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How to get truthful reporting in matching markets: a field experiment

[Arbeitspapier]

Guillén, Pablo; Hakimov, Rustamdjan

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Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123701

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Körperschaftlicher Herausgeber Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract We run a field experiment to test the truth-telling rates of the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles mechanism (TTC) under different information conditions. First, we asked first-year economics students enrolled in an introductory microeconomics unit about which topic, among three, they would most like to write an essay on. Most students chose the same favorite topic. Then we used TTC to distribute students equally across the three options. We ran three treatments varying the information the students received about the mechanism. In the first treatment students were given a description of the matching mechanism. In the second they received a description of the strategy-proofness of the mechanism without details of the mechanism. Finally, in the third they were given both pieces of information. We find a significant and positive effect of describing the strategy-proofness on truth-telling rates. On the other hand, describing the matching mechanism has a significant and negative effect on truth-telling rates. (author's abstract)
Thesaurusschlagwörter school choice; voting; experiment; truth; behavior
Klassifikation Sozialpsychologie
Freie Schlagwörter Feldversuch
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2015
Erscheinungsort Berlin
Seitenangabe 24 S.
Schriftenreihe Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2015-208
Status Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet
Lizenz Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung
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