SSOAR Logo
    • Deutsch
    • English
  • English 
    • Deutsch
    • English
  • Login
SSOAR ▼
  • Home
  • About SSOAR
  • Guidelines
  • Publishing in SSOAR
  • Cooperating with SSOAR
    • Cooperation models
    • Delivery routes and formats
    • Projects
  • Cooperation partners
    • Information about cooperation partners
  • Information
    • Possibilities of taking the Green Road
    • Grant of Licences
    • Download additional information
  • Operational concept
Browse and search Add new document OAI-PMH interface
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Download PDF
Download full text

(448.9Kb)

Citation Suggestion

Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-342939

Exports for your reference manager

Bibtex export
Endnote export

Display Statistics
Share
  • Share via E-Mail E-Mail
  • Share via Facebook Facebook
  • Share via Bluesky Bluesky
  • Share via Reddit reddit
  • Share via Linkedin LinkedIn
  • Share via XING XING

On the comparative advantage of tradable emission permits in a setting of uncertain abatement costs and market power: a case against the invariably pessimistic view

[working paper]

Heuson, Clemens

Corporate Editor
Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung - UFZ

Abstract

Recent work has shown that Weitzman’s policy rule for choosing price- versus quantity-based pollution control instruments under uncertainty is biased when the polluting firms possess market power (Heuson 2010). However, this study is restricted to emission standards and taxes, while tradable emissio... view more

Recent work has shown that Weitzman’s policy rule for choosing price- versus quantity-based pollution control instruments under uncertainty is biased when the polluting firms possess market power (Heuson 2010). However, this study is restricted to emission standards and taxes, while tradable emission permits are ruled out since market power gives rise to strategic permit trading, which requires some separate effort in investigation. This paper aims at closing this gap and, in doing so, makes three main contributions. First, it provides the first-time full comparative analysis of the three most common pollution control instruments stated above which takes into account two features that are frequently given in actual regulation settings, namely market power of polluting firms and uncertain abatement costs from the regulator’s perspective. Second, the paper reveals a new form of strategic permit trading that may arise even though the permit market is perfectly competitive. Finally, the rather pessimistic view concerning the impact of market power on the comparative advantage of tradable emission permits, which dominates in the literature so far, is put into context.... view less

Keywords
emission; market power; environmental management; competition; emissions trading; enterprise; steering; taxation; environmental policy; environmental pollution; environmental protection; environmental law

Classification
Special areas of Departmental Policy
Ecology, Environment

Free Keywords
external diseconomies of pollution; emission standards; tradable emission permits; emission taxes; uncertainty; Cournot competition; strategic behaviour

Document language
English

Publication Year
2013

City
Leipzig

Page/Pages
24 p.

Series
UFZ Discussion Papers, 6/2013

ISSN
1436-140X

Status
Published Version; reviewed

Licence
Creative Commons - Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike


GESIS LogoDFG LogoOpen Access Logo
Home  |  Legal notices  |  Operational concept  |  Privacy policy
© 2007 - 2025 Social Science Open Access Repository (SSOAR).
Based on DSpace, Copyright (c) 2002-2022, DuraSpace. All rights reserved.
 

 


GESIS LogoDFG LogoOpen Access Logo
Home  |  Legal notices  |  Operational concept  |  Privacy policy
© 2007 - 2025 Social Science Open Access Repository (SSOAR).
Based on DSpace, Copyright (c) 2002-2022, DuraSpace. All rights reserved.