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Ticket-splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules : evidence from Germany

[Zeitschriftenartikel]

Gschwend, Thomas

Zitationshinweis

Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-257881

Weitere Angaben:
Abstract "There is more to strategic voting than simply avoiding wasting one’s vote if one is liberated from the corset of studying voting behavior in plurality systems. Mixed electoral systems provide different voters with diverse incentives to cast a strategic vote.They not only determine the degree of strategic voting, but also the kind of strategies voters employ. Strategic voters employ either a wasted-vote or a coalition insurance strategy, but do not automatically cast their vote for large parties as the current literature suggest. This has important implications for the consolidation of party systems. Moreover, even when facing the same institutional incentives, voters vary in their proclivity to vote strategically." (author's abstract)
Thesaurusschlagwörter Federal Republic of Germany; voting behavior; majority election; election by proportional representation; voter; strategy; coalition; electoral system; decision making process
Klassifikation politische Willensbildung, politische Soziologie, politische Kultur
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2007
Seitenangabe 1–23 S.
Zeitschriftentitel European Journal of Political Research, 46 (2007) 1
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00641.x
Lizenz Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung
Datenlieferant Dieser Metadatensatz wurde vom Sondersammelgebiet Sozialwissenschaften (USB Köln) erstellt.
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