Volltext herunterladen
(426.8 KB)
Zitationshinweis
Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-248082
Export für Ihre Literaturverwaltung
On the stability of Cournot equilibrium when the number of competitors increases
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract This article reconsiders whether the Cournot equilibrium really becomes a perfect competition equilibrium when the number of competitors goes to infinity. It has been questioned whether the equilibrium remains stable with an increasing number of firms. Contraindications were given for linear and for... mehr
This article reconsiders whether the Cournot equilibrium really becomes a perfect competition equilibrium when the number of competitors goes to infinity. It has been questioned whether the equilibrium remains stable with an increasing number of firms. Contraindications were given for linear and for isoelastic demand functions. However, marginal costs were then taken as constant, which means adding more potentially infinite-sized firms. As we want to compare cases with few large firms to cases with many small firms, the model is tuned so as to incorporate capacity limits, decreasing with an increasing number of firms. Then destabilization is avoided.... weniger
Klassifikation
Volkswirtschaftslehre
Freie Schlagwörter
Cournot oligopoly; Capacity limits; Stability
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2008
Seitenangabe
S. 445-456
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 66 (2008) 3-4
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.010
Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)