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A result similar to the Odlyzko's "Paris Metro Pricing"


Marin de Montmarin, Maxime de


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Abstract We investigate the two-stage competition in which two Internet Service Providers chosse sequentially their capacities and then their prices while facing a flow of new customers who decide to belong to one ISP or the other on the basis of a comparison of access prices and of expected congestion rates. At the equilibrium of the game a vertical differentiation between the Internet Service Providers endogenously emerges: the firm which provides the larger network has the lowest rate of congestion and the highest access price. The I.S.P providing the smallest network (thus the most congested) earns the larger profit. It will be noticed that the spontaneous functioning of oligopolistic competition produces a result similar to the Odlyzko's "Paris Metro Pricing": at the equilibrium the two competitors propose different prices and rates of congestion, the most expensive one being also the least congested.
Klassifikation Wirtschaftssektoren; Betriebswirtschaftslehre
Freie Schlagwörter Congestion; Internet Service Providers
Sprache Dokument Englisch
Publikationsjahr 2006
Seitenangabe S. 1821-1824
Zeitschriftentitel Applied Economics, 38 (2006) 15
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036840500426967
Status Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)