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Alliances in the shadow of conflict

[working paper]

Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian

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Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58350

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Corporate Editor Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fight against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fight and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the holdup problem. (author's abstract)
Keywords competition; alliance policy; war; distribution conflict; political conflict
Classification Peace and Conflict Research, International Conflicts, Security Policy
Document language English
Publication Year 2012
City Berlin
Page/Pages 39 p.
Series Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Forschungsprofessur und Projekt The Future of Fiscal Federalism, SP II 2012-104
Status Published Version; reviewed
Licence Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications