Export für Ihre Literaturverwaltung

Übernahme per Copy & Paste



Bookmark and Share

Sad, thus true: negativity bias in judgments of truth


Hilbig, Benjamin E.


Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-292118

Weitere Angaben:
Abstract An effect observable across many different domains is that negative instances tend to be more influential than comparably positive ones. This phenomenon has been termed the negativity bias. In the current work, it was investigated whether this effect pertains to judgments of truth. That is, it was hypothesized that information valence and perceived validity should be associated such that more negative information is deemed more true. This claim was derived from the findings that negative instances tend to demand more attentional resources and that more elaborate processing can render messages more persuasive. In three experiments manipulating information valence through framing– and assessing judgments of truth – the hypothesized negativity bias was corroborated. Theoretical explanations and implications for further research are discussed.
Thesaurusschlagwörter persuasion
Klassifikation Sozialpsychologie
Freie Schlagwörter negativity bias; positive-negative asymmetry; truth judgment; validity; elaboration; framing
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2009
Seitenangabe S. 983-986
Zeitschriftentitel Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45 (2009) 4
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.04.012
Status Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)