Rent-sharing and collective wage contracts - evidence from German establishment-level data

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Guertzgen, Nicole

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Abstract	Using German establishment-level data, this paper analyses whether wages respond to firm-specific profitability conditions. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the extent of rent-sharing varies with collective bargaining coverage. In this context, two conflicting hypotheses are tested. The first one asserts that unions exploit their bargaining power at the firm-level and appropriate a larger share of rents than the bargaining parties in uncovered firms. The second one states that unions favour a compressed intra-industry wage structure and suppress the responsiveness of wages to firm-specific profitability conditions.\ The empirical analysis provides strong support for the second hypothesis. While pooled OLS estimates yield positive estimates of the rent-sharing coefficient in covered establishments, dynamic panel data estimates accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity of rents point to a rent-sharing coefficient of zero.
Klassifikation	Einkommenspolitik, Lohnpolitik, Tarifpolitik, Vermögenspolitik
Sprache Dokument	Englisch
Publikationsjahr	2009
Seitenangabe	S. 2835-2854
Zeitschriftentitel	Applied Economics, 42 (2009) 22
DOI	http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036840801964708
Status	Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz	PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)