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Institutional choice and bureaucratic autonomy in Germany

[Zeitschriftenartikel]

Döhler, Marian

Zitationshinweis

Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-423755

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Abstract "Although the delegation of government functions to non-majoritarian bodies such as independent agencies has accelerated throughout the OECD, Germany has followed a different path so far. In particular, administrative agencies have only rarely been granted autonomy from direct political control. The main argument is that a genetic code, inherent to the system of government institutions, has routinely auto-piloted choices that involved the design and control of agencies away from principal-agent-like considerations. The elements of this genetic code are outlined and the likelihood of their future persistence is assessed. Even if the pressure to create new agencies at arms length from government has increased, there are still strong incentives to keep them in a subordinate position." (author's abstract)
Thesaurusschlagwörter institutionalism; bureaucracy; administration; transformation; government; legitimacy; principal-agent-theory; structural organization; departmental principle; legislation; EU authority; executive power; political control; ministerial administration; responsibility; Federal Republic of Germany
Klassifikation Staat, staatliche Organisationsformen
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2002
Seitenangabe S. 101-124
Zeitschriftentitel West European Politics, 25 (2002) 1
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713601587
Status Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung
Datenlieferant Dieser Metadatensatz wurde vom Sondersammelgebiet Sozialwissenschaften (USB Köln) erstellt.
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