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War and the Reelection Motive: Examining the Effect of Term Limits

[journal article]

Zeigler, Sean
Pierskalla, Jan H.
Mazumder, Sandeep

Abstract

This article investigates the relationship between term limits and international conflict. Theories of political survival and diversionary war both imply term limits should play a role in international relations, whereas “permanent referendum theory,” largely motivated by work in American politics, ... view more

This article investigates the relationship between term limits and international conflict. Theories of political survival and diversionary war both imply term limits should play a role in international relations, whereas “permanent referendum theory,” largely motivated by work in American politics, suggests otherwise. Drawing on these theories, we formulate and test competing hypotheses regarding term limits and international crises. Using dyadic militarized interstate disputes data and information on forty-eight democracies with term limits, we uncover strong evidence to support the claim that leaders reaching final terms in office are more likely to initiate conflict than those still subject to reelection. Moreover, we find that the likelihood of conflict initiation is significantly higher during times of recession, but only in the absence of binding term limits. While binding electoral terms and economic downturns are both independently associated with increased levels of conflict initiation, in concert their conditional effects actually counteract each other.... view less

Keywords
international conflict; head of state; president; presidential election; domestic policy; power; political leadership; securing of power; international relations

Classification
Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture
Peace and Conflict Research, International Conflicts, Security Policy

Method
empirical

Free Keywords
term limits; diversionary war

Document language
English

Publication Year
2013

Page/Pages
p. 1-27

Journal
Journal of Conflict Resolution (2013)

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713478561

ISSN
0022-0027

Status
Postprint; peer reviewed

Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications

With the permission of the rights owner, this publication is under open access due to a (DFG-/German Research Foundation-funded) national or Alliance license.


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© 2007 - 2025 Social Science Open Access Repository (SSOAR).
Based on DSpace, Copyright (c) 2002-2022, DuraSpace. All rights reserved.