Export für Ihre Literaturverwaltung

Übernahme per Copy & Paste



Bookmark and Share

Linkages of electoral accountability: empirical results and methodological lessons


Maloy, J. S.

fulltextDownloadVolltext herunterladen

(externe Quelle)


Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v2i2.24

Weitere Angaben:
Abstract A basic theory of electoral accountability is widely accepted by academic opinion: voters cause politicians to gain or lose office through periodic elections, thereby influencing policy through the threat of electoral sanction. Empirical studies run the gamut from findings of strong support for this theory, to mixed or conditional support, to weak or negative results. When electoral processes are analyzed in terms of two distinct causal linkages within a three-part chain of accountability, however, positive findings are revealed as weaker than they appear while a compelling trend emerges toward findings ranging from conditional to negative in the last two decades. This trend is visible in three topical areas -economic voting, political corruption, and ideological congruence- and it holds for both presidential and parliamentary regimes as well as for a variety of electoral systems. The new electoral skepticism's unsettling results and insightful methods may help to improve future research and reform efforts alike.
Thesaurusschlagwörter election; corruption; voting; economy; ideology; parliament; president; political regime; electoral system; voting behavior
Klassifikation politische Willensbildung, politische Soziologie, politische Kultur
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2014
Seitenangabe S. 13-27
Zeitschriftentitel Politics and Governance, 2 (2014) 2
ISSN 2183-2463
Status Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz Creative Commons - Namensnennung