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Public choice with unequally rational individuals

[working paper]

Pelikan, Pavel

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Corporate Editor Walter Eucken Institut e.V.
Abstract "As governments lack the rationality-promoting selective pressures of market competition, the standard (unbounded) rationality assumption is less legitimate in Public Choice than in analysis of markets. This paper argues that many Public Choice problems require recognizing that human rationality has bounds, that these differ across individuals, and that rationality must therefore be treated as a special scarce resource, tied to individuals and used for deciding on its own uses. This complicates resource-allocation in society, which has to rely on institutionally shaped selection processes. But this also appears to be the only way to produce the long-missing analytical support to the first head of J.S. Mill's criticism of government, of which Public Choice has so far supported only the second." (author's abstract)
Keywords rationality; government; politics; analysis; market; economy; voting behavior
Classification National Economy; Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture
Document language English
Publication Year 2007
City Freiburg
Page/Pages 23 p.
Series Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik, 07/2
ISSN 1437-1510
Status Published Version
Licence Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications
data provider This metadata entry was indexed by the Special Subject Collection Social Sciences, USB Cologne