More documents from Hausemer, Pierre
More documents from European Union Politics

Export to your Reference Manger

Please Copy & Paste



Bookmark and Share

Participation and Political Competition in Committee Report Allocation : Under what conditions do MEPs Represent their Constituents?

[journal article]

Hausemer, Pierre

fulltextDownloadDownload full text

(172 KByte)

Citation Suggestion

Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:

Further Details
Abstract The paper models the consequences of committee report allocation for political representation in the European Parliament (EP). The range of legislators involved in each policy area affects the values, interests and constituencies that the Parliament represents. Thus, representation is defined as an MEP’s participation in salient policy areas. The allocation of salient reports follows inter-and intra-party group dynamics. First, party groups compete for salient reports in a context of open voting rules in committee and plenum. Second, group coordinators distribute these reports among their MEPs in an attempt to maximize the cohesion of the group. The model is tested on data from the fifth European Parliament (1999-2002). The results confirm the impact of selective participation on political representation. The EP has evolved into a ‘normal’ Parliament featuring coalitions and competition along a left-right cleavage across party groups and a hierarchical allocation of legislative spoils within parties.
Classification Political Process, Elections, Political Sociology, Political Culture; European Politics
Free Keywords European Parliament; legislative behaviour; party competition; report allocation; representation;
Document language English
Publication Year 2006
Page/Pages p. 505-530
Journal European Union Politics, 7 (2006) 4
Status Postprint; peer reviewed
Licence PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)