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Hierarchy, opportunism in teams

[journal article]

Heijden, Eline van der; Potters, Jan; Sefton, Martin

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Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-281136

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Abstract We use an experiment to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation. Both arrangements are vulnerable to opportunistic incentives: under revenue-sharing team members have an incentive to free ride, while under leader-determined shares leaders have an incentive to seize team output. We find that most leaders forego the temptation to appropriate team output and manage to curtail free riding. As a result, compared to revenue-sharing, the presence of a team leader results in a significant improvement in team performance.
Keywords experiment
Classification Social Psychology; Management Science
Free Keywords leadership; team production; C9; D2; L2
Document language English
Publication Year 2008
Page/Pages p. 39-50
Journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 69 (2008) 1
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.09.007
Status Postprint; peer reviewed
Licence PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)