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Electoral Proximity and the Political Involvement of Bureaucrats: A Natural Experiment in Argentina, 1904

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Figueroa, Valentin

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Abstract In this paper, I use a slightly modified version of the Becker–Stigler model of corrupt behavior to explain bureaucratic political involvement. Since bureaucrats prefer higher rewards and not to support losing candidates, we expect them to become politically involved near elections – when rewards are expected to be higher, and information more abundant. Taking advantage of a natural experiment, I employ differences-in-means and differences-in-differences techniques to estimate the effect of electoral proximity on the political involvement of justices of the peace in the city of Buenos Aires in 1904. I find a large, positive, and highly local effect of electoral proximity on their political involvement, with no appreciable impact in the months before or after elections. (author's abstract)
Keywords Argentina; political system; political elite; political power; political influence; corruption; bureaucracy; political institution; political actor; election; fraud; election campaign; election result; historical analysis
Classification Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture; Political System, Constitution, Government; Social History, Historical Social Research
Document language English
Publication Year 2016
Page/Pages p. 69-94
Journal Journal of Politics in Latin America, 8 (2016) 1
ISSN 1868-4890
Status Published Version; peer reviewed
Licence Creative Commons - Attribution-NoDerivs