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How to get truthful reporting in matching markets: a field experiment

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Guillén, Pablo; Hakimov, Rustamdjan

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Corporate Editor Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract We run a field experiment to test the truth-telling rates of the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles mechanism (TTC) under different information conditions. First, we asked first-year economics students enrolled in an introductory microeconomics unit about which topic, among three, they would most like to write an essay on. Most students chose the same favorite topic. Then we used TTC to distribute students equally across the three options. We ran three treatments varying the information the students received about the mechanism. In the first treatment students were given a description of the matching mechanism. In the second they received a description of the strategy-proofness of the mechanism without details of the mechanism. Finally, in the third they were given both pieces of information. We find a significant and positive effect of describing the strategy-proofness on truth-telling rates. On the other hand, describing the matching mechanism has a significant and negative effect on truth-telling rates. (author's abstract)
Keywords school choice; voting; experiment; truth; behavior
Classification Social Psychology
Free Keywords Feldversuch
Document language English
Publication Year 2015
City Berlin
Page/Pages 24 p.
Series Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2015-208
Status Published Version; reviewed
Licence Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications