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Behaviours of conservation organizations and their environmental implications : analysis based on new (and not so new) institutional economics

Verhaltensweisen von Naturschutzorganisationen und ihre Umweltwirkungen: Analyse auf der Grundlage der neuen (und nicht so neuen) Institutionenökonomie
[working paper]

Tisdell, Clem

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Further Details
Corporate Editor Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Institut für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaus, Fachgebiet Ressourcenökonomie
Abstract This article draws mostly (but not entirely) on new institutional economics to consider the likely behaviours of non-government conservation organizations and the implications of these behaviours for biodiversity conservation. It considers how institutional factors may result in behaviour of conservation NGOs diverging from their objectives, including their support for biodiversity conservation; examines aspects of rent capture and conservation alliances; specifies social factors that may restrict the diversity of species supported by NGOs for conservation; considers bounded rationality in relation to the operation of conservation NGOs; and using game theory, shows how competition between NGOs for funding can result in economic inefficiencies and narrow the diversity of species supported for conservation. It also considers generally how the social role of conservation NGOs might be assessed.
Keywords environmental protection; resources; sustainable development; conservation; non-governmental organization; game theory; research approach; institutional economics; effect; competition; biodiversity
Classification Economic Sectors; Ecology, Environment
Method descriptive study; theory application
Free Keywords Australia; biodiversity conservation; bounded rationality; civil society; Common Agricultural Policy; European Union; Landcare; mixed goods; new institutional economics; New Zealand; NGO's principal-and-agent problem; political acceptability
Document language English
Publication Year 2007
City Berlin
Page/Pages 19 p.
Series Institutional Change in Agriculture and Natural Resources (ICAR) : Discussion Papers, 19
Status Published Version; reviewed
Licence Creative Commons - Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works