Export to your Reference Manger

Please Copy & Paste



Bookmark and Share

The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting

[working paper]

Morton, Rebecca B.; Piovesan, Marco; Tyran, Jean-Robert

fulltextDownloadDownload full text

(external source)

Citation Suggestion

Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86141

Further Details
Corporate Editor Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a dark side, that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters are biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not de-bias voters. (author's abstract)
Keywords information; aggregation; majority election; voter; group; political decision; behavior
Classification Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture; Social Psychology
Document language English
Publication Year 2013
City Berlin
Page/Pages 58 p.
Series Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2013-209
Status Published Version; reviewed
Licence Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications