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Efficient lottery design

[working paper]

Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu; Nesterov, Alexander

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Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107132

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Corporate Editor Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms which proved to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used for indivisible good allocation in real-life. To help facilitate the design of practical lottery mechanisms, we provide new tools for obtaining stochastic improvements in lotteries. As applications, we propose lottery mechanisms that improve upon the widely-used random serial dictatorship mechanism and a lottery representation of its competitor, the probabilistic serial mechanism. The tools we provide here can be useful in developing welfare-enhanced new lottery mechanisms for practical applications such as school choice. (author's abstract)
Keywords efficiency; effect; stochastics; distribution; school choice; random sample; market mechanism; social assistance
Classification Basic Research, General Concepts and History of Economics
Document language English
Publication Year 2015
City Berlin
Page/Pages 36 p.
Series Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2015-203
Status Published Version; reviewed
Licence Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications