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The Impact of Envy on Relational Employment Contracts

[Zeitschriftenartikel]

Kragl, Jenny; Schmid, Julia

Zitationshinweis

Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-314388

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Abstract We study the effects of envy on relational employment contracts in a standard moral hazard setup with two agents. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reects an agent's individual contribution to firm value. Both agents exhibit horizontal disadvantageous inequity aversion. In contrast to the literature, we find that inequity aversion may be beneficial; in the presence of envy, for a certain range of interest rates, relational contracts may be more profitable. For some interest rates reputational equilibria exist only with envious agents.
Klassifikation angewandte Psychologie
Freie Schlagwörter Principal-agent; Relational contract; Inequity aversion; Envy
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2009
Seitenangabe S. 766-779
Zeitschriftentitel Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72 (2009) 2
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.07.016
Status Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)
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