Is the use of bank debt as a governance mechanism conditioned by the financial system? The cases of Chile and Spain

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[Zeitschriftenartikel]

Saona, Paolo; Vallelado, Eleuterio

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Abstract	We test whether the use of bank debt as a governance mechanism is conditioned by the financial system in which firms operate. Our results indicate that the legal and institutional environment determines the use of bank debt to finance growth opportunities. Firms use bank debt to finance their growth opportunities when the country’s banking system contributes to solving agency and asymmetric information problems and avoiding information monopoly costs. The evolutionary process of the financial systems in each country means that market imperfections such as information asymmetry or agency costs can have a diverse influence on firms’ bank debt decisions.
Klassifikation	Finanzwirtschaft, Rechnungswesen
Freie Schlagwörter	Bank debt; Financial system; Growth opportunities; Ownership structure
Sprache Dokument	Englisch
Publikationsjahr	2010
Seitenangabe	S. 1709-1726
Zeitschriftentitel	Applied Economics, 42 (2010) 13
DOI	http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036840701736065
Status	Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz	PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)