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Violations of procedure invariance in preference measurement: Cognitive explanations


Selart, Marcus; Montgomery, Henry; Romanus, Joakim; Gärling, Tommy


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Abstract A violation of procedure invariance in preference measurement is that the predominant or prominent attribute looms larger in choice than in a matching task. In Experiment 1, this so-called prominence effect was demonstrated for choices between pairs of options, choices to accept single options, and preference ratings of single options. That is, in all these response modes the prominent attribute loomed larger than in matching. The results were replicated in Experiment 2, in which subjects chose between or rated their preference for pairs of options which were matched to be equally attractive either in the same session or 1 week earlier. On the basis of these and previous results, it is argued that the prominence effect is a reliable phenomenon. However, none of several cognitive explanations which have been offered appears to be completely viable.
Thesaurusschlagwörter preference; measurement; cognitive factors; decision making; preference ordering; judgment formation; decision making process; rational choice theory; experimental psychology
Klassifikation Allgemeine Psychologie
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 1994
Seitenangabe S. 417-436
Zeitschriftentitel European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 6 (1994) 4
Status Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz Creative Commons - Namensnennung, Weitergabe unter gleichen Bedingungen