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Group dynamics in experimental studies - the Bertrand Paradox revisited


Bruttel, Lisa V.


Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-281155

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Abstract "Different information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects' behavior. Considering the repeated Bertrand duopoly game of Dufwenberg and Gneezy (Dufwenberg, M., Gneezy's, U., 2000. Price competition and market concentration: an experimental study. International Journal of Industrial Organization 18, 7–22.), we find that population feedback about the prices in other markets outside a subjects' own current market causes group dynamics that prevent prices from convergence to Nash equilibrium. Limited information comprising only the decisions of a subject's own opponent, in contrast, leads to competitive behavior. When we extend the number of periods from 10 to 25 in the full information treatment (FULL) we observe a very robust cyclical up and down movement of prices. We can explain tacit coordination in our experiment with an extended learning direction model and leadership by example." [author's abstract]
Thesaurusschlagwörter experiment
Klassifikation Erhebungstechniken und Analysetechniken der Sozialwissenschaften
Freie Schlagwörter Bertrand duopoly; Tacit collusion; Learning; Leadership by example
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2008
Seitenangabe S. 51-63
Zeitschriftentitel Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 69 (2008) 1
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002
Status Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)