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@article{ Koch2009,
 title = {Career concerns incentives: an experimental test},
 author = {Koch, Alexander K. and Morgenstern, Albrecht and Raab, Philippe},
 journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization},
 number = {1},
 pages = {571–588},
 volume = {72},
 year = {2009},
 doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.014},
 urn = {https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-293040},
 abstract = {Holmström's (1982/99) career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many elds. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way, which is difficult to directly test with eld data: typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on. Our laboratory experiment provides prima facie evidence: i) the signal jamming mechanism successfully creates incentives on the labor supply side; ii) decision errors take time to decrease; iii) while subjects' average beliefs are remarkably consistent with play, a mild winner's curse arises on the labor demand side.},
 keywords = {Reputation; reputation}}