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From top to bottom (and back to the top again) : federal spending, sub-national coalitions, and protests in Argentina, 2002-2006

Von oben nach unten und zurück: föderale Ausgabenpolitik, subnationale Koalitionen und Proteste in Argentinien ; 2002-2006
De arriba abajo (y vuelta arriba otra vez): gasto federal, coaliciones subnacionales y protesta en Argentina, 2002-2006
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Moscovich, Lorena

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Abstract Can federal-state relations affect popular protests? Using an extensive dataset measuring local protests in the Argentine provinces (2002–2006), I assess the effects of the president’s and governors’ tactical allocations on the persistence of contentious events. I analyze how the delivery of federal resources, to both provincial governments and local social organizations, affects the chances of protests occurrence and the nature of its demands. Results show that federal spending increases the frequency of protests in the Argentine provinces, particularly when provincial governments are not involved in its delivery. In addition, protest demands are sensitive to president’s discretional expenditure, suggesting a different dynamics in which protests became a legitimate channel to obtain federal monies.

¿Las relaciones entre el presidente y los gobiernos subnacionales podrían influir en la protesta social? Usando una exhaustiva base de datos sobre protesta en provincias argentinas (2002-2006), analizo los efectos que las distintas estrategias de distribución de recursos de los gobernadores y del presidente tienen en la persistencia de los eventos contenciosos. En particular, estudio cómo la distribución de recursos federales, tanto a gobiernos provinciales como a organizaciones sociales locales, afecta las probabilidades de que surjan protestas y la naturaleza de sus demandas. Los resultados muestran que el gasto federal aumenta la frecuencia de las protestas en las provincias argentinas, en particular, cuando los gobiernos provinciales no intervienen en su asignación. También que las demandas de las protestas son sensibles al gasto discrecional del presidente, sugiriendo una dinámica particular en la cual la protesta se convierte en un canal legítimo para obtener fondos federales.
Keywords Argentina; fiscal policy; expenditures; president; political theory; coalition formation; regional factors; regional distribution; protest; protest movement; interdependence; regression analysis; information policy; strategy; government; statuary regulation; partnership; concession; public expenditures; South America; developing country; Latin America
Classification Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture; Economic Policy; Public Finance
Method empirical; quantitative empirical; theory application
Document language English
Publication Year 2012
Page/Pages p. 35-72
Journal Journal of Politics in Latin America, 4 (2012) 1
ISSN 1868-4890
Status Published Version; peer reviewed
Licence Creative Commons - Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works