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Ticket-splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules : evidence from Germany

[journal article]

Gschwend, Thomas

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Abstract "There is more to strategic voting than simply avoiding wasting one’s vote if one is liberated from the corset of studying voting behavior in plurality systems. Mixed electoral systems provide different voters with diverse incentives to cast a strategic vote.They not only determine the degree of strategic voting, but also the kind of strategies voters employ. Strategic voters employ either a wasted-vote or a coalition insurance strategy, but do not automatically cast their vote for large parties as the current literature suggest. This has important implications for the consolidation of party systems. Moreover, even when facing the same institutional incentives, voters vary in their proclivity to vote strategically." (author's abstract)
Keywords Federal Republic of Germany; voting behavior; majority election; election by proportional representation; voter; strategy; coalition; electoral system; decision making process
Classification Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture
Document language English
Publication Year 2007
Page/Pages 1–23 p.
Journal European Journal of Political Research, 46 (2007) 1
Licence Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications
data provider This metadata entry was indexed by the Special Subject Collection Social Sciences, USB Cologne