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Fairness, price stickiness, and history dependence in decentralized trade

[Zeitschriftenartikel]

Korth, Christian; Napel, Stefan

Zitationshinweis

Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-290371

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Abstract "The paper investigates price formation in a decentralized market with random matching. Agents are assumed to have subdued social preferences: buyers, for example, prefer a lower price to a higher one but experience reduced utility increases below a reference price that serves as a common fairness benchmark. The strategic equilibrium reflects market fundamentals, but it is markedly less sensitive to the buyer-seller ratio near the fair price benchmark. Prices may be sticky around very different reference levels in markets with otherwise identical fundamentals. The implied history dependence turns out to be mitigated rather than exacerbated by friction." [auhtor's abstract]
Klassifikation Erhebungstechniken und Analysetechniken der Sozialwissenschaften; Volkswirtschaftstheorie
Freie Schlagwörter Random matching; Price stickiness; Social preferences; History dependence; Reference dependence
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2009
Seitenangabe S. 502-514
Zeitschriftentitel Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71 (2009) 2
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.010
Status Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)
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