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Privacy concerns, voluntary disclosure of information, and unraveling: an experiment

[working paper]

Benndorf, Volker; Kübler, Dorothea; Normann, Hans-Theo

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Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85322

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Corporate Editor Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payout, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further unraveling. Our data suggest that subjects reveal their productivity less frequently than predicted in equilibrium. A loaded frame emphasizing personal information about workers' health leads to even less revelation. We show that three canonical behavioral models all predict too little rather than too much revelation: level-k reasoning, quantal-response equilibrium, and to a lesser extent inequality aversion. (author's abstract)
Keywords labor market; productivity; employee; privacy; behavior; information
Classification Labor Market Research; Social Psychology
Document language English
Publication Year 2013
City Berlin
Page/Pages 33 p.
Series Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2013-208
Status Published Version; reviewed
Licence Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications