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%T Hierarchy, opportunism in teams
%A Heijden, Eline van der
%A Potters, Jan
%A Sefton, Martin
%J Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
%N 1
%P 39-50
%V 69
%D 2008
%K leadership; team production; C9; D2; L2
%= 2012-01-03T12:51:00Z
%~ http://www.peerproject.eu/
%> https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-281136
%X We use an experiment to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation. Both arrangements are vulnerable to opportunistic incentives: under revenue-sharing team members have an incentive to free ride, while under leader-determined shares leaders have an incentive to seize team output. We find that most leaders forego the temptation to appropriate team output and manage to curtail free riding. As a result, compared to revenue-sharing, the presence of a team leader results in a significant improvement in team performance.
%C NLD
%G en
%9 journal article
%W GESIS - http://www.gesis.org
%~ SSOAR - http://www.ssoar.info