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Intergovernmental fiscal relations, 'Argentine Style'

[journal article]

Gordin, Jorge P.

Abstract

This study assesses the explanatory power of two competing views about intergovernmental fiscal transfers; one emphasizing the traditional neoclassical approach to federal-subnational fiscal relations and the other suggesting that transfers are contingent on the political fortunes and current politi... view more

This study assesses the explanatory power of two competing views about intergovernmental fiscal transfers; one emphasizing the traditional neoclassical approach to federal-subnational fiscal relations and the other suggesting that transfers are contingent on the political fortunes and current political vulnerability of each level of government. These models are tested using data from Argentina, a federation exhibiting one of the most decentralised fiscal systems in the world and severe imbalances in the territorial distribution of legislative and economic resources. Over-represented provinces ruled by governors who belong to parties different to that controlling the national executive can bring into play their representational advantages to attract shares of federal transfers beyond social welfare criteria. This finding suggests that decision makers in federal countries must pay close heed to the need to synchronize institutional reforms and fiscal adjustment.... view less

Keywords
Argentina; fiscal policy; taxes; federalism; national state; revenue; distribution; decentralization; fiscal equalization; South America; developing country

Classification
Public Finance
Political System, Constitution, Government

Free Keywords
Fiskalpolitik; Economic governance

Document language
English

Publication Year
2006

Page/Pages
p. 255-277

Journal
Journal of Public Policy, 26 (2006) 3

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X06000535

ISSN
1469-7815

Status
Published Version; peer reviewed

Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications

With the permission of the rights owner, this publication is under open access due to a (DFG-/German Research Foundation-funded) national or Alliance license.


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Home  |  Legal notices  |  Operational concept  |  Privacy policy
© 2007 - 2025 Social Science Open Access Repository (SSOAR).
Based on DSpace, Copyright (c) 2002-2022, DuraSpace. All rights reserved.