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Irrationality in English Auctions


Gonçalves, Ricardo


Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-253787

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Abstract This paper explores the effects of a particular form of irrational behaviour by participating bidders in a common value English auction. We allow bidders to update their expected valuation of the good as the current price increases, assuming that their opponents always play the symmetric Nash equilibrium. When only one bidder adopts this type of behaviour, it is ambiguous whether the final auction price is higher or lower than at the symmetric equilibrium. However, when both bidders behave irrationally, the final auction price is never lower than the symmetric equilibrium provided bidders “match” their strategies.
Klassifikation Allgemeine Psychologie
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2008
Seitenangabe S. 180-192
Zeitschriftentitel Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67 (2008) 1
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.10.002
Status Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)