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Strategic coalition voting : evidence from Austria

Strategisches Koalitionswählen: Befunde aus Österreich
[journal article]

Meffert, Michael F.; Gschwend, Thomas

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Abstract "Strategic coalition voting assumes that voters cast their vote in a way that maximizes the probability that a preferred coalition will be formed after the election. We identify three decision contexts that provide incentives for strategic coalition voting: (1) a rental vote of a major party supporter in favor of a preferred junior coalition partner perceived as uncertain to pass a minimum vote threshold, (2) avoiding a wasted vote for the preferred small party that is not expected to pass the minimum vote threshold, and (3) explicit strategic coalition voting to influence the composition and/or portfolio of the next coalition government. The results based on a nationally representative survey conducted before the 2006 Austrian general election generally support these hypotheses." (author's abstract)
Keywords Austria; coalition; election; voting behavior; election result; decision; strategy; party supporter; coalition formation; coalition policy; influence; formation of a government; party in power; preference
Classification Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture
Method descriptive study; empirical; quantitative empirical
Free Keywords Strategic voting; Coalitions; Electoral expectations; Rational choice; Proportional representation
Document language English
Publication Year 2010
Page/Pages p. 339-349
Journal Electoral Studies, 29 (2010) 3
Licence Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications
data provider This metadata entry was indexed by the Special Subject Collection Social Sciences, USB Cologne