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The evolutionary stability of constant consistent conjectures

[journal article]

Possajennikov, Alex

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Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-295114

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Abstract In the general context of smooth two-player games, this paper shows that there is a close connection between (constant) consistent conjectures in a given game and the evolutionary stability of these conjectures. Evolutionarily stable conjectures are consistent and consistent conjectures are the only interior candidates to be evolutionarily stable. Examples are provided to illustrate the result.
Classification Methods and Techniques of Data Collection and Data Analysis, Statistical Methods, Computer Methods
Free Keywords Consistent conjectures; Evolutionary stability; Indirect evolution
Document language English
Publication Year 2009
Page/Pages p. 21-29
Journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72 (2009) 1
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.013
Status Postprint; reviewed
Licence PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)
Document Type journal article
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