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Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release

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Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora

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Corporate Editor Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information affects welfare and revenues in these markets is of fundamental interest. We introduce new statistical concepts, k- and k-m-dispersion, for understanding the impact of information release. With these tools, we study the comparative statics of welfare versus revenues for auctions with one or more objects and varying numbers of bidders. Depending on which parts of a distribution of valuations are most affected by information release, welfare may react more strongly than revenues, or vice versa. (author's abstract)
Keywords evaluation; information; market; statistics; turnover; auction; welfare
Classification National Economy
Document language English
Publication Year 2015
City Berlin
Page/Pages 31 p.
Series Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels, SP II 2015-301
Status Published Version; reviewed
Licence Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications