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Coalition signals as cues for party and coalition preferences

[Konferenzbeitrag]

Meffert, Michael F.; Gschwend, Thomas

Zitationshinweis

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Abstract "Coalition signals can offer crucial information to voters during political campaigns. In multiparty systems, they reduce the number of theoretically possible coalitions to a much smaller set of plausible and likely coalitions. Strategic voters who care more about the formation of the next coalition government than supporting the preferred party might, for example, defect from the preferred party in favor of another party that might produce a more desirable coalition government. For other voters, coalition signals might merely elicit affective responses which can shift the vote. In this study, we investigate whether and how different coalition signals affect vote intentions and activate different party and coalition preferences. We report the results of a nationally representative survey experiment conducted before the 2006 Austrian General Election. Respondents encountered four vignettes with hypothetical coalitions, each followed by the standard vote intention question. The results indicate that voters are responsive to coalition signals, and especially voters with two preferred parties tend to change their vote intentions. Finally, a more detailed look at Green Party voters suggests that individual party and coalition preferences help to explain the direction of these changes." (authors abstract)
Thesaurusschlagwörter multi-party system; coalition; coalition formation; election; voting behavior; strategy; party; preference; Austria
Klassifikation politische Willensbildung, politische Soziologie, politische Kultur
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2010
Erscheinungsort Mannheim
Seitenangabe 26 S.
Lizenz Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung
Datenlieferant Dieser Metadatensatz wurde vom Sondersammelgebiet Sozialwissenschaften (USB Köln) erstellt.
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