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Why do firms adopt CEO stock options? Evidence from the United States

[Zeitschriftenartikel]

Tzioumis, Konstantinos

Zitationshinweis

Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-264026

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Abstract This paper examines the determinants of stock option introduction as a part of CEO compensation in listed US firms during the 1994–2004 period. The results are consistent with agency costs and recruiting considerations, suggesting that firms do not adjust CEO compensation in order to address the 'investment horizon' problem. The findings also suggest that CEO stock option adoption is not necessarily influenced by the same factors that have been found in the literature to affect the level of CEO stock option compensation and the adoption of broad-based stock option incentives. Overall, the findings provide evidence for several theoretical predictions, thus adding to our understanding of managerial incentives.
Klassifikation Management; Personalwesen
Freie Schlagwörter Stock options; CEO compensation; J33; M12; M52
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2008
Seitenangabe S. 100-111
Zeitschriftentitel Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68 (2008) 1
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2007.06.008
Status Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)
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