More documents from Duffy, John; Fehr, Dietmar

Export to your Reference Manger

Please Copy & Paste



Bookmark and Share

Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games: experimental evidence on the role of precedents

[working paper]

Duffy, John; Fehr, Dietmar

fulltextDownloadDownload full text

(external source)

Citation Suggestion

Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:

Further Details
Corporate Editor Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two stage game forms. We find that a precedent for efficient play in the repeated Stag Hunt game does not carry over to the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game despite the possibility of efficient play in the latter game. Similarly, a precedent of inefficient play in the Prisoner's Dilemma game does not extend to the repeated Stag Hunt game. We conclude that equilibrium selection between similar repeated games has little to do with historical precedents and is mainly determined by strategic considerations associated with the different payouts of these similar repeated games. (author's abstract)
Keywords experiment; behavior; equilibrium; faith; playing
Classification Social Psychology
Free Keywords Hirschjagd
Document language English
Publication Year 2015
City Berlin
Page/Pages 36 p.
Series Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2015-202
Status Published Version; reviewed
Licence Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications