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Information alliances in contests with budget limits

[working paper]

Konrad, Kai A.

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Corporate Editor Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract "We study the role of information exchange through alliances in a framework with contestants who have binding budget limits and know their own budget limit but are incompletely informed about other contestants' budget limits. First, we solve for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then we consider the role of information exchange through alliances. Contestants learn the budget limits of all players who are within the same alliance, and then decide independently about their own contest efforts. This type of alliance formation is beneficial for alliance members and neutral for players who do not belong to the alliance. Also, a merger between alliances is beneficial for their members. Further, we consider merger between alliances and discuss the set of stable combinations of alliances." (author's abstract)
Keywords information; information exchange; budget; enterprise; organizations; microeconomic factors; behavior; merger; communication; information flow; competition
Classification Political Economy
Free Keywords contest; budget limits; incomplete information; alliances; information sharing; D72; D74
Document language English
Publication Year 2010
City Berlin
Page/Pages 25 p.
Series Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Forschungsprofessur und Projekt The Future of Fiscal Federalism, 2010-21
Licence Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications
data provider This metadata entry was indexed by the Special Subject Collection Social Sciences, USB Cologne