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Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
[working paper]
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information affects welfare and revenues in these markets is of fundamental interest. We introduce new statistical concepts, k- and k-m-dispersion, for understanding th... view more
Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information affects welfare and revenues in these markets is of fundamental interest. We introduce new statistical concepts, k- and k-m-dispersion, for understanding the impact of information release. With these tools, we study the comparative statics of welfare versus revenues for auctions with one or more objects and varying numbers of bidders. Depending on which parts of a distribution of valuations are most affected by information release, welfare may react more strongly than revenues, or vice versa. (author's abstract)... view less
Keywords
evaluation; information; market; statistics; turnover; auction; welfare
Classification
National Economy
Document language
English
Publication Year
2015
City
Berlin
Page/Pages
31 p.
Series
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels, SP II 2015-301
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/110635
Status
Published Version; reviewed
Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications