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Self-protection as a limit to strategic delegation in the context of global pollution problems

[Arbeitspapier]

Heuson, Clemens

Zitationshinweis

Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-365417

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Körperschaftlicher Herausgeber Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung - UFZ
Abstract This paper analyses the outcome of non-cooperative national efforts in combatting global pollution problems when governments are elected by their citizens. It is well-known that the latter tend to vote governments that are less ‘green’ than the median voter in order to commit to lower national mitigation efforts, which further increases the inefficiently high amount of global emissions. However, the present paper shows that the option of self-protection against environmental damages, which has been invariably neglected in the relevant literature to date, alleviates or even completely offsets such strategic delegation and the related adverse effects.
Thesaurusschlagwörter environmental pollution; environmental protection; climate policy; international agreement; emission; environmental impact; environmental policy; international politics
Klassifikation Ökologie und Umwelt; spezielle Ressortpolitik
Freie Schlagwörter strategic delegation; global pollution problems; self-protection; non-cooperative behaviour
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2013
Erscheinungsort Leipzig
Seitenangabe 7 S.
Schriftenreihe UFZ Discussion Papers, 18/2013
ISSN 1436-140X
Status Veröffentlichungsversion
Lizenz Creative Commons - Namensnennung, Nicht-kommerz., Weitergabe unter gleichen Bedingungen
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