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Panina, Nataliia

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NATALIIA PANINA,

Doctor of Sciences in Sociology, Principal Research Fellow of the Department of Socio-Political Processes, Institute of Sociology, NAS of Ukraine

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Abstract

The article presents the main results of the survey (1992–2003) on interethnic orientations of Ukrainian population measured according to the social distance scale by Bogardus adapted in Ukraine by the article's author in 1990. The obtained data made it possible to reveal a number of phenomena ("over-caution", "Eastern Slavic isolation", "redoubled border control", "high jump", "unanimous isolation"), and paradoxes of the mass interethnic self-consciousness of population (paradox of the "national identification", the "good attitude" paradox). New results confirmed the growing orientations (in the mass consciousness) to the larger ethnic distance, which promotes development of national and governmental isolation. The author paid much attention to a story about the methods (the social distance scale) development and their approbation in Ukraine.

Recently the mass media persistently have been attracting public attention to national tolerance (or, it would be better to say, "intolerance") of Ukrainian population. There are many articles in scientific and public political journals, TV programs in which one can hear disturbing data about risen interethnic intolerance and xenophobia in the mass consciousness.

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Outcomes of scientific sociological studies used by the mass media contradict the obvious fact: Ukraine develops as an independent state without serious interethnic conflicts. Peaceful coexistence of various ethnic cultures is possible due to the power providing sufficiently balanced inner and foreign policy in the sphere of interethnic relations and due to the population. Under conditions of the totalitarian system crash and disastrous economic crisis, when a splash of ethnic intolerance seems to be inevitable, Ukrainian citizens have not been involved into any essential conflict. If we remember historically difficult relations between Ukrainians, Russians, Poles, Romans, Jews, Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups, our multi-ethnic population rather peacefully overcomes the same problems of transition from the dark past to the vague future.

What is the reason of differences between the disturbing sociological data and rather "calm" social and political reality of interethnic relations in Ukraine? This question was a key when we analyzed the outcomes of the long-term research on ethnic tolerance in Ukraine. Is this a result of methodical errors in the ethnic tolerance measurements or the scientific outcomes make it possible to see some covert features of ethnic mentality and give us a chance to diagnose unfavorable intentions in a good time?

It happened so that for the last ten years, most studies on ethnic tolerance in Ukraine have been methodically based on the social distance scale by Bogardus. As I was one of those started to apply this method in Ukrainian sociological research, I feel my personal responsibility for the outcomes and especially for their interpretation in the ethnic tolerance terms. So, I think it is necessary to talk about the story of how the social distance scale was developed, its features and application in Ukraine. In fact, neither the scale author nor his followers wrote that this scale was for measuring ethnic tolerance.

When we study such a delicate topic as interethnic relations, it is especially important to explain what aspects of these relations are regarded. Why this method was chosen for this empirical study, what is its specific character and how rightful will be conclusions about ethnic tolerance/intolerance as a whole while basing on the data obtained with its help?

Preconditions for Choosing the Social Distance Scale as a Method of Studies on Interethnic Relations in Ukraine

I chose the social distance scale by Bogardus to be a method for studying interethnic relations because of the situation that had formed

in the end of 80s — beginning of 90s of the past century in the political space of the former USSR. And although the current political situation of the interethnic relations in Ukraine, as we have mentioned above, is rather fair (at least from the outside), at the beginning of 1990s one could not be sure in this way of development taking into account numerous interethnic conflicts in the former socialist republics. While post-Soviet ethnic groups cleared up their relations in Karabakh, Dniester Region, Tajikistan, Chechnia, Abkhaziia, Kirghiziia, Southern and Northern Osetiia, Ukrainian people anxiously observed interethnic relations in their own country. Numerous sociological studies were being conducted, with my participation, during 1989–1991 by the Central Ukrainian Department of the All-Union Center of Public Opinion and by the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine. These studies included a number of questions somehow connected to interethnic relations. Although the obtained results did not reveal the wide-spread and clear nationalistic orientations among the majority of Ukrainian people of all Ukrainian regions, as well as any splash of interethnic conflicts, all polls registered rather high levels of people's anxiety as to possibility of these conflicts. In all polls related to the social problems that disturb people, the possibility of interethnic conflicts always took one of the first positions. Although for the whole period of time the part of those who were participators or observers of interpersonal conflicts related to ethnic insult was at the same level (about 3%), the public opinion became more and more anxious about possible interethnic conflicts. A peak of this anxiety was registered in 1992 when almost a half of Ukrainian adults (49%) named this threat, as one they fear most of all. Deviations between personal experience of interethnic conflicts and the anxiety level seem to be connected not with interethnic situation in Ukraine but to ethnic conflicts in other regions of the former USSR. However, in order to make prognosis of interethnic relations development in Ukraine and to reveal possible worsening of these relations in a good time, the fragmentary data obtained from answers to particular polling questions were obviously insufficient.

Deep analysis of this topic required special methods measuring a level of general ethnic tolerance as a deep psychological basis of interethnic contacts. In my opinion, we needed methods that would enable to measure attitudes towards representatives of other nations, psychological readiness to become close or to reject people of other nation. We talk about a stereotype attitude towards representatives of other nation as a group without taking into account their personal features and peculiari-

ties of their contacts with certain people. We know that to develop, carry out approbation and standardize qualitative tools, one needs usually 2–3 years, and at the beginning of 1990s in Ukraine circulated "terrible rumors" about "fearful nationalists". So, I decided to use qualitative methods measuring interethnic relations — ethnic distance scale.

Because even in those "hot" years, life experience and scientific intuition prompted that the main problem in Ukraine might be not ethnic intolerance, not thirst for blood of other ethnic group, but keeping a distance between "ours" and "strangers" who, according to the very popular at that time opinion, were a burden to Ukraine. As a result, these arguments determined the method I chose. The author called it the race distance scale (it is one of various social distance scales by Bogardus).

A Story about Development of Social Distance Scales

Emory Bogardus, a professor, University of Southern California, started his work on the method in 1924. Two years he empirically worked out a methodical plan for a scale measuring social distance suggested by Robert Park, professor of the University of Chicago [1; 2]. In that period, scientific interests of many American sociologists and social psychologists were related to urbanization, social integration and social mobility of population. Big cities started to grow due to the people coming from other regions of the country and immigrants. To study these processes, sociologists had to develop adequate sociological categories. One of these categories related to urbanization studies was the "social distance" notion. R. Park thinks that the social distance between people of different social or ethnic (race) groups makes it possible to conclude about integration and solidarity of forming society as well as about a general level of democratic culture development. He writes that theoretically the true democracy means absence of *social* distance between members of a society [1, p. 341]. It was necessary to develop adequate methods measuring the social distance for empirical studying of new communities forming from representatives of different cultures, analysis of factors favorable for or preventing from contacts between people (first of all, as representatives of different subcultures) as well as determination of political culture levels dominating in these communities.

Since 1925, after primary approbation of the suggested method, there have been appeared the first publications by E. Bogardus on out-

comes of the research with the help of the scale developed on R. Park's approach to measuring the social distance [3; 4].

As a result of a long-term work, there was developed a number of social distance scales: the race distance scale, the education distance scale, the economic distance scale, the political distance scale, the professional distance scale, the religious distance scale, etc. The method idea is that a respondent is asked to name the kinds of social contacts that he / she is ready to have with representatives of certain social group. A set of answers presented to respondent was formed according to results of preliminary procedure. First, there was compiled a list of numerous social contacts (links) of various kinds that people may have while living in one country. Then this big list was given to sixty experts (according to R. Park, prepared and experienced people) who had to evaluate each kind of social links on the 7-point scale guided by the *"feeling of closeness and understanding"* criterion. The result consisted of seven kinds of social contacts arranged by the closeness / remoteness extent. Every option got its range figure reflecting level of social relation closeness:

1 — "to close kinship by marriage";

2 — "to my club as personal chums";

3 — "to my street as neighbors";

4 — "to employment in my occupation in my country";

5 — "citizenship in my country";

6 — "as visitors only to my country";

7 — "would exclude from my country".

E. Bogardus suggested a number of indices that could be calculated according to respondents' answers: index of social contact quality, index of social contact distance, index of social contact range, etc. [3, p. 303].

Further, the most popular index became the race distance one. It is calculated according to the answer about the closest distance acceptable for a respondent as to representative of a certain nation. First six options show the desired extent of relation closeness, the seven one means that a respondent oriented to no social contacts with representatives of this nation. This index is methodically based on cumulative character of scale: we suppose that positive answer to the option reflecting the closest social distance implies positive answers (agreement) to all following (more remote) social contacts. Technically it means that positive answer to the first position ("would admit as a family member") implies positive answers to all following positions ("...as friends, neigh-

bors" and so on), except the last one — "would not allow entering my country". If respondents choose the second position ("would admit as a friend") then it implies positive answers to the following positions and negative answer to the first one ("admit as a family member"), etc. Cumulative character of scale makes it possible to calculate an index (points) of social distance towards representatives of a certain nation. The answer "admit as a family member" gives 1 point, "…as a friend" — 2 points, "…neighbors" — 3 points, "…colleagues" — 4 points, "…live in one country" — 5 points, "…visitors to the country (tourists)" — 6 points, "would exclude from the country" — 7 points. Arithmetical mean of points for a certain social group is an average index of this group's attitude towards a specific nation. In his works, E. Bogardus calls it the race distance index. But he stressed many times that the word "race" in the name of scale (and of index in particular) was rather a tribute to a generally clear word (in the USA *of that time* — **N. P.).** He thinks that more adequate term (implying mainly social and cultural differences between groups of people) would be the name "ethnic distance". But the term "ethnic" is rather scientific, that is why Bogardus makes this name simple for people who are far from scientific terms and calls the scale a race distance one [7, p. 5]. In our study, after sorting out a number of terms (including several publications), I eventually decided to call it *the national distance index.*

Among all the scales of social distance, the race distance one became the most popular mainly due to the fact that Bogardus, along with many local studies being conducted during forty years, carried out four big polls basing on this scale. Within the frames of this project with organizational help of his colleagues — professors of various universities and colleges of the USA, he interviewed over eight thousands of students. All four polls were conducted according to the same organizational scheme. The sample consists of people who represent universities in half of the states of various American regions — "from Washington University to University of Florida, from University in Vermont to University of Southern California" [7, pp. 9–10]. Results of these polls reflecting interethnic orientation dynamics were repeatedly published [5–7]. The most complete results are presented in the publication prepared after the fourth poll had been conducted [6, p. 28], the general table of which can be seen below (see Table 1).

According to the R. Park's concept in which the social distance is meant as characteristics of social links and contacts, as an "extent of understanding and feeling", E. Bogardus said that the democratic soci-

ety aims to cutting down social distances between representatives of different social and cultural groups. Despite this fact, some social distances always exist "even between close friends, even between lovers" [6, p. 7]. We can talk only about shorter or longer distances, minimal or maximal, because it is somewhere between them. The suggested method makes it possible to conduct quantitative measurements and this is favorable for monitoring and comparative sociological studies.

Moreover, the race distance scale attracted attention of other specialists especially working in the conceptual frames of the social education theory very popular in the USA. According to this theory, lack of social experience and socialization (such as, gaps in knowledge about culture, customs and traditions of other nations) could be significantly compensated by direct training at special courses, seminars, etc. The race distance scale enabled to provide measuring before the training and after it, so, its efficiency could be assessed.

Approbation and Application of the Social Distance Scale in Ukraine

In 1990, I conducted the first approbation of this method in Ukraine — I checked how ordinary citizens of Ukraine apprehended questions and answers. As to the first prepared questionnaire, we interviewed 30 people of different sex, age, place of residence and level of education. Direct contacts at the moment of filling the questionnaire helped a lot because the corresponding commentaries made it possible to understand what implied the final choice of options. For example, the man living in a village near to Kyiv hesitated a lot while choosing "admit only as people who live in my country" for Germans. His thought was like the following: "Germans are pedant, they like to maintain order. They may not like my house, our facilities are outside the house, they are not used to this. If they were my neighbors they would see what I do wrong. The same would be at my work place. If they want to live in Ukraine let them find the place by themselves, the place they like". Another discourse was by a city-dweller with high education. He decided to "admit" Americans "as tourists": "Americans are an advanced nation, they are used to have everything. They will poke their noses into everything and criticize. Perhaps they will come as guests, then we can show them only the best".

After the approbation, we made the sentences that determined the minimal and the maximal distances ("become a relative due to marriage" and "exclude from my country") a bit softer because of difficulties they

Changes in Racial

I		II	
Racial distance indices given racial groups in 1926 by 1725 selected persons throughout the U.S.		*Racial distance indices given racial groups in 1946 by 1950 selected persons throughout the U.S.*	
1. English	1.06	1. Americans (U.S. white)	1.04
2. Americans (U.S. white)	1.10	2. Canadians	1.11
3. Canadians	1.13	3. English	1.13
4. Scots	1.13	4. Irish	1.24
5. Irish	1.30	5. Scots	1.26
6. French	1.32	6. French	1.31
7. Germans	1.46	7. Norwegians	1.35
8. Swedish	1.54	8. Hollanders	1.37
9. Hollanders	1.56	9. Swedish	1.40
10. Norwegians	1.59	10. Germans	1.59
11. Spanish	1.72	11. Finns	1.63
12. Finns	1.83	12. Czechs	1.76
13. Russians	1.88	13. Russians	1.83
14. Italians	1.94	14. Poles	1.84
15. Poles	2.01	15. Spanish	1.94
16. Armenians	2.06	16. Italians	2.28
17. Czechs	2.08	17. Armenians	2.29
18. Indians (American)	2.38	18. Greeks	2.29
19. Jews	2.39	19. Jews	2.32
20. Greeks	2.47	20. Indians (American)	2.45
21. Mexicans	2.69	21. Chinese	2.50
22. Mexican Americans	-	22. Mexican Americans	2.52
23. Japanese	2.80	23. Filipinos	2.76
24. Japanese Americans	-	24. Mexicans	2.89
25. Filipinos	3.00	25. Turks	2.80
26. Negroes	3.28	26. Japanese Americans	2.90
27. Turks	3.30	27. Koreans	3.05
28. Chinese	3.36	28. Indians (from India)	3.43
29. Koreans	3.60	29. Negroes	3.60
30. Indians (from India)	3.91	30. Japanese	3.61
Arithmetical Mean	2.14	**Arithmetical Mean**	2.12

Table 1

Distance Index

III		IV	
Racial distance indices given racial groups in 1956 by 2053 selected persons throughout the U.S.		*Racial distance indices given racial groups in 1966 by 2605 selected persons throughout the U.S.*	
1. Americans (U.S. white)	1.08	1. Americans (U.S. white)	1.07
2. Canadians	1.16	2. English	1.14
3. English	1.23	3. Canadians	1.15
4. French	1.47	4. French	1.36
5. Irish	1.56	5. Irish	1.40
6. Swedish	1.57	6. Swedish	1.42
7. Scots	1.60	7. Norwegians	1.50
8. Germans	1.61	8. Italians	1.51
9. Hollanders	1.63	9. Scots	1.53
10. Norwegians	1.66	10. Germans	1.54
11. Finns	1.80	11. Hollanders	1.54
12. Italians	1.89	12. Finns	1.67
13. Poles	2.07	13. Greeks	1.82
14. Spanish	2.08	14. Spanish	1.93
15. Greeks	2.09	15. Jews	1.97
16. Jews	2.15	16. Poles	1.98
17. Czechs	2.22	17. Czechs	2.02
18. Armenians	2.33	18. Indians (American)	2.12
19. Japanese Americans	2.34	19. Japanese Americans	2.14
20. Indians (American)	2.35	20. Armenians	2.18
21. Filipinos	2.46	21. Filipinos	2.31
22. Mexican Americans	2.51	22. Chinese	2.34
23. Turks	2.52	23. Mexican Americans	2.37
24. Russians	2.56	24. Russians	2.38
25. Chinese	2.68	25. Japanese	2.41
26. Japanese	2.70	26. Turks	2.48
27. Negroes	2.74	27. Koreans	2.51
28. Mexicans	2.79	28. Mexicans	2.56
29. Indians (from India)	2.80	29. Negroes	2.56
30. Koreans	2.83	30. Indians (from India)	2.62
Arithmetical Mean	2.08	**Arithmetical Mean**	1.92

Source: [7].

caused. The first sentence was understood too literally — "How can I become a relative by marriage if I got married long ago?" So, the answer was changed to "would admit as a family member". It is necessary to take into account that Bogardus, like most American social psychologists, worked mostly with students while collecting empirical data, and we wanted to develop methods for the mass polls among population. The last option — "would exclude from my country" (in some cases, Bogardus even put "would debar from my nation" — intimidated my interlocutors by its "active position". "Why would I evict anybody? Let those who are commissioned to do it". As a result, I picked a softer option — "would not let in my country". This sentence did not rouse censure. I think it was because in our country people got used to "not let" somebody in something at least in their thoughts.

In August 1990, I included (for the first time) the social distance scale in the mass representative poll among Kyivers. In September 1991, we conducted the second study in Kyiv with this method. The main conclusions from the obtained data were published both in scholarly journals and popular magazines [see: 8–11].

The results were rather unexpected. The first related to *significance* of the national distance indices. Kyivers were significantly more remote from social contacts with representatives of most nations in comparison to American students. All comparable indices of national distance were significantly higher than the corresponding values of the forty-year monitoring being conducted by E. Bogardus in the USA from 1926 to 1966.

Along with the data confirming that in the mass consciousness of Kyivers, orientations to democratic transformations in the country (multi-party system, market transformations in economy, etc.) are dominant, the unexpectedly high index of general national distance among these people notified that Ukrainian way towards open democratic society will be long enough. In 1992, it was the first time when I included this method into an all-national representative poll aimed to study psychological condition of Ukrainian population. The obtained results confirmed the main tendencies revealed in the interethnic orientations of Kyivers [12–14].

Indicators of national distance make it possible to determine attitudes to various nations and to assess the level of democratic values development (or degradation), so, while developing a monitoring program on sociological indicators of democratic development in Ukraine, we (Ye. Golovakha and me) decided to include the social distance scale into the all-national monitoring. It has been started by the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine in 1994. Results of this research were pub-

lished in information and analytical materials of the Institute dedicated to the monitoring of social indicators of democratic development in Ukraine [15–17]. These data formed an empirical basis for the further conclusions that I will present below.

The aforementioned our long-term research, from 1990 to 2002, with application of the social distance scale made it possible to reveal a number of phenomena related to national mentality and specific attitudes towards other nations; so, we think we can discuss some tendencies regarding general development of political culture in Ukraine.

The Research Outcomes: Phenomena and Paradoxes of Interethnic Mentality

In our first studies (1990–1992), there were obtained rather unexpected data. On the one hand, measurements of the national distance indices brought up doubts about some popular ideas in that time.

The table presents the indices of national distance (the mean on the 7-point scale of social distance) towards representatives of every nation; and the integral index of national distance (IIND) — the mean between all nations except Ukrainians, Russians and Ukrainian Diaspora. For ten years of research, the list of nations presented in the monitoring has been varied. In order to avoid any possible impact of these changes, we included the integral index of national distance for ten nations attitudes to which were assessed in all stages of the monitoring.

— First, there were disproved the stereotypes on popular anti-Russian attitudes in western regions of Ukraine.
— Second, the stereotype about the massively spread anti-Semitism was not confirmed.
— Third, there was not confirmed the idea popular in critical social conditions that marriages to foreigners (representatives of developed countries in particular) are very attractive.

At the same time, the data demonstrated that people's attitudes to representatives of other nations was more "guarded" as it could be expected in the situation of no serious interethnic conflicts in Ukraine (see Table 2). Also, the national distance indices of Ukrainian population as well as Kyivers were significantly higher than the same indicators of interethnic orientations in the USA (see Table 1).

Results of the Monitoring of National Distance Indices among Ukrainian Population

National distance of Ukrainian population from…	National distance index (scale: 1–7 points)								
	1992 N = 1800	**1994** N = 1807	**1996** N = 1800	**1998** N = 1810	**1999** N = 1810	**2000** N = 1810	**2001** N = 1800	**2002** N = 1799	**2002** Students N = 80
Afghans	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.2	6.2
Americans*	4.3	4.4	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.8	4.9	5.4	5.1
Arabs	5.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.1	5.9
Azerbaijan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.8	5.8
Belarusians*	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.8	2.7	4.2	4.3
Blacks	4.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.0	5.5
Chechens	-	-	-	-	-	6.1	6.1	6.3	6.3
Chinese	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.9	5.4
Crimean Tatars*	5.1	4.6	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.9	5.0	5.6	5.3
Czechs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.3	5.0
French	4.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Georgians*	5.3	4.9	5.0	5.1	5.0	5.4	5.3	5.4	5.1
Germans*	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.8	4.7	4.8	4.9	5.2	4.6
Gypsies*	5.6	5.1	5.3	5.4	5.5	5.6	5.7	6.0	6.1
Hungarians*	4.2	4.6	4.8	4.9	4.8	5.1	5.1	5.4	5.1
Japanese	4.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jews*	4.2	3.8	3.8	3.9	3.8	3.9	3.9	5.1	4.9
Moldavians	-	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.8	5.1	5.1	5.3	5.2
Poles*	3.8	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.5	4.8	4.9	5.0	4.6
Romanians*	4.6	4.7	4.9	4.9	4.9	5.2	5.2	5.4	5.0
Russians	2.5	2.3	2.1	2.0	1.9	2.3	2.2	3.3	3.4
Serbians	-	4.8	5.0	5.1	5.1	5.4	5.4	-	-
Slovaks	-	4.6	4.8	4.8	4.8	5.0	5.0	5.1	4.7
Turks	-	4.9	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.6	5.6	5.9	5.4
Ukrainians	1.6	1.8	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	2.4	2.2
Ukrainians living in other countries	3.5	-	-	3.9	3.8	4.0	4.1	3.5	2.9

End of Table 2

National distance of Ukrainian population from…	National distance index (scale: 1–7 points)								
	1992 *N* = 1800	**1994** *N* = 1807	**1996** *N* = 1800	**1998** *N* = 1810	**1999** *N* = 1810	**2000** *N* = 1810	**2001** *N* = 1800	**2002** *N* = 1799	**2002** Students *N* = 80
Integral index of national distance	4.6	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.7	5.0	5.0	5.5	5.3
Integral index of national distance *(to 10 nations marked by "*")*	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.5	4.7	4.8	5.3	5.1

"Over-Caution" Phenomenon

Predisposition to closer, direct contacts (family, friends, neighbors, colleagues) was demonstrated by majority of people as to Ukrainians, Russians, Belarusians, Poles, and Jews — the national groups attitudes to which deal with historical experience of coexistence. 4—5 points on the social distance scale characterized most nations. This fact can be interpreted in the following way: "They may live in Ukraine but I would not like to have direct contacts with them".

The most remote distance — "Would not let in Ukraine" — was given to Azerbaijan, Armenians, Uzbek, and Crimean Tatars; in 1991, Georgians entered this group. If you take into account serious interethnic conflicts in various regions of dying USSR, then you understand that most people rejected the nations related to bloody interethnic conflicts. It seemed that the mass consciousness tried to keep away from *all* conflict participants, they did not want to take any political or humanitarian position, to understand who was wrong, who was right, who suffered and who attacked. We wanted to conclude that the public opinion registered by the polls of that time about fear of possible interethnic conflicts in Ukraine was not a consequence of special ethnic prejudices but rather manifestation of general caution being one of the basic features of national mentality.

In 1992, we were sure in "overly cautious" Ukrainian population as to readiness for contacts with generalized representatives of most nations. To be cautious in contacts (including social ones) with "strangers" is praiseworthy to some extent, but we should remember that proponents of archaic traditionalist values usually regard such behavior as praiseworthy. A priori "cautious" attitude to practically all nations with which they had no experience of long coexistence is a characteristic of closed societies, as a rule.

"Eastern Slavic Isolation" Phenomenon

The data of the first all-national poll of Ukrainian population carried out in 1992 confirmed some other phenomena revealed by the study on interethnic orientations of Kyivers. The social distance index was less than 4 points only for Ukrainians, Russians, Belarusians, representatives of Ukrainian Diaspora and Poles. It was an evidence of the fact that most Ukrainian people are predisposed to *direct* contacts with representatives of these nations. Results of the factor analysis made it possible to conclude that: first, in 1992, in the interethnic consciousness of Ukrainian population, the "Eastern Slavic isolation" factor was dominant; second, any manifestation when a certain nation was rejected is, as a rule, a manifestation of general xenophobic orientation — distrust and suspicion to all "strangers". In other words, when somebody demonstrates "rejection" of a certain nation we can be almost sure that he will be suspicious to representatives of most other ethno-cultural groups if these groups are considered by him as "strange".

"Redoubled Border Control" Phenomenon

Intention to isolate from all "strangers", the main feature of which is no specific position in the current geopolitical space, can become a serious obstacle on the way to make our integration into the world civilized community of full value. Ukraine declared this way of international integration, so it was important to continue studying how people change their attitudes to various nations: does the mass consciousness of Ukrainians become more predisposed to international integration or it tends to the national isolation?

Results of the monitoring conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine reveal a very unfavorable tendency of growing isolation. During 1992–2002, there were gradually growing the general index of national distance and indices of "distances" between Ukrainians and practically all nations included in the list. It means that the part of people who admit representatives of other nations as Ukrainian citizens becomes significantly less, correspondingly, the part of those who would not let them in the country grows. At the beginning of the 2002 (see Table 2), practically all nations (except Ukrainians, Russians, and Belarusians) were removed by the mass consciousness beyond 5 points ("evicted from the country").

In the monitoring being conducted by E. Bogardus in the USA from 1926 to 1966, despite varying attitudes to some nations, the mean index

of national distance generally tended to go down (see Table 1). In Ukraine, from 1992 to 2002, the same index has significantly grown. In studies by Bogardus, there were interviewed mostly students. In order to compare, we presented the data characterizing orientations of Ukrainian students in Table 2 (the year 2002 was taken as an example). If we compare the students' orientations to orientations of the whole population, we can confirm the Bogardus' idea that interethnic attitudes of students reflect (as a whole) orientations of the region in which they live.

If we unite into one group all respondents who would admit representatives of a certain nation as a family member, friend, neighbor, colleague or only citizen of Ukraine, we will see a national structure of Ukrainian population that reflects the current structure of national and civic self-consciousness. Results of the "collective border control" towards representatives of various nations in 2002 presented by Fig. 1 show what nations are welcomed in the country by a majority of people and what nations would be not let in.

In our opinion, classification of population according to the integral index of social distance makes it possible to form four categories of people with different level of openness to social contacts. In this context, openness to new social contacts can be regarded as a certain indicator of national tolerance or, it would be better to say, predisposition to national tolerance. Total rejection of social contacts with representatives of various national groups can be considered as a manifestation of xenophobia [22].

Basing on this approach, we picked out four categories of Ukrainian population:

1. Mostly *open (tolerant)* people who are ready to have social contacts with representatives of most nations at least to see them as colleagues (the mean index of national distance is no more than 4 points).

2. People *inclined to isolation*, whose position towards most of nations is "let them live in Ukraine but I would not like to have direct contacts with them".

3. The third category is *oriented to isolation*, they do not want to see representatives of most nations as Ukrainian citizens but they would not refuse them to come in the country as guests or tourists.

4. And at last, the fourth category with *dominant xenophobic orientations* — they do not want to let representatives of most nations in the country.

This classification makes it possible to see the situation at different stages of our way to the open democratic society (see Table 3).

Fig. 1. Results of mental "border control" towards various nations by Ukrainian population in 2002 or "Whom would we let in Ukraine"

Table 3

**Tolerance Dynamics of Interethnic Orientations
of Ukrainian Population**

Level of openness	*Percent of people with the corresponding level of tolerance*	
	1992	*2002*
Openness (tolerance)	35.2	9.9
Keeping a distance	25.2	16.0
Isolation	33.3	48.1
Xenophobia	6.3	27.0

The general result of the mass consciousness transformation is the following: for ten years of Ukrainian independence, the proportion of psychologically open (tolerant) people has become over 3.5 times less. Now practically a half of population is oriented to isolation in the interethnic relations. Especial disturbance is caused by the grown xenophobic orientations: the number of their proponents has become over 4 times more during ten years.

"High Jump" Phenomenon

During 1992–2001, the mean index of general national distance was gradually going down, but in 2002, it happened a sharp rise in distances from practically all nations (see Table 2). What reasons could cause the *"high jump"* registered in February 2002?

Analyzing the reasons of a growth of the mass distances between American people and a certain nation, E. Bogardus decided that, among these reasons, the first place is taken by dramatic events in the country and in the world, the ones frequently mentioned in headlines in particular. For example, the Pearl Harbor events changed the Americans' attitude to Japanese, the "cold war" period to Russians, etc. As we could see, Ukrainian population also reacted to interethnic conflicts. It seems that the tragedy of September 2001 in America and further orientation of most countries to anti-terrorist coalition aimed to fight against the regimes supporting terrorists caused the global "ostrich" reaction among Ukrainian people — "to dig in, wait and see".

"Unanimous Isolation" Phenomenon

An attempt to understand what categories of people more open and what are characterized by isolation and xenophobia led me to an idea

that rising isolation and xenophobia is a phenomenon inherent to all categories of Ukrainian population. The level of national tolerance does not practically depend on the social and demographic factors, such as sex, age, ethnic group, marital status, national composition of family, income, employment (governmental or private economy). The factors, like education level, profession, language, type of settlement (city / village), are of some influence. These groups have differences but they are not principal because, even in the most "favorable" groups, the mean index of national distance is over 5 points. The level of national distance does not depend on people's life experience, related to national discrimination or work abroad. Even those who plan to work abroad have an interethnic orientation in the same way as the population as a whole.

National Identification Paradox

I have already written about some paradoxes of national self-consciousness [20]. The attempt to understand what civic position determines a type of distance from representatives of other national cultures helped us to reveal a number of paradoxical (at least, at first sight) features.

Analysis of national tolerance among people of various kinds of civic identification revealed an interesting understanding by people of the social and national environment of their identity.

In our study, according to their answers to the question "What do you consider yourself first of all?" we classified people by types of civic identification: "regionalists" — those who consider themselves as dwellers of their region (village, town, city, oblast, etc.); "citizens" — citizens of Ukraine; "nationalists" — representatives of their ethnic group, nation; "nostalgists" — citizens of the former USSR; and "cosmopolitans" — citizens of Europe or the world. The results of distribution of Ukrainian population by the type of civic identification are presented in Table 4.

Table 4

Distribution of Ukrainian Population by the Type of Civic Identification

Type of civic identification	%
"Regionalists"	37.5
"Citizens"	41.0
"Nationalists"	3.0
"Nostalgists"	12.7
"Cosmopolitans"	3.4
Other answers	2.4

It would be natural if "nostalgists" made closer (if not to them but at least to the country) representatives of nations lived at the territory of the former USSR, "cosmopolitans" wanted closer social contacts with representatives of the most world countries. After we had analyzed the data of 2002, we got that among "nostalgists" who were grieving for the past and still feeling that they were citizens of the former USSR, 93% would not like to see Chechens as citizens of the country, 79% — Azerbaijan, 64% — Georgians, 63% — Crimean Tatars, 57% — Moldavians, 46% — Jews, 29% — Belarusians, 10% — Russians. "Cosmopolitans" as "citizens of Europe and the world" also would not let everybody in the country. 44% of "cosmopolitans" did not want to see Jews as citizens of the country, 48% — Germans, 60% — Americans, 66% — Blacks, 69% — Turks, 69% — Chinese, 98% — Chechens.

The same ambivalent character of national and civic self-consciousness can be revealed among those Ukrainians who accept Ukrainian entry to EU, NATO, IMF or dream about a union of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus.

"Good Attitude" Paradox

In sociological studies, to clarify interethnic relations, it is usually applied the direct question: "What is your attitude to people of other nations?" We included this question too in order to control. In 2002, 25% of respondents answered "Positively", 7% answered "Negatively". If we compare answers to the direct question about attitude towards people of other nations with answers on the social distance scale, we can see that "good" attitudes of our people mostly means only "love at a distance". Among those who assessed their attitudes as positive, not many would let the people of other nations to become members of their families. For example, as family members, Azerbaijan would be welcomed by only 1% of those whose attitude to people of other nations is "good", Afghans — 1%, Arabs — 1%, Americans — 3%, Belarusians — 11%, Blacks — 1%, Chechens — 1%, Chinese — 1%, Crimean Tatars — 1%, Czechs — 2%, Georgians — 1%, Germans — 3%, Gypsies — 1%, Hungarians — 2%, Jews — 3%, Moldavians — 2%, Poles — 3%, Romanians — 1%, Russians — 28%, Slovaks — 2%, Ukrainians — 57%, Turks — 1%. It is easy to see that among those who declare their attitude to other nations as positive, only a few are ready for close contacts with representatives of most nations. We might have considered this to be an evidence of folk wisdom, "to keep good relations with relatives, one has to live separately from them". However, along with general good attitudes to representatives of other nations as a whole, these "tolerant" people would not let

most of them here even as tourists. Azerbaijan would not be let in Ukraine even as tourists by 28% of those whose attitude to people of other nations is "positive", Afghans — 43%, Americans — 16%, Arabs — 38%, Blacks — 25%, Belarusians — 7%, Chechens — 52%, Chinese — 21%, Crimean Tatars — 21%, Czechs — 11%, Germans — 12%, Georgians — 17%, Gypsies — 37%, Hungarians — 11%, Jews — 14%, Moldavians — 14%, Poles — 8%, Romanians — 14%, Slovaks — 10%, Turks — 24%.

Partly, this paradox can be explained by the fact that over two thirds of people (68%) assessed their attitude to representatives of other nations as "neutral". In this context, the "neutral" category may be regarded as an equivalent of indifference. It could be that this indifferent attitude to what is outside their personal interests determines the national "intolerance".

Conclusions

The described phenomena and paradoxes are caused by the fact that the mass consciousness of Ukrainian people is still at the "crossroads" of national and civic identification process. Ukrainians are away now from the nations they lived together in the former country, and they have not come closer to others. They voted for leaving the USSR and for independent country, but they have different feelings to that mutual past. Some of them are relieved because they are free from communist and chauvinistic dictate of the neighbor oriented to empire. Others remember their youth and still doubt whether the decision was right. But even those who regret about their youth and want to revive the former community, even those can see interethnic conflicts and their aftermath in the East. So, proponents of the USSR want to reconstruct the old international community (the former USSR) without all participants of interethnic conflicts, especially those who resolve them with weapon. But the West hardly presents an idyllic picture of international coexistence too. The West has started a fight of civilizations. Every participant has to show its clear geopolitical position that means necessity to be involved in an open conflict. But this contradicts to the national mentality the folk wisdom of which says, "that is nothing to do with me". As a result, there develops a complex of national isolation that leads to the state isolation position.

When we compare dynamics of the national distance indices in Ukraine and in the USA (let me remind that in the USA from 1926 to 1966, this indicator was growing, and in Ukraine from 1992 to 2002, it

was going down), we should remember historical features of development in both countries. Other country has never oppressed the USA and their task was to develop an open democratic society. The way was hard but it took the country to the declared direction. Ukraine completely got rid of external oppression for the first time in its life. The main task of a new country was to assert its right for independence. However, in my opinion, the revealed tendency of the mass interethnic consciousness to "retire into one's shell" has absolutely no future if we think about development of the modern civilized country.

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