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Mergers and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets

[Zeitschriftenartikel]

Granier, Laurent; Trinquard, Sébastien

Zitationshinweis

Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgenden Persistent Identifier (PID):http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-242012

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Abstract After patent expirations in pharmaceutical markets, brand-name laboratories are threatened by generic firms' entry. To fill the gap in the theoretical literature on this topic, we study brand-name firms' incentives either to deter entry, or to merge with the entrant. These strategies are considered along with the possibility of the brand-name firm producing its own generic drug, called a pseudo-generic drug. Using a vertical differentiation model with Bertrand-Stackelberg competition, we show that each strategy, merging and deterring entry, may be Nash equilibrium, according to the generic firm's setup cost level and to the rate of discount.
Klassifikation Allgemeines, spezielle Theorien und "Schulen", Methoden, Entwicklung und Geschichte der Wirtschaftswissenschaften; Wirtschaftssektoren
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2009
Seitenangabe S. 297-309
Zeitschriftentitel Applied Economics, 42 (2009) 3
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036840701604495
ISSN 1466-4283
Status Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)
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