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Monkey see, monkey do: truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others

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Guillen, Pablo; Hakimov, Rustamdjan

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Corporate Editor Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract We test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played by others has a negative and significant effect in truth-telling rates relative to full or no information about others' strategies. Subjects report truthfully more often when either full information or no information on the strategies played by others is available. Our results have potentially important implications for the design of markets based on strategy-proof matching algorithms. (author's abstract)
Keywords school choice; strategy; security; information; quantity; impact; market; layout
Classification Social Psychology; Information Management, Information Processes, Information Economics
Free Keywords Top-Trading-Zyklen
Document language English
Publication Year 2014
City Berlin
Page/Pages 24 p.
Series Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2014-202
Status Published Version; reviewed
Licence Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications