitment in the 1960s and 1970s, or belonging to the second generation, i.e. to those who immigrated as children or were born in Germany. Previous research has shown that both Turks in Turkey and Turkish immigrants in Germany do in fact hold substantially more conservative gender role attitudes than Germans (see Nauck 1990; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Gerhards 2007). However, it has not yet been systematically assessed to which extent these traditional orientations are related to the strength of Turkish immigrants' religiosity and to their religious background as Muslims.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

This research lacuna is at least partly due to data limitations. However, the ‘Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS)’, which are based on large samples of Germans and Turks, offer new and unique opportunities for the systematic study of the relationship between Muslim religiosity and gender equality: They provide information on both groups’ individual levels of religiosity as well as on gender attitudes and behaviors, i.e. individuals’ approval of gender equality as well as more practical features of gender relations such as the way couples share household tasks.

Using these new datasets, we ask to which extent between- and within-group differences in gender-related attitudes and behaviors of Turks and Germans are attributable to differences in religiosity. Both groups vary with respect to many other characteristics known to affect gender equality such as education, female labor force participation, or broader socialization contexts. We thus need to assess the relative extent to which group differences are attributable to degrees and contents of religiosity as compared to other factors. Since it may be expected that exposure to more egalitarian gender values during formative years attenuates the influence of Muslim religiosity, we also need to scrutinize how the nexus between religiosity and gender-related attitudes and behaviors changes in the generational succession among Turkish immigrants.

We start with an overview of theoretical arguments and previous empirical findings on the relationship between religion and gender relations in general and among Muslim migrants in particular. We then present our data and measurements and give a descriptive overview of the distribution of our relevant variables for Germans’ and first and second generation Turks’. Based on this, we present the analysis of how religiosity impacts on gender-related attitudes and behaviors among the groups under consideration. A critical discussion of our findings concludes the article.

Religion and gender in the context of migration: Theoretical arguments and empirical findings

1
2
3 The intersection between religion and gender relations has long attracted attention among social
4 scientists. Within the specific context of migration, researchers have focused on the role of
5 gender in religious identity construction among migrants (Alumkal 1999; Amir-Moazami/Jouili
6 2006), on female activism in religious diasporas (Werbner 2002), and on the influence of
7 religious socialization goals on the transmission of gender-role values in migrant families
8 (Idema and Phalet 2007). However, as Cadge and Ecklund (2007, p. 365) argue in their review
9 of US scholarship about religion and migration, ‘there are few studies that examine the way
10 religion and gender intersect more broadly outside of particular religious organizations’. In
11 European scholarship there is a rich literature on public discourses about religion and gender
12 (Gaspard/Koshrokhavar 1995 Bowen 2006), but few studies systematically scrutinize their
13 relationship on the individual level.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

27 In the following, we discuss potential hypotheses about the influence of religious
28 traditions and of individual religiosity – broadly understood as the commitment to religious
29 values and norms – as potential factors for subscribing to more traditional gender role
30 orientations and gender related behaviors such as the division of household labor. Doing this,
31 we draw on standard paradigms of secularization and assimilation as well as on alternative
32 theories of religious culture and reactive ethnicity, assess their *prima facie* plausibility against
33 the background of existing empirical findings on Turkish migrants in Germany, and discuss
34 arguments about religiosity’s changing pertinence in the generational succession.
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

45 *Religion’s impact on gender attitudes and behavior*

46
47

48 There are many factors that affect gender attitudes and behavior, including most notably the
49 degree of societal modernization (Inglehart and Norris 2003, p. 47). Gender attitudes are
50 strongly related to *individual social background*, with the better educated, female, and younger
51 parts of the population holding more egalitarian attitudes. Gender behavior – e.g. the division of
52 household tasks between men and women, decision making in the household, or couples’
53 money arrangements – is similarly related to *partners’ resourcefulness* such as income
54 differences and life circumstances (Blood and Wolfe 1960, Becker 1981; Treas 1993; Bianchi et
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 al 2000; Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001; Breen and Cooke 2005; Grunow, Schulz and Blossfeld
4
5 2007). Nevertheless, since many of these studies show that an increase in women's resources
6
7 does not necessarily lead to more equality, people's gender behavior seems also to be influenced
8
9 by *cultural values* and *social norms*.

10
11 Within the broad range of values and norms, religious traditions have long been a prime
12
13 suspect for explaining the unequal distribution of power between men and women. Many
14
15 religions regulate the sphere of reproduction, and female sexuality in particular, by linking
16
17 gender to symbolic distinctions between sacred and profane and to ritual norms of purity and
18
19 impurity. In doing so, they tend to legitimize inequalities and hierarchical relationships between
20
21 the sexes both within religious institutions and within broader society (Brinkerhoff and MacKie
22
23 1985). Individuals with strong religious commitments may therefore be assumed to share more
24
25 traditional gender attitudes and behavior. And indeed, strong religiosity tends to be correlated
26
27 with overall less egalitarian gender role attitudes even after controlling for other individual level
28
29 factors such as education (Inglehart and Norris 2003, p. 670; for ethnic group variation in this
30
31 association see Kane 2000, p. 434).

32
33 Now, standard theories of secularization predict that increasing societal modernization
34
35 contributes to both a decline in religiosity and a decrease in the practical relevance of religion
36
37 and, in both ways, facilitates more egalitarian gender relations. Within the context of
38
39 presumably secularized European societies, it can therefore be hypothesized that migrants from
40
41 less modernized countries with higher levels of general religiosity exhibit less egalitarian
42
43 attitudes than those shared by the majority, other things being equal.

44
45 The stereotypical argument that Muslim immigrants are ill-equipped to adapt to
46
47 Western norms of gender equality, however, does not just refer to their strong religiosity.
48
49 Rather, it assumes that there are also differences in the *content* of religiosity. There is indeed a
50
51 long-standing literature which highlights denominational variations in attitudes toward women's
52
53 roles and women's socio-economic status and family related behavior (Lenski 1963; Porter and
54
55 Albert 1977; Heaton and Cornwall 1989). Islamic discourses and practices such as Quranic
56
57 scripture and the legal rules of shari'a are in particular perceived to entail inherently non-
58
59
60

1
2
3 egalitarian gender relations (for discussion see Mir-Hosseini 2000). And in fact, Inglehart and
4
5 Norris (2003, p. 47) have found that contemporary Jews, Protestants, and Catholics – along with
6
7 non-affiliated individuals – show higher mean scores on the gender equality scale than
8
9 Buddhists and Muslims even after controlling for individual and societal background variables.
10
11 Whereas religious cultures are here considered to affect the values and norms of most of its
12
13 adherents, one would have to hypothesize *a fortiori* that Muslim migrants with high degrees of
14
15 religiosity hold more conservative gender role orientations than strongly religious Christians or
16
17 Jews, other things being equal.
18
19

20 Available empirical evidence on Turkish Muslims in Germany is inconclusive with
21
22 respect to these hypotheses. Previous findings confirm that immigrants from Turkey are
23
24 substantially more religious than native Germans and other groups of former guest workers
25
26 (Frick 2004; Fuchs-Heinritz 2000; for more ambivalent results on girls and young females see
27
28 Boos-Nünning and Karakasoglu 2005). Besides, existing data support the assumption that
29
30 Turkish migrants most of whom come from rather traditional rural contexts and only rarely hold
31
32 higher educational degrees, are overall less egalitarian than natives. There is also some
33
34 preliminary evidence that religiously committed Muslim migrants (but not Christians) are
35
36 substantially less approving of gender equality than secular ones (for high school students see
37
38 Brettfeld and Wetzels 2003, p. 331). At the behavioral level, previous research has shown that
39
40 higher levels of religiosity are related to less female autonomy in Turkish immigrant households
41
42 (Nauck 1985). In sum, however, the existing literature does not reveal to which degree
43
44 traditional gender attitudes and behaviors among Muslim immigrants are best explained by
45
46 either their socio-economic background, their degree of religiosity, or by some particular
47
48 characteristics of Islam.
49
50
51
52

53 54 *Religion and gender among second generation immigrants*

55
56 We now turn to the implications of straight-line theories of secularization and assimilation for
57
58 the role of religion and gender among second generation migrants. Higher levels of education
59
60 and labor force participation are usually connected to lower levels of religiosity (van Tubergen

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
2006). Many migrants born in the host society left the educational, social and occupational ethnic niches occupied by the first generation and can therefore be expected to be *less religious* than those who immigrated as adults. Changes in the cultural and economic context of female migrants in particular (Jones Correa 1998) and exposure to more egalitarian gender norms may also alter the practical relevance of religious norms in the generational succession. As life in a secular society raises the social and economic (opportunity-)costs of strict adherence to religious gender norms, migrants' religiosity may not only weaken over time, but also become more private and 'symbolic' (Gans 1994). One would therefore hypothesize that the relationship between migrants' religiosity and their gender attitudes and behaviors differs markedly between the first and the second generation.

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
However, theories of secularization and assimilation have met considerable criticism. Thus, it is claimed that depending on the circumstances in the host society, ethnic ties and identities may be maintained or even revitalized among the second generation (Portes and Rumbaut 2001, p. 148). These 'reactive' forms of identity formation may compensate for a lack of social approval and are most likely to emerge in hostile reception contexts marked by discrimination and a lack for upward mobility that create the need for alternative sources of social status and identity. Since religion is an important foundation of ethnicity for many immigrant groups, this should also apply to religious acculturation processes (Greeley 1971). As generational persistence may affect both the strength of religious commitments and their grip on migrants' attitudes and behaviors in other, non-religious spheres, one would hypothesize that the relationship between religiosity and gender-related attitudes and behavior remains strong or becomes even stronger for second generation migrants.

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Again, empirical evidence is inconclusive to decide between these two alternative arguments. At first sight, it seems that religiosity is declining in the generational succession, as evinced by data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) which show that second generation immigrants from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia are less religious than first generation migrants in terms of indicators such as religion's subjective importance or attendance of religious services (Frick 2004; Diehl and Schnell 2006). However, it is not clear to which

1
2
3 extent these changes are merely due to differences in group composition (e.g. age and
4
5 education). In fact, one might well expect that Turkish migrants in Germany follow patterns of
6
7 'reactive ethnicity' or at least 'ethnic maintenance' rather than of straight-line assimilation since
8
9 they face larger social and cultural distances than other groups of labor migrants such as Italians
10
11 or Greeks. Although second generation Turks in Germany have higher levels of education and
12
13 labor force participation and more contacts with natives than the first generation, their
14
15 structural, cognitive, and social assimilation progresses slower than that of other labor migrants
16
17 (Kalter and Granato 2002; Diehl and Schnell 2006) and they remain subject to negative
18
19 stereotypes (Wasmer and Koch 2003). This may slow down acculturation processes and further
20
21 the maintenance or even reactivation of ethnic and religious identifications and norms.
22
23

24
25 Moreover, there is evidence that migrant parents feel a greater need to put more effort in
26
27 the maintenance of cultural heritage than non-migrants. Intergenerational continuity in the
28
29 transmission of religious norms within Turkish families is indeed high, particularly in the
30
31 relationship between fathers and sons (Nauck 1995; 2000). Existing findings also reveal that
32
33 children of immigrant-parents with religious socialization goals hold more conservative gender
34
35 role orientations than children who were raised in a more secular socialization climate. Again,
36
37 this applies particularly to father-son dyads (Idema and Phalet 2007). Empirical research on
38
39 generational change on the behavioral level is so far limited to qualitative studies which suggest
40
41 that religion has indeed changed its meaning for second generation Muslim migrants.
42
43 Supposedly, Turkish women who grew up in Germany, not unlike young urban female Muslims
44
45 in Turkey (Göle 1996), draw a sharp line between religious and traditional norms and rules and
46
47 consider the former as a source of identity and emancipation rather than of oppression. 'Neo-
48
49 Muslimas' tend to choose partners who follow the 'true Islam', and even though gender roles
50
51 are still far from interchangeable the asymmetry in the privileges of the sexes is limited (Nökel
52
53 2002, p. 251). There is no evidence, however, about the quantitative relevance of this group.
54
55

56
57 This brief outline shows that existing empirical evidence cannot settle the contradictory
58
59 theoretical assumptions about the role of religiosity in explaining gender role orientations and
60

1
2
3 gender-related behavior of natives and first and second generation immigrants. Therefore, we
4
5 now turn to our own empirical analyses.
6
7

8 9 **Data and measurements**

10
11 The ‘Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS)’ were conducted in 2005 and 2006 at the *German*
12
13 *Federal Institute for Population Research*. In two separate surveys, 10.000 Germans and 4.000
14
15 Turks in the age group between 18 and 79 were interviewed on topics such as relationships with
16
17 partners, parents, and children, gender role orientations and family life, religious attitudes and
18
19 socio-demographic characteristics. The survey instrument was the same for both groups, except
20
21 for some additional questions on migrants’ immigration history and their individual integration
22
23 (for data and methods see Ruckdeschel et al. 2006; Ette et al. 2007). In the German sample
24
25 respondents were identified by random route; the survey of Turks was based on a probability
26
27 sample from the local registration offices. Accordingly, only Turkish citizens were interviewed.
28
29 About 20 per cent of all persons of Turkish origin living in Germany, especially those whose
30
31 assimilation is more progressed, have acquired German citizenship during the last decade (see
32
33 Salentin and Wilkening 2003; Diehl and Blohm 2007). Findings can thus not be generalized to
34
35 the whole Turkish origin population in Germany (1).
36
37
38
39

40
41 The survey covers a broad range of issues and contains several suitable indicators for
42
43 migrants’ gender role attitudes and behaviors and for their religious affiliation and orientations
44
45 (2). In order to measure gender role attitudes, we adapted Inglehart and Norris’ Gender-Equality
46
47 Scale (GES, see Inglehart and Norris 2003) and constructed an index based on five items
48
49 measuring approval of gender equality (3). On the behavioral level, gender equality is measured
50
51 by the division of household tasks between the partners. Gender division of labor is labeled
52
53 ‘traditional’ if the female partner is responsible for typical women’s tasks (doing the dishes and
54
55 cooking) and the male partner does typical men’s tasks (maintenance repairs and paying the
56
57 bills). All other forms of household division of labor (man does typical women’s tasks and vice
58
59 versa, third party does the work, man or woman does all the work) are categorized as ‘non-
60
traditional’.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

With regard to religious affiliation, the survey distinguishes between self-identified Christians, Muslims, others and those belonging to no religion. Individual religiosity is measured by three standard indicators: attendance of religious services, approval of the statement that religious ceremonies related to the life-cycle events such as weddings or funerals are important, and the mentioning of religion as one of the three most important socialization goals for children. In terms of Glock's (1962) seminal statement, these indicators measure the public-ritual and ethical dimensions of religiosity, respectively. Cognitive, belief, and experiential dimensions of religiosity were, unfortunately, not included in the survey. However, even a moderate multi-dimensional concept of religiosity is desirable, when comparing Christians and Muslims who vary substantially with regard to the doctrinal and practical importance of various dimensions. For instance, religious service attendance, the standard indicator for the public-ritual dimension of religiosity, has very different meanings within Christian and Islamic traditions and, as our data show, it is also less important for Muslim women than for men. To measure strong religious commitment, we therefore used a composite index that takes group specific manifestations of religiosity into account. Thus, we code all those respondents as 'religious' who display strong religious commitments according to at least two of the three indicators mentioned above (attendance of religious services at least once a week; agreement that religious ceremonies are important; religion mentioned as one of the three most important socialization goals out of a list of eleven).

44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

As outlined above, relevant social background variables need to be taken into account when assessing the relative impact of religion on gender-related attitudes and behavior. Age, sex, and family status (married or cohabiting with partner *versus* living alone) are thus included in the analyses. As indicators for respondents' resourcefulness individual level variables such as education (CASMIN classification, recoded into low for those who completed no school or basic education *versus* high for all others) (4), employment status (full/part time employment or unemployment *versus* not employed or retired), and the presence of children are added. Additional indicators for partner's resourcefulness on the household level are the age differences between the partners (female more than three years younger than male *versus* female

1
2
3 about the same age than male or older) and the employments status of the couple (only one
4 partner is employed *versus* both partners are employed).

5
6
7 In order to measure respondents' exposure to the overall more egalitarian gender values
8 of majority members, additional analyses for Turks include measurements of their social
9 assimilation (Idema and Phalet 2007, p. 85). Since the latter is not measured directly we use the
10 language spoken most of the time (German *versus* Turkish) and – on the household level – the
11 origin of the partner as proxies (partner is first generation Turk or Turkish origin *versus* partner
12 is second generation Turk or Turkish origin *versus* partner has German or other non-Turkish
13 origin).

24 **Empirical findings**

25
26 We start out with a descriptive overview of the different variables for first and second
27 generation Turks and Germans. We then take a closer look at the relationship between
28 religiosity, nationality, and generation. Against this background, we scrutinize the role of
29 religiosity in explaining between- and within-group difference in gender-related attitudes and
30 behavior of German and first and second generation Turks.

38 *Gender, religion, and socio-structural background characteristics: A descriptive overview*

39
40 The three groups differ substantially in terms of the characteristics under consideration. In
41 accordance with much of the existing literature, we find that first generation Turks approve of
42 gender equality less often and are less likely to practice an egalitarian division of household
43 tasks than Germans. Second generation Turks are right in between Germans and Turkish
44 immigrants with respect to the attitudinal aspects of gender equality while on the behavioral
45 level the dividing line is still between first and second generation Turks and Germans (see table
46 1).

57
58
59 **Table 1:** *Distribution of dependent and independent variables by nationality and generational*
60 *status (means or per cent)*

1
2
3 The three groups also differ in terms of our most important independent variable, religion.
4
5 Analyses not displayed here reveal that 70 per cent of the Germans claim to be Christians, while
6
7 more the 90 per cent of the Turks identify as Muslims. Of greater interest to our analysis is,
8
9 however, the respective share of religiously committed or 'orthodox' persons among the three
10
11 groups. Against the background of existing research of religious affiliation, it should not come
12
13 as a surprise that only 6 per cent of Germans are religiously committed in terms of at least two
14
15 of our three indicators (regular attendance, importance of religious ceremonies, religious
16
17 socialization goals), as compared to 21 per cent of second generation Turks and 27 per cent of
18
19 those Turks who immigrated after childhood. It should be noted here that the religiously
20
21 committed constitute a minority not only within the German population (see e.g. Norris and
22
23 Inglehart 2004, p. 74) but also, in accordance with the 'polarization thesis' (Merkens 1997, p.
24
25 63), within the Turkish population.
26
27
28

29
30 Second generation Turks are younger than the other two groups and accordingly less
31
32 likely to be married or cohabiting and to have children. The share of individuals with higher
33
34 educational degrees and the share of those who are employed are larger among second than
35
36 among first generation Turks. Germans, however, are the group with the largest share of
37
38 employed individuals. Those Turks who were born in Germany or immigrated as children speak
39
40 mostly German more often than first generation migrants, probably because they have German
41
42 friends.
43

44
45 In terms of the indicators for the resource asymmetry within the household, the figures
46
47 show that first and second generation Turks live substantially less often in a relationship in
48
49 which both partners are employed than Germans. Females are about the same age or older than
50
51 her partners in two thirds of second generation Turkish and German couples while this share is
52
53 smaller among Turkish immigrants. In addition, less than 10 per cent of first generation Turks
54
55 have a partner of non-Turkish origin whereas this share is twice as high for second generation
56
57 Turks. The share of those with a partner from another immigrant generation (i.e. first generation
58
59 migrants with a partner who was born in Germany or immigrated at an early age or vice versa)
60
is also larger among second generation migrants.

Generational change in migrants' religiosity

Before turning to the impact of religiosity on gender roles attitudes and gender equality, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at generational change in migrants' religious orientations.

While bivariate results suggested that there is generational change in religiosity figure 1 reveals that this is exclusively due to the different age composition of first and second generation migrants. If this is taken into account, second generation migrants are about as religious as first generation migrants.

Figure 1: *Gross and net differences in religiosity between first and second generation Turks and Germans (odds ratios)*

Separate analyses for males and females not presented here show that second generation Turkish men are even slightly more religious than first generation males whereas second generation women are slightly (though not significantly) less religious than female immigrants. Moreover, while the difference between first and second generation Turks disappears after controlling for the demographic composition of the groups, the one between Turks and Germans becomes larger. If Germans were as young and male as first generation Turks, they would be even less religious than they already are. Additional controls for education do not change the picture substantially.

In sum, our findings show that contrary to assumptions of straight-line theories of assimilation and secularization, religiosity does not decline in the generational succession, at least not when the share of those with strong religious commitments is considered. On the other hand, popular statements about a religious revival among second generation migrants are also without empirical evidence.

Religion and the approval of gender equality

As already discussed, second generation Turks are more approving of gender equality than first generation Turks but still less approving than Germans. But to what extent do these differences merely reflect group variation in relevant individual background variables? And in how far are

1
2
3 they attributable to migrants' strength or content of religiosity? In order to answer these
4
5 questions, we start out by presenting regression models on the approval of gender equality first
6
7 excluding and then including religion (model I and II). A model with interactions between
8
9 group belonging and religiosity allows us to study the *differences* in the attitudinal repercussions
10
11 of strong religious commitments for Muslims and Christians and for first and second generation
12
13 migrants (III). Separate models for the three groups accomplish the picture by providing more
14
15 detailed insight into the relative importance of religious commitments, background variables on
16
17 the individual and household level, and – for the Turkish group – degree of social assimilation
18
19 (IV to VIII, see table 2).
20
21
22
23
24

25 **Table 2:** *Approval of gender equality (unstandardized linear regression coefficients)*
26

27
28 The models confirm, first, that Turkish immigrants and, to a lesser degree, second generation
29
30 Turks hold substantially more conservative gender role attitudes than Germans even after
31
32 controlling for individual background variables known to affect these orientations. Furthermore,
33
34 we can see in model II that religiosity has a rather strong negative impact on the approval of
35
36 gender equality. However, results also show that group differences in the approval of gender
37
38 equality remain fairly stable when religiosity is included. Obviously, it is only to a very small
39
40 extent that the nationality gap shown in model I can be attributed to migrants' religious
41
42 commitment.
43
44

45
46 In order to assess if and to what extent the relationship between religiosity and
47
48 traditional gender role orientations is stronger for Muslim as compared to Christian believers
49
50 and for first as compared to second generation Turks we insert interactions between religiosity
51
52 and generation/nationality (dummy variables for religious and non-religious first and second
53
54 Turks and Germans) into model III. Results show very clearly that religiosity has a negative
55
56 impact on the approval of gender equality for *all three* groups – albeit the overall lower level of
57
58 approval is lower among Turks in general: religious Germans are still more approving of gender
59
60

1
2
3 equality than secular Turks. Furthermore, generational change towards more egalitarian gender
4
5 roles orientations is limited to secular Turks.
6

7
8 Separate models for first and second generation Turks and for Germans provide more
9
10 detailed insight into the relative importance of the factors under consideration here. For the
11
12 Turkish group, these models also allow us to look into the role of social contacts with majority
13
14 members who on average hold more egalitarian gender role attitudes. Results show some
15
16 substantial similarities between the groups (see table 2). As we have already seen, the role of
17
18 strong religious beliefs reduces the likelihood to approve of gender equality for each group.
19
20 Furthermore, being female and better educated comes along with more egalitarian gender role
21
22 orientations for all three groups. This is especially the case for second generation Turks and for
23
24 Germans. However, only Turks hold more conservative gender role attitudes when they are
25
26 married or cohabiting and have children. As expected, those Turks who speak German most of
27
28 the time are more likely to approve of gender equality (5).
29
30

31
32 In general, the attitudes of first generation Turks seem to be more ‘diffuse’, i.e. less
33
34 explicable by the variables under consideration here (see low model fit). This suggests that
35
36 unobserved heterogeneity with regard to factors related to the country of origin, e.g. urban
37
38 versus rural background, might play an important role for this group.
39
40

41 *Religion and gender-related behavior*

42
43 We now turn to the impact of religion on gender-related behavior. Here, we limit our analyses to
44
45 cohabiting and/or married couples and look into the factors that influence how they divide the
46
47 tasks in the household. Apart from that, we run similar models to the ones presented in the last
48
49 section.
50
51
52
53
54

55 **Table 3:** *Non-traditional division of household tasks (logistic regression coefficients)*

56
57
58
59 The models displayed in table 3 show that Germans are much more likely to share household
60
tasks in an egalitarian manner than Turks, whereas there is no significant difference between

1
2
3 first and second generation Turks when background variables on the individual and household
4 level are taken into account. The sizeable difference between Germans and Turks is partly due
5 to the fact that both first and second generation Turks included in the analyses on the household
6 level are a somewhat selective subsample. As we already saw in the previous section, Turks
7 who are married or cohabiting are considerably more conservative than singles whereas the
8 difference between married and single Germans is very small. Accordingly, if this selectivity in
9 the subsample considered here was taken into account, the differences between Germans and
10 Turks would most likely diminish whereas the ones between first and second generation would
11 remain rather stable.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23 The model including religiosity shows once more that the differences between Turks
24 and Germans are only marginally attributable to differences in both groups' level of religiosity
25 (see rather stable group coefficients in model II as compared to model I). The group interactions
26 that we added in model III reveal an important difference between gender-related attitudes and
27 behavior: Religious commitments seem to come along with a traditional division of household
28 tasks only for Turks but less so for Germans (the dummy-coefficients for religious and secular
29 Germans are rather similar in model III). Furthermore, we can see that the absence of
30 generational change in gender-related behavior is mostly due to the fact that second generation
31 religious Turks are just as conservative with regard to their gender-related behavior than first
32 generation religious Turks while there is at least some generational change for secular second
33 generation Turks.
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

46
47 Again, we present separate models (IV to VIII) in order to assess the relative
48 importance of the factors under consideration here for all three groups and look into the impact
49 of migrants' exposure to natives' overall more egalitarian gender norms. These models confirm
50 that religion is negatively related to an egalitarian division of household tasks only for Turks,
51 not for Germans. Religious Turks of both generations are less likely to pursue an egalitarian
52 division of labor in their household than secular Turks. And again, the influence of religiosity
53 seems to be just as strong for second than for first generation Turks (6). The impact of religion
54 for second generation migrants is moderated if respondents' social context is taken into account:
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Having a partner from a different generation is marginally positively related to more liberal
4 gender division of labor for second generation migrants. This effect seems somewhat surprising
5 but is easy to explain: Analyses run separately for both sexes show that it is exclusively caused
6 by second generation females whose partner migrated from Turkey (first generation). These
7 couples are very likely to share household tasks in a non-traditional way which probably reflects
8 the better bargaining position of those females who have been living in Germany for longer and
9 who often sponsored their husband's immigration (for a similar finding, see Nauck 1985).
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18 The positive effects of age for first and second generation Turks show once again that
19 conservative young Turks are more likely to live in a relationship than more egalitarian ones
20 who may have adapted to the 'western' pattern of late marriages. In all three groups, those who
21 approve of gender equality are more likely to show a non-traditional division of labor. The
22 positive impact of egalitarian gender attitudes is particularly strong for second generation Turks.
23 Obviously, 'cultural' factors such as religious commitments or gender role orientations matter
24 more for Turks than for natives whose gender division of labor seems to hinge primarily on
25 factors not considered here (see low model fit for this group) (7).
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

36 **Conclusion**

37
38 In this article, we have asked to what extent between- and within-group differences of Germans
39 and first and second generation Turks in gender attitudes and behavior can be attributed to
40 religious commitment. In sum, our analyses establish four key findings. First of all, whereas
41 previous research has described the assimilation process of Turkish migrants in Germany as
42 comparatively slow but steady, their religiosity seems to be rather stable across the generations.
43 This applies at least to immigrants with strong religious commitments – who are a minority
44 even within the Turkish population – and particularly to young Turkish males.
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

54 Secondly, our findings suggest that religious individuals hold more conservative gender
55 role attitudes than more secular ones among both Turks *and* Germans – even if relevant social
56 background characteristics are taken into account. However, strong religious commitments do
57 not affect the division of household tasks among German couples, while this continues to be the
58
59
60

1
2
3 case among Turkish couples. Furthermore, the repercussions of religious commitments in
4
5 everyday life are just as strong for those who grew up in Germany as for those who immigrated
6
7 later in life. Turkish migrants' religiosity thus seems to be less 'symbolic' than in the case of
8
9 Germans in so far as its grip on everyday life is tighter.
10

11
12 Thirdly, we could demonstrate very clearly that in explaining why Turkish immigrants
13
14 hold more conservative gender role orientations and exhibit more traditional ways of organizing
15
16 the household, strong religious commitment is just one among several factors – and not even a
17
18 particularly important one. Even secular Turks are more conservative than Germans with similar
19
20 background characteristics. One might argue that this is just another piece of evidence for the
21
22 strong indirect impact of the Islamic heritage on cultural norms of gender relations even of
23
24 secular Turks. However, existing research suggests caution in drawing such far reaching
25
26 conclusions: populations of many other non-Islamic countries in Southern and Eastern Europe
27
28 have similar traditional gender orientations as Turkey (Gerhards 2007), and parents' gender
29
30 specific expectations of their children's involvement in household tasks are rather conservative
31
32 for all labor migrants (Greeks, in particular, see Nauck 2000, p. 369). Clearly, further research is
33
34 needed to assess the relative impact of the Islamic culture and to disentangle it from other
35
36 aspects of migrants' cultural background.
37
38
39

40
41 Fourthly, despite religiosity's moderate role in explaining gender-related differences
42
43 between Turks and Germans our analyses show that strong religious commitments contribute to
44
45 generational stability in attitudinal and behavioral gender-traditionalism. Only secular second
46
47 generation migrants hold more egalitarian gender role attitudes than first generation migrants,
48
49 and generational change in gender-related behavior – albeit small – is also limited to secular
50
51 Turks. Strong religiosity, or so our analyses suggest, seems to be an effective barrier to
52
53 generational change towards gender equality in attitudes and in everyday life among Turkish
54
55 migrants.
56

57
58 It has to be emphasized that our findings cannot be generalized to the whole Turkish
59
60 origin population living in Germany. Since naturalized Turks who are often less religious are
not included in our analyses, the overall level of religiosity for the Turkish origin population

1
2
3 might be overestimated (note, however, that naturalization is equally prevalent among first and
4 second generation Turks, see Diehl and Blohm 2008). Besides, nationality differences on the
5 behavioral level might be somewhat overstated because Turks who live in relationships tend to
6 be more conservative than single ones.
7
8
9
10

11 Notwithstanding these reservations, the baseline of our argument is rather clear-cut:
12 Religious commitment has considerable influence on gender attitudes of *all* groups considered
13 here, whereas it has repercussions on everyday behavior only for the Turkish population. These
14 findings are in accordance with decades of research showing that the religious factor matters in
15 the sphere of gender relationships. With regard to the role of Islam in explaining the more
16 conservative gender attitudes and behaviors of Turks as compared to natives, however, our
17 findings call for a revision of popular and easy-at hand attributions: The large attitudinal and
18 behavioral differences even between secular Turks and Germans suggest that the factual
19 explanatory power of migrants' religiosity lags far behind its prominence in public debates.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 Acknowledgments

34 We would like to thank Teresa Jurado, Pia Schober and Peter Preisendörfer for carefully reading
35 and commenting the manuscript.
36
37
38
39
40
41

42 Notes

- 43
44 (1) Although naturalized Turks were included in the German sample, they were strongly
45 underrepresented. We therefore had to exclude them from the analyses.
46
47 (2) The questionnaires are available under http://www.bib-demographie.de/publikat/frame_material.html.
48
49 (3) The four GES items are: 1) On the whole, men make better political leaders than women (agree coded
50 low); 2) When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women (agree coded low); 3) Do
51 you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary (agree coded
52 low); 4) If a woman wants a child as a single parent but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship
53 with a man, do you approve or disapprove? (disapprove coded low). The fifth item was not in the original
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 GES: 5) Taking care of household and children is just as satisfying as to work for money (agree coded
4
5 low).

6
7 (4) This was necessary due to the large differences between the groups. Most first generation Turks have
8
9 no educational degree or have completed elementary education while only a small share of Germans fall
10
11 into this category.

12
13 (5) Note, however, that it is impossible to assess the causal relationship between migrants' social
14
15 assimilation and their adoption of liberal gender attitudes with cross-sectional data.

16
17 (6) The statistically non-significant coefficients ($p=.9$) for the second generation are primarily due to the
18
19 small number of cases for this group.

20
21 (7) In analyses not presented here we inserted several indicators that have proven to be an important
22
23 determinant in explaining changes in the gender division of labor over time (duration of partnership,
24
25 marriage-migration, large educational gap between the partners) into the models (see Grunow, Schulz and
26
27 Blossfeld 2007) but this did not increase their explanatory power. Including income differences between
28
29 the spouses was impossible due to missing cases.

30 31 32 33 34 **References**

35
36 ALBA, R.D. 2005 'Bright vs. blurred boundaries: second generation assimilation and exclusion
37
38 in France, Germany and the United States', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 28, pp. 20-49

39
40 ALUMKAL, A.W. 1999 Preserving patriarchy: assimilation, gender norms, and second-generation
41
42 Korean American evangelicals, *Qualitative Sociology*, vol. 22, pp.127-140

43
44
45
46 AMIR-MOAZAMI, S, and JOUILI, J. 2006 'Knowledge, empowerment and religious authority among
47
48 pious Muslim women in France and Germany'. *The Muslim World*, vol. 96, pp. 617-642.

49
50 BECKER, G.S. 1981 *A Treatise on the Family*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press

51
52 BIANCHI, S.M. *et al.* 2000 'Is anyone doing the housework? Trends in the gender division of
53
54 household labor', *Social Forces*, vol. 79, pp. 191-234

55
56 BLOOD, R.O. JR. and WOLFE, D.M. 1960 *Husbands & Wives. The Dynamics of Married*
57
58 *Living*, New York: Free Press

- 1
2
3 BLOSSFELD, H.-P. and DROBNIC, S. 2001 'Theoretical perspectives on couples' careers', in
4 H.-P. Blossfeld and S. Drobic (eds), *Careers of Couples in Contemporary Societies. From*
5 *Male Breadwinner Households to Dual Earner Families*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.
6
7 16-50
8
9
10
11 BOOS-NÜNNING, U. and KARAKAŞOĞLU, Y. 2005 *Viele Welten leben. Zur*
12 *Lebenssituation von Mädchen und jungen Frauen mit Migrationshintergrund*, Münster:
13 Waxmann
14
15
16
17
18 BOWEN, J. R. 2006 *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
19
20 BREEN, R. and COOKE, L.P. 2005 'The persistence of the gendered division of domestic
21 labour', *European Sociological Review*, vol. 21, pp. 43-57
22
23
24
25 BRETTFELD, K. and WETZELS, P. 2003 'Junge Muslime in Deutschland: Eine
26 kriminologische Analyse zur Alltagsrelevanz von Religion und Zusammenhängen von
27 individueller Religiosität mit Gewalterfahrungen, -einstellungen und -handeln', in *Islamismus.*
28 *Texte zur Inneren Sicherheit*, Berlin: Bundesministerium des Inneren, pp. 221-316
29
30
31
32
33 BRINKERHOFF, M.B. and MACKIE, M. 1985 'Religion and gender: a comparison of
34 Canadian and American student attitudes', *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, vol. 27, 415-29
35
36
37
38 CADGE, W. and ECKLUND, E.H. 2007 'Immigration and religion', *Annual Review of*
39 *Sociology*, vol. 33, pp. 359-79
40
41
42 CASANOVA, J. 2006 'Religion, European secular identities, and European integration', in T.
43 Byrnes and P. Katzenstein (eds), *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge
44 University Press, pp. 65-92
45
46
47
48 CÉSARI, J. 2004 *When Islam and Democracy Meet*, New York: Palgrave
49
50
51
52 DIEHL, C. and BLOHM, M. 2007 'Die Entscheidung zur Einbürgerung: Optionen, Anreize und
53 identifikative Aspekte', in F. Kalter (ed.), *Migration, Integration und ethnische Grenzziehungen.*
54 *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Special Issue 48*, in print
55
56
57
58 DIEHL, C. and SCHNELL, R. 2006 "'Reactive ethnicity" or "assimilation"? Statements,
59 arguments, and first empirical evidence for labor migrants in Germany', *International*
60 *Migration Review*, vol. 40, pp. 786-816

- 1
2
3 ETTE, A. et al. 2007 *Generations and Gender Survey. Dokumentation der Befragung von*
4 *türkischen Migranten in Deutschland*, Wiesbaden: Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung
5
6
7
8 FRICK, J.R. 2004 *Integration von Migranten in Deutschland auf Basis national und*
9 *international vergleichbarer Mikrodaten*, im Auftrag des Sachverständigenrats für
10 *Zuwanderung und Integration*.
11
12
13
14 FUCHS-HEINRITZ, W. 'Religion', in A. Fischer, Y. Fritzsche and W. Fuchs-Heinritz (eds),
15 *Jugend 2000. 13. Shell Jugendstudie, Vol. 1*, Opladen: Leske & Budrich, pp. 157-80
16
17
18 GANS, H.J. 1994 'Symbolic ethnicity and symbolic religiosity: towards a comparison of ethnic
19 and religious acculturation', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 17, pp. 577-92
20
21
22
23 GASPARD, F. and KOSHROKHAVAR, F. 1995 *Le foulard et la République*, Paris: Éditions la
24 *Découverte*
25
26
27 GERHARDS, J. 2007. *Cultural Overstretch: Differences Between Old and New Member States*
28 *of the EU and Turkey*, London: Routledge
29
30
31 GLOCK, C.Y. 1962 'On the study of religious commitment', *Religious Education*, vol. 57, pp.
32 98-110
33
34
35
36 GÖLE, N. 1996 *The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling*, Ann Arbor: University of
37 *Michigan Press*
38
39
40 GREELEY, A.M. 1971 *Why Can't They Be Like Us? Americas White Ethnic Groups*, New
41 *York: E.P. Dutton*
42
43
44 GRUNOW, D., SCHULZ F. and BLOSSFELD, H.-P. 2007 'Was erklärt die
45 *Traditionalisierungsprozesse häuslicher Arbeitsteilung im Eheverlauf: soziale Normen oder*
46 *ökonomische Prozesse?*', *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, vol. 36, pp. 162-81
47
48
49
50
51 HEATON, T.B. and CORNWALL, M. 1989 'Religious group variation in the socioeconomic
52 *status and family behavior of women*', *Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion*, vol. 23, pp.
53 283-99
54
55
56
57
58 IDEMA, H. and PHALET, K. 2007 'Transmission of gender-role values in Turkish-German
59 *migrant families: the role of gender, intergenerational and intercultural relations*', *Zeitschrift für*
60 *Familienforschung*, vol. 19, pp. 71-105

- 1
2
3 INGLEHART, R. and NORRIS, P. 2003 *Rising Tide. Gender Equality and Cultural Change*
4 *Around the World*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
5
6
7 JONES CORREA, M. 1998 'Different path: gender, immigration and political participation',
8 *International Migration Review*, vol. 32, pp. 326-49
9
10
11 KALTER, F. and GRANATO, N. 2002 'Demographic change, educational expansion, and
12 structural assimilation of immigrants. The case of Germany', *European Sociological Review*,
13
14 vol. 18, pp. 199-216
15
16
17 KANE, E.W. 2000 'Racial and Ethnic Variations in Gender-Related Attitudes', *Annual Review*
18 *of Sociology*, vol. 26, pp. 419-439
19
20
21 KOENIG, M. 2007 'Europeanizing the governance of religious diversity - Islam and the
22 transnationalization of law, politics and identity', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol.
23
24 33, 911-32
25
26
27 LENSKI, G. 1963 *The Religious Factor. A Sociological Study of Religion's Impact on Politics,*
28 *Economics, and Family Life*, Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday
29
30
31 MERKENS, H. 1997 'Familiale Erziehung und Sozialisation türkischer Kinder in Deutschland',
32 in H. Merkens and F. Schmidt (eds), *Sozialisation und Erziehung in ausländischen Familien in*
33 *Deutschland*, Hohengehren: Schneider, pp. 9-100
34
35
36 MIR-HOSSEINI, Z. 2000 *Islam and Gender*, London: I.B. Tauris
37
38
39 NAUCK, B. 1985 "'Heimliches Matriarchat" in Familien türkischer Arbeitsmigranten?
40 Empirische Ergebnisse zu Veränderungen der Entscheidungsmacht und Aufgabenallokation',
41 *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, vol. 14, pp. 450-65
42
43
44 - 1990 'Eltern-Kind-Beziehungen bei Deutschen, Türken und Migranten', *Zeitschrift für*
45 *Bevölkerungswissenschaft*, vol. 16, pp. 87-120
46
47
48 - 1995 'Educational climate and intergenerative transmission in Turkish families: A comparison
49 of migrants in Germany and non-migrants', in P. Noak, M. Hofer and J. Youniss (eds),
50 *Psychological Responses to Social Change. Human Development in Changing Environment*,
51 Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 67-85
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 - 2000 'Eltern-Kind-Beziehungen in Migrantenfamilien - ein Vergleich zwischen griechischen,
4 italienischen, türkischen und vietnamesischen Familien in Deutschland', in
5 Sachverständigenkommission 6. Familienbericht (ed.), *Empirische Beiträge zur*
6 *Familienentwicklung und Akkulturation. Materialien zum 6. Familienbericht, Vol. 1.*, Opladen:
7 Leske & Budrich, pp. 347-92
8
9
10
11
12 NÖKEL, S. 2002 *Die Töchter der Gastarbeiter und der Islam. Zur Soziologie alltagsweltlicher*
13 *Anerkennungspolitiken. Eine Fallstudie*, Berlin: Transcript
14
15
16
17
18 NORRIS, P. and INGLEHART, R. 2004 *Sacred and Secular. Religions and Politics Worldwide*,
19 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
20
21
22
23 PORTER, J.R. and ALBERT, A. 1977 'Subculture or assimilation? A cross-cultural analysis of
24 religion and women's role', *Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion*, vol. 16, pp. 345-59
25
26
27
28 PORTES, A. and RUMBAUT, R.G. 2001 *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second*
29 *Generation*, Berkeley: University of California Press
30
31
32
33 RUCKDESCHEL, K. et al. 2006. *Generations and Gender Survey. Dokumentation der ersten*
34 *Welle der Hauptbefragung in Deutschland*, Wiesbaden: Bundesinstitut für
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
- TREAS, J. 1993 'Money in the bank: transaction costs and the economic organization of marriage', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 58, 723-34
- VAN TUBERGEN, F. 2006 'Religious affiliation and attendance among immigrants in eight Western countries: individual and contextual effects', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, vol. 45, pp. 1-22

1
2
3 WASMER, M. and KOCH, A. 2003 'Foreigners as second-class citizens? Attitudes toward
4 equal civil rights for non-Germans', in R. Alba, P. Schmidt and M. Wasmer (eds), *Germans or*
5 *Foreigners? Attitudes toward Ethnic Minorities in Post-Unification Germany*, New York:
6 Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 119-141
7
8
9

10
11 WERBNER, P. 2002 'The place which is diaspora: citizenship, religion and gender in the
12 making of chaotic transnationalism', *Journal for Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 28, 119-
13 33
14
15
16
17

18 ZOLBERG, A.R. and LONG, L.W. 1999 'Why Islam is like Spanish: cultural incorporation in
19 Europe and the United States', *Politics & Society*, vol. 27, pp. 5-38
20
21
22
23

24
25 Contact details:

26
27 CLAUDIA DIEHL is Juniorprofessor for Migration and Ethnicity at the Department of
28 Sociology at University of Göttingen, Germany. ADDRESS: University of Göttingen, Platz der
29 Göttinger Sieben 3, D- 37073 Göttingen. Email: claudia.diehl@sowi.uni-goettingen.de
30
31
32
33

34
35
36 MATTHIAS KOENIG is Professor for the Sociology of Religion at the Department of
37 Sociology at University of Göttingen, Germany. ADDRESS: University of Göttingen, Platz der
38 Göttinger Sieben 3, D- 37073 Göttingen. Email: matthias.koenig@sowi.uni-goettingen.de
39
40
41
42

43
44
45 KERSTIN RUCKDESCHEL is researcher at the Federal Institute for Population Research,
46 Wiesbaden, Germany. ADDRESS: Friedrich-Ebert-Allee 4, 65185 Wiesbaden. Email:
47 bib@destatis.de
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Table 1: *Distribution of dependent and independent variables by nationality and generational status (means or %)*

	Turks 1. generation (n=2721)	Turks 2. generation (n=1161)	Germans (n=8594)
<i>dependent variable (individual level)</i>			
gender index (means)*	2,5	2,9	3,4
<i>dependent variable (household level)**</i>			
egalitarian division of labor	42	45	59
<i>independent variables (individual level)</i>			
religious	27	21	6
attendance at least once a week	28	19	8
relig. ceremonies very important	38	35	21
religious socialization goals	30	26	5
female	48	45	54
age (means)	42	28	49
married or cohabiting	82	50	62
parent	82	46	67
education: more than basic school	28	49	63
employ. status: employed	41	47	51
assimilation: speaks mostly German	20	49	
<i>independent variables (household level)**</i>			
partners about the same age/ women older	56	67	65
both partners employed	17	25	42
partner's origin			
German	9	22	
other generation than respondent	17	39	

* Gender index: 1= rejection of gender equality, 5= approval of gender equality

** Cohabiting couples only

Table 2: Approval of gender equality (unstandardized linear regression coefficients)

		All			Turks 1 st generation		Turks 2 nd generation		German
		M I	M II	M III	M IV	M V	M VI	MVII	MVIII
group:	<i>Turks 1st generation</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Turks 2nd generation	,185 (,023)	,181 (,023)	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Germans	,731 (,015)	,676 (,016)	-	-	-	-	-	-
religious		-	-,258 (,018)	-	-,234 (,028)	-,230 (,028)	-,225 (,048)	-,209 (,048)	-,299 (,027)
female		,247 (,011)	,242 (,011)	,247 (,011)	,115 (,027)	,133 (,027)	,260 (,041)	,271 (,041)	,272 (,013)
age		-,006 (,000)	-,005 (,000)	-,005 (,000)	-,002 n.s. (,001)	-,001 n.s. (,001)	,006 n.s. (,003)	,007 (,003)	-,007 (,000)
married or cohabiting		-,077 (,013)	-,071 (,013)	-,078 (,013)	-,174 (,035)	-,157 (,034)	-,204 (,055)	-,197 (,055)	-,039 (,014)
parent		-,030 (,014)	-,028 (,014)	-,035 (,014)	-,097 (,035)	-,090 (,034)	-,105 n.s. (,057)	-,099 n.s. (,057)	,003 (,016)
education:	> basicschool	,261 (,012)	,258 (,012)	,270 (,012)	,182 (,028)	,157 (,028)	,286 (,040)	,268 (,040)	,259 (,014)
employ. status:	employed	,136 (,012)	,130 (,012)	,133 (,012)	,090 (,027)	,071 (,027)	,076 n.s. (,042)	,067 n.s. (,041)	,125 (,014)
assimilation:	speaks mostly German	-	-	-	-	,234 (,031)	-	,148 (,040)	-
interactions:	<i>1st gen. relig. Turks</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1st gen. secular Turks	-	-	,089 (,026)	-	-	-	-	-
	2st gen. relig. Turks	-	-	-,011 n.s. (,043)	-	-	-	-	-
	2st gen. secular Turks	-	-	,276 (,030)	-	-	-	-	-
	religious Germans	-	-	,326 (,030)	-	-	-	-	-
	secular Germans	-	-	,771 (,023)	-	-	-	-	-
Constant		2,610	2,656	2,540	2,734	2,647	2,617	2,524	3,345
R ²		,32	,33	,32	,08	,10	,15	,16	,18
N		12053	12053	12053	2607	2607	1080	1080	8366


Note: p<.05 (coefficients significant unless noted otherwise), *reference categories in italics*, SE in parentheses

Table 3: *Non-traditional division of household tasks (logistic regression coefficients)*

		All			Turks 1 st generation		Turks 2 nd generation		Germans
		M I	M II	M III	M IV	M V	M VI	M VII	M VIII
group:	<i>Turks 1st generation</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Turks 2nd generation	,053 n.s. (,099)	,052 n.s. (,099)	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Germans	,331 (,068)	,285 (,070)	-	-	-	-	-	-
religious		-	-,251 (,071)	-	-,369 (,104)	-,329 (,108)	-,378 n.s. (,212)	-,219 n.s. (,224)	-,105 n.s. (,116)
female		,186 (,048)	,183 (,048)	,180 (,048)	-,225 (,093)	-,103 n.s. (,098)	,520 (,180)	,548 (,192)	,328 (,060)
age		,005 (,002)	,005 (,002)	,005 (,002)	,007 (,004)	,014 (,004)	,040 (,014)	,040 (,015)	,002 n.s. (,002)
parent		-,314 (,063)	-,309 (,063)	-,310 (,063)	-,400 (,140)	-,315 (,149)	-,231 n.s. (,243)	-,164 n.s. (,253)	-,292 (,075)
education:	> basicschool	-,047 n.s. (,052)	-,044 n.s. (,052)	-,037 n.s. (,052)	-,056 n.s. (,103)	-,088 n.s. (,109)	,160 n.s. (,185)	,084 n.s. (,195)	-,074 n.s. (,065)
	approval of gender equality	,305 (,039)	,290 (,039)	,303 (,039)	,335 (,075)	,302 (,078)	,399 (,141)	,419 (,146)	,236 (,049)
	assimilation: speaks mostly German	-	-	-	-	,229 n.s. (,127)	-	,210 n.s. (,194)	-
	female same age or older	,102 (,048)	,106 (,048)	,107 (,048)	,187 (,092)	,167 n.s. (,095)	,241 n.s. (,188)	,279 n.s. (,198)	,048 n.s. (,060)
	both employed	,139 (,054)	,133 (,054)	,140 (,054)	,458 (,123)	,434 (,129)	,290 n.s. (,211)	,329 n.s. (,226)	,008 n.s. (,063)
partner's origin:	<i>same generation</i>	-	-	-	-	,959 (,203)	-	,364 n.s. (,319)	-
	different generation	-	-	-	-	,032 n.s. (,137)	-	,384 n.s. (,209)	-
interactions:	<i>1st gen. relig. Turks</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1st gen. secular Turks	-	-	,257 (,099)	-	-	-	-	-
	2nd gen. relig. Turks	-	-	-,160 n.s. (,188)	-	-	-	-	-
	2nd gen. secular Turks	-	-	,319 (,128)	-	-	-	-	-
	religious Germans	-	-	,350 (,125)	-	-	-	-	-
	secular Germans	-	-	,493 (,096)	-	-	-	-	-
Constant		-1,162	-1,093	-1,406	-1,086	-1,517	-2,850	-3,316	-,443
Nagelkerkes R ²		,05	,06	,06	,05	,08	,09	,10	,02
N		7719	7719	7719	2092	1980	557	516	5070

Note: p<.05 (coefficients significant unless noted otherwise), *reference categories in italics*, SE in parentheses

Figure 1: Gross and net differences in religiosity between first and second generation Turks and Germans (odds ratios)



Note: Differences statistically significant except for 2nd generation net differences ($p < .10$), reference category: first generation Turks