Export für Ihre Literaturverwaltung

Übernahme per Copy & Paste
Bibtex-Export
Endnote-Export

       

Weiterempfehlen

Bookmark and Share


Hierarchy, opportunism in teams

[Zeitschriftenartikel]

Heijden, Eline van der; Potters, Jan; Sefton, Martin

Zitationshinweis

Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-281136

Weitere Angaben:
Abstract We use an experiment to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation. Both arrangements are vulnerable to opportunistic incentives: under revenue-sharing team members have an incentive to free ride, while under leader-determined shares leaders have an incentive to seize team output. We find that most leaders forego the temptation to appropriate team output and manage to curtail free riding. As a result, compared to revenue-sharing, the presence of a team leader results in a significant improvement in team performance.
Thesaurusschlagwörter experiment
Klassifikation Sozialpsychologie; Management
Freie Schlagwörter leadership; team production; C9; D2; L2
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2008
Seitenangabe S. 39-50
Zeitschriftentitel Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 69 (2008) 1
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.09.007
Status Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)
top