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Strategic voting in proportional systems: the case of Finland

[conference paper]

Gschwend, Thomas; Stoiber, Michael; Günther, Mareen

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Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-257735

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Abstract "In this paper we make a case that strategic voting can be observed and predicted even in PR systems. Contrary to the literature we do not see weak institutional incentive structures as indicative of a hopeless endeavor for studying strategic voting. The crucial question for strategic voting is how institutional incentives constrain an individual's decision-making process. Based on expected utility maximization we put forward a micro-logic of an individual’s expectation formation process as a function of situational and dispositional factors. All well-known situational incentives to vote strategically that get channeled through the district magnitude are moderated by dispositional factors in order to become relevant for voting decisions. Employing district-level data from Finland – because of its electoral system a particularly hard testing ground - we find considerable evidence for predictive implications of our theory." (author's abstract)
Keywords election; voting behavior; decision making; electoral system; election by proportional representation; electoral district; parliamentary election; Finland; voting; strategy; utility; maximization
Classification Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture
Document language English
Publication Year 2004
City Mannheim
Page/Pages 24 p.
Licence Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications
data provider This metadata entry was indexed by the Special Subject Collection Social Sciences, USB Cologne