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The Council Presidency : power broker or burden? An emperical analysis

[journal article]

Warntjen, Andreas

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Abstract The potential impact of the EU Council Presidency on legislative decision-making has been frequently identified. This article provides an empirical analysis of the Presidency's influence on decision outcomes based on a large-n data set. Two counterfactuals are used to represent consensual decision-making and hard bargaining in the Council. The role of supranational actors is controlled for directly. The findings show that a member state benefits from holding the Presidency during the final stages of the legislative proceedings. Besides the support of supranational actors, the regression analysis controls for the voting threshold, the type of proposal and salience.
Classification Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture; European Politics
Free Keywords Council of the European Union; Council Presidency; EU legislation; power;
Document language English
Publication Year 2008
Page/Pages p. 315-338
Journal European Union Politics, 9 (2008) 3
Status Postprint; peer reviewed
Licence PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)