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%T Hierarchy, opportunism in teams %A Heijden, Eline van der %A Potters, Jan %A Sefton, Martin %J Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization %N 1 %P 39-50 %V 69 %D 2008 %K leadership; team production; C9; D2; L2 %= 2012-01-03T12:51:00Z %~ http://www.peerproject.eu/ %> https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-281136 %X We use an experiment to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation. Both arrangements are vulnerable to opportunistic incentives: under revenue-sharing team members have an incentive to free ride, while under leader-determined shares leaders have an incentive to seize team output. We find that most leaders forego the temptation to appropriate team output and manage to curtail free riding. As a result, compared to revenue-sharing, the presence of a team leader results in a significant improvement in team performance. %C NLD %G en %9 journal article %W GESIS - http://www.gesis.org %~ SSOAR - http://www.ssoar.info