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Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

[Zeitschriftenartikel]

Siemens, Ferdinand A. von

Zitationshinweis

Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-286081

Weitere Angaben:
Abstract "In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences and thus differ in their bargaining behavior. Individual preferences are taken to be private information. Investments can then signal preferences and thereby influence beliefs and bargaining behavior. In consequence, individuals might choose high investments in order not to signal information that is unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining." [author's abstract]
Thesaurusschlagwörter fairness
Klassifikation angewandte Psychologie
Freie Schlagwörter Hold-up; Relationship-specific investments; Reciprocity; Asymmetric information; Signalling;
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2009
Seitenangabe S. 486-494
Zeitschriftentitel Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71 (2009) 2
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.007
Status Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)
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