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Determinants of judicial dissent in contexts of extreme institutional instability : the case of Ecuador's constitutional court

Determinanten von gerichtlichen Abweichungen in Kontexten extremer institutionellen Instabilität : der Fall des Verfassungsgerichts in Ecuador
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Basabe-Serrano, Santiago

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Abstract "This article identifies the variables that explain the dissenting legal vote in courts that operate under conditions of extreme institutional instability. Drawing on three logistic regression models, this article proposes that judges' ideological preferences constitute a good predictor of the dissenting vote. Contrary to the classic argument, which indicates that the instability of judges encourages strategic voting, this article argues that this relationship can be demonstrated only up to a certain point - that is, until an exponential increase in institutional instability leads the judges to vote sincerely, even when this means being part of a minority or 'losing' coalition." (author's abstract)
Keywords Ecuador; court; court decision; legal proceedings; trial; context analysis; strategy; stability; institution; institutionalization; election; election result; political attitude; Andean Region; developing country; South America; Latin America
Classification Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture; Criminal Sociology, Sociology of Law
Document language English
Publication Year 2014
Page/Pages p. 83-107
Journal Journal of Politics in Latin America, 6 (2014) 1
ISSN 1866-802X
Status Published Version; peer reviewed
Licence Creative Commons - Attribution-NoDerivs