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Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

[journal article]

Siemens, Ferdinand A. von

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Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-286081

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Abstract "In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences and thus differ in their bargaining behavior. Individual preferences are taken to be private information. Investments can then signal preferences and thereby influence beliefs and bargaining behavior. In consequence, individuals might choose high investments in order not to signal information that is unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining." [author's abstract]
Keywords fairness
Classification Applied Psychology
Free Keywords Hold-up; Relationship-specific investments; Reciprocity; Asymmetric information; Signalling;
Document language English
Publication Year 2009
Page/Pages p. 486-494
Journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71 (2009) 2
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.007
Status Postprint; peer reviewed
Licence PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)